Babet v Commonwealth of Australia; Palmer v Commonwealth of Australia

High Court of Australia · 2025

Constitutional LawImplied Freedom Of Political Communication

Babet v Commonwealth of Australia; Palmer v Commonwealth of Australia [2025] HCA 21

A political party deregistered itself, then asked for its name back on the ballot paper before the next election. The High Court’s orders were unanimous. The reasons were not.

What happened?

The United Australia Party (UAP) was registered as a political party under Pt XI of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) until it was voluntarily deregistered under s 135(1) on 8 September 2022 ([4], [60]). While registered it had to file annual returns disclosing its receipts, payments and debts, which the Australian Electoral Commission published on a Transparency Register ([17]-[19], [59]). Section 135(3) provides that a party deregistered under s 135(1) is “ineligible for registration under this Part until after the general election next following the deregistration” ([23]).

On 29 November 2024 Senator Ralph Babet applied for the UAP to be registered again, and the application was refused because of s 135(3) ([5], [61]). Senator Babet and Mr Favager (the UAP’s National Director), and separately Mr Clive Palmer (who owned the registered trade marks the UAP used), commenced proceedings in the High Court’s original jurisdiction, and the parties agreed special cases stating questions of law for the Full Court ([5]-[7]). The questions asked whether s 135(3) was invalid because it impaired the “direct choice by the people” required by ss 7 and 24 of the Constitution, because it impermissibly discriminated against candidates of a party that had deregistered voluntarily, or because it infringed the implied freedom of political communication ([8]).

What did the Court decide?

The Court heard the matters on 7 February 2025, answered each of the first three questions “No” on 12 February 2025, ordered that no relief issue, and ordered the plaintiffs to pay the costs; the reasons were published on 14 May 2025 (cover page; [8]). Seven Justices sat. There were six sets of reasons: Gageler CJ and Jagot J jointly ([1]-[58]), Gordon J ([59]-[128]), Edelman J ([129]-[204]), Steward J ([205]-[212]), Gleeson J ([213]-[235]) and Beech-Jones J ([236]-[261]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

In the implied freedom of political communication enquiry, Gageler CJ and Jagot J said that structured proportionality “can be a way of organising reasons”, that “[t]he flexible application of all or any of the steps of structured proportionality is to be understood as a ‘tool of analysis’”, and that “express or ritual invocation” of its steps “is by no means necessary in every case” ([49]). They also said that “[d]ebate about the best way in which to ascertain if the implied freedom of political communication has been infringed says nothing about the legitimacy of the principle” ([49]).

Gordon J agreed with [49] on structured proportionality and did not consider it “necessary (or helpful)” to apply the three steps in dealing with the implied freedom in this case ([72]; see also [118]). Beech-Jones J agreed with Gageler CJ and Jagot J “in relation to ‘structured proportionality’ and the implied freedom of political communication” ([242]). That is four of the seven Justices. Edelman J took a different view and held that “[e]ven as a ‘tool of analysis’, structured proportionality has precedential value” ([177]) and said it was his “present duty of fidelity to precedent” to apply it in its most coherent form until a majority accepts a submission that it should be abolished ([184]).

Steward J agreed with Edelman J “that the doctrine is binding on this Court unless and until it is overruled” ([211]). Gleeson J, for her part, agreed with Gageler CJ and Jagot J for the answers to the questions, subject to what she went on to say ([213]), did not address [49], and applied the necessity and adequacy-in-balance steps ([231]-[234]). The Justices who addressed the status of the test therefore divided, and the orders were reached by different routes.

Section 135(3) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth), which makes a political party that has voluntarily deregistered under s 135(1) ineligible for registration until after the general election next following the deregistration, was held not invalid on any of the three grounds stated: impairing direct choice under ss 7 and 24, impermissible discrimination, or infringing the implied freedom of political communication.

Informed choice. Gageler CJ and Jagot J held that s 135(3) imposes an effective burden on informed choice, properly characterised as substantial from the voter’s perspective ([44]-[46]), and that the burden was reasonably appropriate and adapted because there is a rational connection between it and the contemporary transparency purpose ([50]-[53]). They said that whether such a burden is justified “cannot be reduced to a formula” and “covers a spectrum of potentially sufficient connections from a ‘rational connection’ to a ‘compelling justification’” ([48]).

The other Justices differed on the size of the burden: Gordon J thought it “very slight” ([91]); Edelman J “narrow” and “shallow” ([195]-[197]); Steward J could not agree that there was “any burden, or even a slight burden” ([207]); Gleeson J thought its scope “particularly narrow” but its consequences significant where it applies ([221]); Beech-Jones J agreed with Gageler CJ and Jagot J that there was an effective burden ([244]). Steward J, finding no burden to justify, found it unnecessary to consider justification ([210]); each other Justice held, or said that if there were a burden it would be, that the burden was justified ([53], [94], [198], [235], [245]).

Implied freedom. Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ held that Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission (2004) 220 CLR 181 foreclosed a burden on the implied freedom, because the claimed freedom did not exist independently of the statutory entitlement to have party affiliation on the ballot paper, and refused leave to reopen it ([97]-[98], [203], [205], [209]). Gageler CJ and Jagot J, Gleeson J and Beech-Jones J did not entertain reopening Mulholland because it would not be dispositive: even on the plaintiffs’ premise, the justification for the burden on informed choice would equally justify any burden on the freedom ([56], [235], [259]). So no majority decided whether Mulholland is correct.

Discrimination. Gageler CJ and Jagot J rejected the proposed further limitation against impermissible discrimination between candidates ([41]-[43]); Beech-Jones J agreed that the premise could not be accepted ([248], [250]); Gleeson J agreed that it failed for the reasons Gageler CJ and Jagot J gave ([217]); Edelman J found no basis in the text for such an implication ([190]). Gordon J did not decide whether such an implication exists, because s 135(3) was not discriminatory in any event ([128]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Classification unresolved · Gageler CJ and Jagot J; Gordon J; Beech-Jones J

Read judgment: [49] (PDF p 24) (opens in a new tab), [72] (PDF p 33) (opens in a new tab), [242] (PDF p 101) (opens in a new tab)

Four Justices endorsed flexible use of structured proportionality. Their agreement is significant, but counting agreement does not establish that the whole methodological statement was necessary to the decision. It explains the joint reasons’ approach to justification, whereas Gordon J disposed of the implied-freedom challenge at the burden stage. The statement about the legitimacy of the implication also extends beyond what was needed to reject these challenges. Treat the passage as an attributed view with this qualification, rather than an unqualified majority ratio abolishing a binding test.

Obiter · Edelman J

Read judgment: [177] (PDF p 75) (opens in a new tab), [184] (PDF p 79) (opens in a new tab)

Edelman J concurred in the orders but defended the precedential force of structured proportionality. That defence was unnecessary to his rejection of the implied-freedom challenge because he found no burden on an independently existing freedom. His account of what earlier decisions require is his own observation here; it does not become Babet’s ratio merely because it describes those earlier decisions as binding.

Obiter · Steward J

Read judgment: [210]–[212] (PDF p 88) (opens in a new tab)

Steward J concurred in the result and expressly found it unnecessary to consider justification because no burden existed. His ensuing defence of structured proportionality and agreement with Edelman J therefore did not determine his answer to the challenge. The extended quotation in this discussion is from LibertyWorks; the endorsement and statement of what he would have done are Steward J’s own observations.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Gageler CJ and Jagot J

Read judgment: [50]–[53] (PDF p 25) (opens in a new tab)

For these joint reasons, the connection between the restriction on reregistration and continuing financial disclosure supplied the justification necessary to reject the informed-choice challenge. Their consideration of alternative means formed part of that conclusion. This identifies the ground used by these two Justices; it does not make their description of the burden’s magnitude the view of the whole Court.

Ratio · Gageler CJ and Jagot J; Gleeson J; Beech-Jones J

Read judgment: [56] (PDF p 26) (opens in a new tab), [235] (PDF p 97) (opens in a new tab), [259] (PDF p 106) (opens in a new tab)

These four Justices rejected the implied-freedom challenge because even an assumed burden would be justified. That conclusion made reopening Mulholland incapable of changing the result and was necessary to their refusal to entertain it. The ratio on this ground concerns justification of the restriction in this statutory scheme, not a determination that Mulholland was correct or incorrect. Gleeson J reached the justification conclusion through her own proportionality analysis.

Separate reasoning · Gordon J

Read judgment: [97] (PDF p 43) (opens in a new tab)

Gordon J concurred in the orders but took a distinct route on the implied freedom: the claimed communication depended on a statutory entitlement, whose conditions did not burden an independently existing freedom. Applying Mulholland was a necessary step in her route to rejecting this challenge. That route must be distinguished from the four Justices’ assumed-burden justification reasoning; it is not a majority endorsement of Mulholland’s correctness.

Why does this case matter?

Babet is the case a student is most likely to meet as a one-line citation for a point of method in the implied freedom. Use it as a source of passages to attribute, not as a rule to recite: marks go to the answer that says whose words a sentence is and how far they carry.

Its facts also fit a recurring problem-question shape: a challenge to electoral regulation such as registration, the content of a ballot paper, or disclosure. In that shape, look for what the claimant opted into and what consequence the statute attached to its own choice, then ask which constitutional limit the challenger actually invokes.

Exam and application relevance

For an electoral regulation problem, identify the constitutional constraint invoked by each challenge. Explain how the party’s registration history, the timing of the application and the disclosure requirements bear on the argument you are assessing.

Distinguish agreement in the orders from agreement in reasoning. Locate each judge’s approach to structured proportionality and ask what support the reasons provide for the particular statement you propose to cite.

When a party asks to reopen an earlier authority, consider how that request relates to the grounds on which the present dispute could be resolved. What would changing the earlier rule contribute to the outcome sought?

For the informed-choice and discrimination arguments, compare the premises each judgment examines. Identify whose perspective your analysis adopts, and support your attribution with a passage from that judge’s reasons.

Check your understanding

1. Which Justices agreed with [49] on structured proportionality? Which two Justices expressed a contrary view, and what did Gleeson J do? Give a pinpoint for each.

2. The Court’s orders were unanimous. Why does that not tell you what the Court held about the test for the implied freedom?

3. Which Justices declined to entertain reopening Mulholland, and why? How did their approach differ from that of the other Justices?

4. A student writes that Babet held the High Court no longer applies structured proportionality. Identify what is wrong and rewrite it accurately.