Palmer v Western Australia

High Court of Australia · 2021

Constitutional LawSection 92

Palmer v Western Australia [2021] HCA 5

A Queensland company chairman was refused entry to Western Australia during COVID-19 and took s 92 to the High Court. He lost, but the reasons reset what the section says about people crossing a border.

What happened?

On 15 March 2020 the Western Australian Minister for Emergency Services declared a state of emergency over the whole State in respect of the COVID-19 pandemic, under s 56 of the Emergency Management Act 2005 (WA), and the Commissioner of Police, as State Emergency Coordinator, issued the Quarantine (Closing the Border) Directions, which took effect from 5 April 2020 [1]. Under para 4 a person could not enter Western Australia unless an “exempt traveller” [7].

The first plaintiff, a Queensland resident who travelled to Western Australia for business and other purposes, had his application to enter as an exempt traveller refused; the second plaintiff was a company with iron ore interests and litigation in the State [10]-[11]. They sought a declaration that the Act or the Directions infringed s 92, claiming a burden on interstate intercourse and, alternatively, a discriminatory burden of protectionist effect on trade and commerce [12]-[13]. Facts about the need for and efficacy of the measures were found on remitter by Rangiah J in the Federal Court [15]-[23], and a special case was stated for the Full Court [24].

What did the Court decide?

On 6 November 2020 the Court answered the question reserved: ss 56 and 67 of the Act, in their application to an emergency constituted by the occurrence of a hazard in the nature of a plague or epidemic, comply with s 92 in each of its limbs, and the exercise of power to make paras 4 and 5 of the Directions does not raise a constitutional question. The plaintiffs were ordered to pay the costs [25]. The reasons were published on 24 February 2021, and a bench of five delivered four sets of reasons: Kiefel CJ and Keane J jointly, then Gageler J, Gordon J and Edelman J separately.

Kiefel CJ and Keane J, Gageler J and Gordon J treated the constitutional question as one about the Act’s authorising provisions rather than about the Directions made under them [63]-[67], [127], [201]-[202]; Edelman J also treated validity as a question about the empowering statute [224], assessed at a level of generality higher than the Directions but more particular than all applications of the provisions [234].

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The intercourse limb and discrimination. Kiefel CJ and Keane J, Gageler J, Gordon J and Edelman J each treat the intercourse limb as concerned with discriminatory burdens, not every burden on interstate movement. Kiefel CJ and Keane J observed at [40] that there had been no occasion since Cole v Whitfield fully to consider the distinction between the freedoms, so this is the case in which the intercourse limb was worked through.

Kiefel CJ and Keane J at [50]: a law “directed to discriminating against, or in fact discriminates against, interstate movement is invalid as contrary to s 92 unless it is justified by reference to a non-discriminatory purpose”, and it may be justified “if it goes no further than is reasonably necessary to achieve a legitimate object, as this Court held in Betfair No 1”. They accepted at [48] Queensland’s submission that discrimination should be required for both limbs. Their Honours compare the effects of a law on interstate movement with its effects on intrastate movement [47], and hold that it is not necessary that the law favour intrastate movement [72].

Gageler J at [114]: the intercourse limb is “a guarantee that interstate intercourse is to be absolutely free from discriminatory burdens of any kind”. His Honour read the earlier AMS v AIF and APLA formulations (“reasonably required”) as indistinguishable in substance from reasonable necessity, and said at [113] of APLA that “Neither the outcome nor the reasoning therefore stands in the way of now recognising the intercourse limb to be confined to discriminatory burdens”, because no argument had been put there that a burden need not be justified if it was not differential.

He is the only Justice who addresses APLA in those terms. Kiefel CJ and Keane J noted at [49] that the cases framing the test as “reasonably required” predate Betfair No 1 and did not state a preference between formulations; Gordon J saw no difference of substance between “reasonably required” and “reasonably necessary” [193]. None said that APLA was overruled.

Gordon J at [188]: laws that restrict both interstate and intrastate intercourse without a differential burden would, on a limb not confined to differential burdens, give interstate movement a privilege over intrastate movement, and so “the burden on interstate trade, commerce and intercourse must be a differential one”. Where there is no differential burden, “that is the end of the inquiry” [190]. For her Honour the discrimination in the trade and commerce limb is protectionist and in the intercourse limb is between intrastate and interstate movement [184].

Edelman J at [241]: the test for the intercourse limb “should involve an enquiry into whether the impugned law, without justification, discriminates between States by burdening one State more than another”. His Honour included discrimination between two other States, not only between the local State and others [249].

On Cole v Whitfield’s remarks about a personal freedom to pass between the States, Kiefel CJ and Keane J said it was “not fully explained” why the notion of a right of persons to pass between the States was retained [42], Gageler J said the remarks cannot be taken to suggest an individual right [105], and Edelman J said that the approach there, which saw s 92 as guaranteeing more than freedom from discriminatory burdens, “should not be followed” [241].

The method of justification. The Court was divided on how a discriminatory burden is justified, and the orders were the same. Kiefel CJ and Keane J would apply the three stages of structured proportionality to a s 92 burden, including adequacy in the balance [52]-[62]; Edelman J would too, confining invalidation at the balancing stage to extreme circumstances [275]-[276], [288]-[291]. Gageler J rejected it (“Nothing is broken; nothing should be fixed” [151]) and Gordon J said that the inquiries “are not assisted by adopting structured proportionality as a tool of analysis” and that s 92 “neither permits nor requires” its balancing stage [198]-[199]; both kept reasonable necessity as an evaluative standard. Kiefel CJ and Keane J accepted that the restrictions were severe and that the importance of protecting health and life justified them [81].

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Kiefel CJ and Keane J

Read judgment: [50] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab), [72] (PDF p 30) (opens in a new tab), [81] (PDF p 32) (opens in a new tab)

Their test of discrimination and justification supplies the ground on which they upheld the empowering provisions in their application to a plague or epidemic. They identified a discriminatory burden in the application of s 67 and required its justification; the public health purpose justified the severe restriction. This does not make every burden on movement invalid.

Separate reasoning · Gageler J

Read judgment: [97] (PDF p 36) (opens in a new tab), [166] (PDF p 60) (opens in a new tab)

Concurring in the result, Gageler J treated discrimination as an unjustified differential burden, with reasonable necessity as the standard of justification. Applying that standard to the cumulative statutory constraints explained his conclusion that the empowering provisions complied with both limbs. His formulation supports the shared discrimination requirement without adopting the joint reasons in full.

Separate reasoning · Gordon J

Read judgment: [190] (PDF p 70) (opens in a new tab), [192] (PDF p 71) (opens in a new tab), [210] (PDF p 80) (opens in a new tab)

Concurring in the result, Gordon J required a differential burden favouring intrastate movement, then asked whether it was reasonably necessary for a legitimate object. Her conclusion that the provisions imposed no unjustified differential burden applied that framework to uphold their relevant operation. Her comparison is stated separately because the formulations of discrimination differ between the judgments.

Separate reasoning · Edelman J

Read judgment: [241] (PDF p 93) (opens in a new tab), [265] (PDF p 104) (opens in a new tab), [282] (PDF p 110) (opens in a new tab)

Concurring in the result, Edelman J aligned the intercourse limb with freedom from unjustified discrimination between States. Reasonable necessity was part of his structured justification analysis, applied to the statutory restrictions to uphold the provisions in their limited application. His route includes a further balancing inquiry, so the shared requirement of reasonable necessity does not imply agreement that it alone suffices.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Kiefel CJ and Keane J

Read judgment: [62] (PDF p 27) (opens in a new tab), [81] (PDF p 32) (opens in a new tab)

Structured proportionality was their stated test for justification and was used to decide validity. They separately assessed adequacy in the balance, explaining why legitimate purpose and the absence of reasonable alternatives did not automatically discharge that stage. Protecting health and life justified the severe restriction. Edelman J also adopted three stages, giving this methodological position three votes, but Gageler J and Gordon J did not adopt it.

Separate reasoning · Edelman J

Read judgment: [265] (PDF p 104) (opens in a new tab), [288] (PDF p 112) (opens in a new tab), [291] (PDF p 113) (opens in a new tab)

Concurring in the result and agreeing with the use of three stages, Edelman J presented his own formulation: invalidity at the balancing stage was confined to exceptional circumstances. He applied that stage and found the public health purpose sufficient to justify the burden. His separate reasoning supports the three-to-two division without attributing his precise account of balancing to the joint judgment.

Separate reasoning · Gageler J

Read judgment: [139] (PDF p 52) (opens in a new tab), [151] (PDF p 56) (opens in a new tab), [166] (PDF p 60) (opens in a new tab)

Gageler J concurred in the orders but rejected incorporating structured proportionality into s 92. He retained reasonable necessity as an evaluative standard and found it satisfied by the cumulative statutory constraints. This is a distinct route to the same result, rather than a dissent in the disposition or adoption of the three-stage method.

Separate reasoning · Gordon J

Read judgment: [198] (PDF p 75) (opens in a new tab), [199] (PDF p 76) (opens in a new tab), [210] (PDF p 80) (opens in a new tab)

Gordon J concurred in the orders but rejected structured proportionality as an aid to the inquiry and rejected its additional balancing stage. Her inquiry characterised the law by its objects and whether its differential burden was reasonably necessary; that inquiry led to her conclusion that the provisions were not discriminatory. Agreement in the result therefore did not resolve the methodological disagreement.

Why does this case matter?

It is the case that students most often meet through its facts, and the facts are the trap. A border closure that survives a challenge in a pandemic invites a general conclusion about border closures, or about health prevailing over free movement. The report supports neither as a general statement. How far a measure is justified was decided on a particular evidential record: the findings Rangiah J made in August 2020 about a new disease [16]-[17], with Kiefel CJ and Keane J noting that circumstances had changed since his Honour’s assessments and that nothing turned on it [20].

It also matters for how it is cited. Before attributing a point from this report, check whether one Justice makes it or several do: a point only one set of reasons makes belongs to that Justice.

Exam and application relevance

Which limb does the problem engage? For a restriction on people or communications crossing a border, identify the relevant comparison under each set of reasons. How would each approach deal with a law that burdens interstate and intrastate movement alike? What further inquiry, if any, would follow, and how would you explain the competing methods?

If the problem also concerns trade and commerce, compare the Justices’ treatment of that limb and identify any question left unresolved. Keep the two limbs distinct when explaining your answer.

When a problem turns on APLA or AMS v AIF, identify what each set of reasons says about the earlier decision. Does the passage support the use you propose to make of it?

Check your understanding

1. Identify the Justices’ positions on structured proportionality for s 92. Which stage did Gordon J address separately, and how did her approach compare with the other reasons?

2. A State law restricts travel between its own regional towns and across its border in identical terms. Using paragraph [188] of Gordon J’s reasons, explain where the law stands in relation to the intercourse limb.

3. What did the Justices say about APLA and the “reasonably required” formulation, and which of them addressed APLA’s outcome and reasoning?