Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth
Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1
Parliament declared in the preamble that the Communist Party was a danger to the nation, and then dissolved it. Could the Court test those declarations, and did the Act have to be justified by a head of power at all?
What happened?
The Communist Party Dissolution Act 1950 (Cth) received the Royal Assent on 20 October 1950. Its preamble recited, in nine recitals, that the Australian Communist Party was a revolutionary party using violence, fraud, sabotage, espionage and treasonable or subversive means, and that it was causing dislocation in industries declared vital to the security and defence of Australia. The Act dissolved the Party and forfeited its property (s 4), allowed the Governor-General to declare other bodies unlawful and dissolve them where satisfied that their continued existence would be prejudicial to the security and defence of the Commonwealth or to the execution or maintenance of the Constitution or of the laws of the Commonwealth (ss 5-6), and allowed declarations that made individuals ineligible for Commonwealth employment or for office in industrial organisations in vital industries (ss 9-10).
The Party, trade unions and individuals brought eight actions for declarations that the Act was invalid. The plaintiffs denied the facts stated in the recitals, and Dixon J stated a case for the Full Court asking whether validity depended on judicial determination of those facts and whether the plaintiffs could adduce evidence denying them, and, if not, whether the Act was invalid in whole or in part.
What did the Court decide?
The case was remitted to Dixon J and the defendants were ordered to pay the plaintiffs’ costs.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
By a majority of six Justices to one, the Court held the Communist Party Dissolution Act 1950 (Cth) invalid in its entirety: it answered question 1(a) and (b) No and question 2 Yes, wholly invalid. Latham CJ dissented, and would have answered every question No, holding that it is for the Government and not for any court to identify the enemies of the Commonwealth and that the question whether a crisis requires the exercise of the defence power is one Parliament may properly determine for itself.
The Justices in the majority gave separate reasons. Dixon J held that nothing less than an extreme and exceptional extension of the defence power, of a kind that could not be justified in the conditions then prevailing, would support the provisions, and that the Act could not be upheld as incidental to the execution and maintenance of the Constitution, because it proceeded directly against particular bodies and persons by name or characterisation and left its connection with power to rest on the legislature’s own conclusion.
McTiernan J held that the recitals show Parliament’s reasons and opinions but are in no way decisive of validity, which is a judicial question, and that in time of peace Parliament’s opinion that persons are a danger could not connect the Act with defence. Williams J held that recitals cannot discharge the burden of showing that an Act is within power and are no more than a statement of Parliament’s reasons. Fullagar J held that Parliament cannot recite itself into a field locked against it by superior law.
Kitto J held that a judgment of Parliament about danger to the nation cannot enlarge the scope of any of its powers. Webb J answered question 1 differently, holding that validity depended on facts determined judicially without limitation by the recitals and that, in the absence of evidence from the defendants in support of s 4, the whole Act was invalid. Williams J reserved the validity of provisions about Commonwealth employment.
In his own reasons, Fullagar J said that the question whether the Act is valid arises for the Commonwealth Parliament only because its legislative power is limited by an instrument emanating from a superior authority, and that in our system the principle of Marbury v Madison is accepted as axiomatic, modified in varying degree in various cases, but never excluded, by the respect which the judicial organ must accord to opinions of the legislative and executive organs.
In his own reasons, Dixon J described the Constitution as an instrument framed in accordance with many traditional conceptions, to some of which it gives effect, as in separating the judicial power from other functions of government, and others of which are simply assumed, and said that among these it may fairly be said that the rule of law forms an assumption. He said this in explaining why a law which depends for its supposed connection with the incidental power on the legislature’s own conclusion, and affords no objective test of applicability, could not be a law on a matter incidental to the execution and maintenance of the Constitution.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Dixon J
Read judgment: pp 192–194 (PDF p 192) (opens in a new tab), pp 202–203 (PDF p 202) (opens in a new tab)
These passages supply two necessary steps in Dixon J’s decision against validity: the incidental power did not support this direct legislative treatment of identified bodies and persons without objective tests, and the exceptional expansion of the defence power needed to sustain it was unjustified in the prevailing conditions. The classification concerns those grounds in his reasons, rather than every statement in the combined proposition.
Ratio · McTiernan J
Read judgment: pp 206–207 (PDF p 206) (opens in a new tab)
McTiernan J rejected the assumption that communist identity itself connected the affected persons with a head of power. Parliament’s opinion of danger could not justify this control of civil liberties in the conditions of peace. That reasoning was necessary to his rejection of the defence-power justification; he also preserved the Court’s responsibility to decide constitutional validity.
Ratio · Williams J
Read judgment: p 224 (PDF p 224) (opens in a new tab)
Williams J distinguished the effect of recitals in an otherwise valid statute from their effect when legislative competence itself is disputed. His refusal to let recitals discharge the burden of establishing power was a necessary step in testing the Act independently of Parliament’s assertions. This classification does not turn his reservation about Commonwealth employment into a decision of invalidity.
Ratio · Fullagar J
Read judgment: p 263 (PDF p 263) (opens in a new tab)
The prohibition on Parliament reciting itself into power explains why the preamble could not conclusively supply the missing constitutional connection for s 4. This is Fullagar J’s own reasoning in rejecting the recitals as a sufficient foundation for validity, rather than an adoption of all his reasons by the other Justices.
Ratio · Kitto J
Read judgment: p 272 (PDF p 272) (opens in a new tab)
Kitto J distinguished Parliament’s assessment of the practical usefulness of defence measures from the Court’s duty to determine whether their legal operation fell within power. Refusing to let Parliament’s judgment of danger enlarge its powers was necessary to his independent examination of the Act’s validity.
Separate reasoning · Webb J
Read judgment: p 244 (PDF p 244) (opens in a new tab), p 248 (PDF p 248) (opens in a new tab)
Webb J concurred in invalidity but took a distinct route: the recitals did not discharge the burden of establishing the constitutional connection, and validity of s 4 depended on judicial ascertainment of facts. His answers allowed evidence, unlike the other majority answers to question 1; without defendants’ evidence supporting s 4 he concluded that the whole Act was invalid.
Separate reasoning · Latham CJ
Read judgment: p 151 (PDF p 151) (opens in a new tab)
Latham CJ dissented. He treated identification of the Commonwealth’s enemies as a responsibility of government under parliamentary and electoral control, rather than a question for judicial determination. That allocation of responsibility supported his conclusion that the Act was valid; it is the opposing reasoning, not a ground of the majority’s invalidity decision.
Proposition 2
Separate reasoning · Fullagar J
Read judgment: pp 262–263 (PDF p 262) (opens in a new tab)
Fullagar J concurred in the result. His statement about Marbury v Madison explains the constitutional premise of his ensuing scrutiny of the recitals: respect for legislative and executive opinions does not displace judicial determination of the limits of Commonwealth power. It forms part of his own route to invalidity; the broad formulation should not be treated as a separately adopted holding of all six Justices in the majority.
Proposition 3
Classification unresolved · Dixon J
Read judgment: p 193 (PDF p 193) (opens in a new tab)
Dixon J used the rule-of-law assumption within his reasoning that the incidental power could not sustain this Act’s reliance on legislative characterisation without objective tests. That rejection of the asserted power was a ground of his decision, but the general statement about the rule of law does not itself specify an independent constitutional prohibition. A binary label for the statement in isolation would conceal the distinction between its supporting role in his reasons and a freestanding rule adopted by the Court.
Why does this case matter?
The case is cited in two quite different kinds of answer. In an answer about the limits of the defence power and legislative recitals it is a decision about the validity of a particular Act. In an answer about the nature of the constitutional system it is cited for two quotable sentences, and the common error is to present those as what the Court held. Marks are lost by treating the order of the Court as if it settled every proposition any Justice stated on the way to it.
Exam and application relevance
Use the order and the dissent for the decision, and attribute each reason to the Justice who gave it. Cite the observations of Fullagar J and Dixon J as individual statements by those Justices and not as the Court’s holding. The Act was tested as at the date of the Royal Assent, and Dixon J treated the matter substantially as if a state of peace ostensibly existed, so state that limitation when using the case on the defence power.
Check your understanding
1. On who decides whether a danger to the nation calls for the exercise of the defence power, how did Latham CJ’s reasons differ from those of the majority, and how did Webb J’s answers to question 1 differ from the other majority Justices’?
2. Whose words are “Parliament cannot recite itself into a field the gates of which are locked against it by superior law”, and what did McTiernan J say about the effect of the recitals?
3. In which Justice’s reasons does the statement that the rule of law forms an assumption of the Constitution appear, and was it made as part of the order of the Court?