Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Wardley

High Court of Australia · 1980

Constitutional LawFederalism

Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Wardley (1980) 142 CLR 237; [1980] HCA 8

Ansett did not want a woman as a trainee pilot, and said a federal pilots’ agreement let it dismiss pilots on short notice for any reason. Could Victoria’s equal opportunity law still bind it?

What happened?

Mrs Wardley applied to Ansett in 1976 for employment as a pilot and was rejected in July 1978. She complained to the Equal Opportunity Board under the Equal Opportunity Act 1977 (Vic) that Ansett had discriminated against her on the ground of sex (at 257). On 19 June 1979 the Board ordered Ansett to refrain from further discrimination against her, to engage her as a trainee pilot by its next intake and to pay damages of $14,500 and $40 a day until she began to receive a salary (at 258).

Ansett took out an originating summons in the Supreme Court of Victoria, which was removed into the High Court under s 40 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) (at 268). It sought declarations that Part III of the State Act did not apply to it in deciding whether to offer her employment, in setting the terms, or in exercising “such rights to dismiss pilots as are conferred on it” by the Airline Pilots Agreement 1978 (at 271). She was enrolled as a trainee pilot on 5 November 1979, after argument had finished (at 256).

The Agreement had been certified under s 28 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth) and, under s 28(3), “has the same effect as, and shall be deemed to be, an award of the Commission” (at 257). Clause 6B made a pilot’s services terminable by seven days’ notice in the first six months and one month’s notice after that, or by payment in lieu, required written reasons for dismissal, and gave recourse to grievance procedures except during the first twelve months of service (at 245, 261). Ansett said that cl 6B gave it an unqualified right to dismiss, and that s 18(2)(b) of the State Act, which makes it unlawful to dismiss an employee on the ground of sex, was inconsistent with it (at 245).

What did the Court decide?

The originating summons was dismissed with costs (at 292). Six Justices each wrote separately. Stephen, Mason, Murphy and Wilson JJ would have refused the declarations. Barwick CJ, agreeing with Aickin J, would have granted a declaration of the kind Aickin J proposed: that Part III of the State Act would not apply to the dismissal of Mrs Wardley from her position as a trainee pilot if the dismissal occurred in accordance with the Agreement (at 244, 280).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The majority. Each of the four Justices who would refuse the declarations read the Agreement as not giving Ansett a right to dismiss on the ground of sex that the State Act could not touch, but by different routes and without joint reasons. Stephen J said the right in cl 6 is “not one which is capable of exercise regardless of the unlawfulness under State law of the ground for its exercise”, and that the question of dismissal on the discriminatory ground “is in my view no part” of whatever field the Agreement covers (at 246, 253).

Mason J said cl 6B “does not deal with the substantive right of dismissal”, which it assumes under the general law, and that the Agreement “merely assumes the right of dismissal for which the general law provides”, so that there was no direct inconsistency and no covering of the field (at 262, 264). Murphy J said the Agreement “leaves the employer to exercise such rights as it has under the general law” (at 267). Wilson J concluded that the Agreement “does not confer on Ansett the authority, subject only to other provisions of the Agreement, to terminate Mrs. Wardley’s employment because of her sex” (at 289).

Differences. Stephen J rejected the view that cl 6B governs only notice and takes the right to terminate from the general law, and treated cl 6B as providing the power of termination as well (at 254-255). Murphy J treated the first and second declarations as moot and the third as seeking an abstract ruling (at 266-267). Wilson J found no collision with the Board’s powers to order Ansett to refrain from further discrimination or to pay damages, but said that an order under the general power in s 40(2)(c) could conceivably conflict directly with the Agreement, and held a declaration inappropriate as things then stood (at 290, 292).

The dissent. Aickin J said the Agreement appeared to permit the dismissal of a pilot in the first six months on notice “upon any ground whatever”, whereas the State Act prohibited dismissal on specified grounds, which was “making unlawful that which the Agreement permits” (at 275). He treated the State Act as inconsistent also because it would set at nought a dismissal the Agreement allows, and said that the field or subject matter of the State law “is not necessarily of significance” and that “The critical matter is the field of the federal law” (at 276, 279). Barwick CJ agreed that the scope of the federal law “leaves no room for the addition of further restraints upon the employer’s ability to terminate the employment” (at 244).

Limits. The reasons concerned a pilot in her first year of service. Stephen J said whether the grievance procedures could produce inconsistency “need not now be determined” (at 256). Mason J said the situation after twelve months “may well result in direct inconsistency, though it is fraught with difficulties not explored in argument” (at 264).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Separate reasoning · Stephen J (concurring in the dismissal of the summons)

Read judgment: pp 246–249 (opens in a new tab), pp 252–253 (opens in a new tab)

Stephen J holds that cl 6B confers no right of termination capable of exercise regardless of the unlawfulness of the ground under State law, that the Agreement and the State Act concern different subject matters, and that the Agreement does not cover the field of dismissal for sex. He is in the majority on the order but his route differs from Mason and Murphy JJ: he treats cl 6B as conferring the power to terminate (254-255) but not as an absolute one.

Separate reasoning · Mason J (concurring in the dismissal of the summons)

Read judgment: pp 262–265 (opens in a new tab)

Mason J reads cl 6B as prescribing notice and procedure while assuming the right to dismiss under the general law, finds no direct inconsistency and no covering of the field of the substantive right to dismiss, and says that inconsistency may arise after twelve months because of the grievance procedures. This is his route to the order; the other majority Justices do not adopt it in terms.

Separate reasoning · Murphy J (concurring in the dismissal of the summons)

Read judgment: pp 266–267 (opens in a new tab)

Murphy J treats the first and second declarations as moot, finds no inconsistency because the Agreement leaves the employer with the rights it has under the general law, and would refuse the third declaration as an abstract ruling.

Separate reasoning · Wilson J (concurring in the dismissal of the summons)

Read judgment: pp 287–290 (opens in a new tab), p 292 (opens in a new tab)

Wilson J concludes that the Agreement does not confer authority to terminate because of sex, finds no collision with the Board’s powers in s 40(2)(a) and (b), sees a possible direct inconsistency with the power in s 40(2)(c) in a different case, and declines a declaration as inappropriate on the circumstances then existing.

Separate reasoning · Barwick CJ and Aickin J (dissenting from the order)

Read judgment: pp 243–244 (opens in a new tab), pp 275–277 (opens in a new tab), pp 279–280 (opens in a new tab)

Aickin J holds that the Agreement permitted dismissal of a pilot in the first six months on notice for any reason, that the State Act would set that at nought, and that an agreement certified under s 28 stands as an award with overriding character, so that the State law is inconsistent. Barwick CJ agrees that the scope of the federal law leaves no room for further restraints on termination and would make the declaration Aickin J proposes.

Why does this case matter?

Students asked whether a State anti-discrimination law survives a federal industrial instrument often go straight to the s 109 tests and label the conflict. This case is a reminder that there is a step before the tests, and that it was where the argument was won and lost.

Exam and application relevance

Use the case for problems in which a State law is said to be inconsistent with an award or a certified agreement. Begin with what the federal instrument actually provides, then apply the direct-conflict and covering-the-field approaches to that instrument, naming the Justice whose approach you follow.

Because the order rests on separate reasons, attribute each route to its Justice. Check how long the pilot in the problem has served, because the reasons were directed to a pilot in her first year of service. A student who relies on Mason J’s reading of cl 6B or Aickin J’s reading of the federal law should say how the other Justices reached a different conclusion.

Check your understanding

1. What did Ansett say cl 6B of the Agreement gave it, and what did s 18(2)(b) of the State Act make unlawful?

2. How did Mason J describe the effect of cl 6B, and why did that mean there was no direct inconsistency?

3. On what ground did Murphy J treat the first and second declarations differently from the third?

4. Which Justices would have made a declaration, and what was the centre of Aickin J’s reasoning?

5. Which group of pilots did Mason J think might be in a different position, and why was that not decisive here?