Unincorporated treaties and the external affairs power

Explains what an unincorporated treaty can still do in Australian administrative decisions and statutory interpretation (Teoh, Lam, Al-Kateb), and what the Commonwealth must show to implement a treaty under the external affairs power (Koowarta, Tasmanian Dam, the Industrial Relations Act case).

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
au-commonwealth, nsw, vic, qld, wa, sa, tas, nt, act
Subjects
international-law-and-conflict-of-laws
Topics
treaty-incorporation

Learning outcomes

  • Explain why Parliament’s approval of a treaty is not incorporation, using Bradley v Commonwealth.
  • State what Teoh decided, why the ratification-based legitimate expectation no longer carries an argument after Lam and WZARH, and which narrower propositions survive.
  • Explain why unambiguous statutory words prevail over the presumption of consistency with international law (Al-Kateb), and say how NZYQ affects that decision.
  • Apply the tests in Koowarta, the Tasmanian Dam case and the Industrial Relations Act case to decide whether a Commonwealth law implementing a treaty is within the external affairs power, attributing divided reasoning to the Justices who gave it.

The companion article on treaty incorporation explains why a treaty Australia ratifies does not, by itself, change the law that binds people in Australia. This article takes the two questions that follow. What can an unincorporated treaty still do when an official makes a decision or a court reads a statute? And when Parliament does implement a treaty, what must the Commonwealth show to have the power to do so? The authorities are High Court decisions on Commonwealth law, so the statements below concern Commonwealth law, and where the Court divided the article attributes each view to the Justices who held it. The prior question in a problem is whether the treaty has been enacted, because the answer sends the problem to the statute or to the heads of power rather than to the treaty text.

Approval is not incorporation

In Bradley v Commonwealth (1973) 128 CLR 557, the plaintiff was acting director of the Rhodesia Information Centre and the Postmaster-General had directed that its postal and telephone services be withdrawn. The Commonwealth relied in part on United Nations Security Council resolutions.1 Barwick CJ and Gibbs J said that such resolutions “neither form part of the law of the Commonwealth nor by their own force confer any power on the Executive Government of the Commonwealth which it would not otherwise possess”. Parliament had passed the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth), s 3 of which, as the Court then read it, provided that the Charter “is approved”, but their Honours held that this does not make the Charter binding on individuals as part of Australian law.2 The plaintiff succeeded, with Stephen J agreeing in the result and McTiernan and Menzies JJ dissenting. The lesson is that a statute approving a treaty and a statute giving it the force of domestic law are different things.

What an unincorporated treaty can still do: Teoh

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273 was decided by four Justices to one.3 The joint reasons of Mason CJ and Deane J began from the orthodox position that a treaty “which has not been incorporated into our municipal law cannot operate as a direct source of individual rights and obligations under that law” (paragraph 25). They then said what an unincorporated treaty may do, in passages that did not arise for decision because the case concerned neither an ambiguous statute nor the development of the common law (paragraph 29): where legislation is ambiguous, courts should favour the construction that accords with Australia’s treaty obligations (paragraphs 26-27), and a convention may be a “legitimate guide” in developing the common law, with “due circumspection” (paragraph 28). Their further holding was the controversial one. Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child was “a positive statement by the executive government” that its agencies would act in accordance with the Convention, and was “an adequate foundation for a legitimate expectation, absent statutory or executive indications to the contrary” that decision-makers would do so; a decision-maker proposing to act inconsistently with it had to give notice and an opportunity to be heard (paragraphs 34 and 37). McHugh J dissented: ratification “is, by its very nature, a statement to the international community”, and the executive does not by it give undertakings to Australian citizens or residents (paragraph 37).

The legitimate expectation idea was not new to Teoh. In Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, Mason J had said that the common law imposes a duty to act fairly in making administrative decisions that affect rights, interests and legitimate expectations, “subject only to the clear manifestation of a contrary statutory intention”, though the duty does not attach to every decision of an administrative character, for example a general decision that affects citizens only indirectly (paragraph 31).4 Teoh applied that vocabulary to ratification.

What became of Teoh

The ratification-based expectation has not lasted. In Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1, the application was dismissed, and several Justices questioned Teoh without overruling it.5 McHugh and Gummow JJ observed that if Teoh is to have continued significance, “further attention will be required to the basis upon which Teoh rests”, and that the reasoning which treats unenacted obligations as mandatory relevant considerations for review concerned with procedural fairness, though not as mandatory relevant considerations attracting review for jurisdictional error, “remains for analysis and decision” ([98], [101]-[102]). Hayne J said that it “may be” that Teoh “cannot stand” with the Court’s earlier decision in Haoucher and that the consequences it drew from ratification might need further consideration, though neither question needed answering ([122]). Callinan J called “legitimate expectation” in Teoh “a complete misnomer” ([140]). Later, in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH [2015] HCA 40, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ said that the legitimate expectation of an affected person “does not provide a basis for determining whether procedural fairness should be accorded to that person or for determining the content of such procedural fairness” ([30]).6

So in a problem do not argue that ratification of a convention gives rise to a legitimate expectation. The narrower points in paragraphs 26-28 of the Teoh joint reasons are a different matter. McHugh J said in Al-Kateb v Godwin that the rule of construction favouring consistency with international law “was reaffirmed by this Court in Teoh” and was “too well established to be repealed now by judicial decision”, though he thought its rationale had little reality under modern conditions ([65]).

Clear words prevail: Al-Kateb

Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562 shows the limit of the presumption.7 A stateless man whose removal from Australia was not reasonably practicable argued that the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) should not be read to require his indefinite detention. By four Justices to three the appeal was dismissed. McHugh J held that the words of ss 196 and 198 “are unambiguous” and “too clear to read them as being subject to a purposive limitation or an intention not to affect fundamental rights” ([33]). On international law he accepted the presumption of Polites v Commonwealth but said that it “must give way where the words of the statute are inconsistent with the implication” ([63]). Hayne J and Callinan J also would have dismissed the appeal, and Heydon J agreed with Hayne J while reserving whether s 196 should be read consistently with unincorporated treaties ([303]). Gleeson CJ, Gummow J and Kirby J would have allowed it. Kirby J said that the construction was supported by Australia’s obligations under international law and the common law presumption in favour of liberty ([150]).

Al-Kateb has since been qualified. In NZYQ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 37, the Court refused to reopen the statutory construction holding ([23]). It was unanimous that the statement of principle in Al-Kateb about the power to detain was incomplete and inaccurate ([43]); six members said that the constitutional holding “must be overruled” ([45]), and Edelman J reached the conclusion by a different approach ([51]-[55]).8 The statutory point for present purposes, that unambiguous words are not read down to fit an unincorporated obligation, was not disturbed.

Implementing a treaty: the external affairs power

When Parliament does implement a treaty, it needs a head of power, and s 51(xxix) (external affairs) is the one usually relied on. In Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168, four Justices to three upheld ss 9 and 12 of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), which gave effect to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.9 Mason J said that the power “would enable the Parliament to legislate not only for the ratification of a treaty but also for its implementation”, that the Constitution draws no distinction under which a law on a domestic topic is outside the power, and that this holds for a “genuine” treaty and not a “colourable” one made only to attract power (paragraphs 6, 12, 23). Stephen J’s reasons were narrower: the Act was supported because there was “a quite precise treaty obligation, on a subject of major importance in international relationships, which calls for domestic implementation” (paragraph 36). Gibbs CJ, with Aickin and Wilson JJ agreeing, dissented, reasoning that if the power covered any treaty the executive could by its own act determine the scope of Commonwealth power (Gibbs CJ, paragraph 28).

Commonwealth v Tasmania (the Tasmanian Dam case) (1983) 158 CLR 1 applied the power to the World Heritage Convention, with Mason, Murphy, Brennan and Deane JJ in the majority and Gibbs CJ, Wilson and Dawson JJ dissenting; the Court’s answers upheld some provisions of the World Heritage Properties Conservation Act 1983 (Cth) and held others invalid.10 Mason J said that Parliament may not treat the subject matter of a treaty as a new head of power: “The law must conform to the treaty and carry its provisions into effect” (paragraph 26). Deane J added that a law must be “capable of being reasonably considered to be appropriate and adapted” to achieving what gives it the character of a law with respect to external affairs, with reasonable proportionality between purpose and means (paragraphs 20-21).

The joint reasons in Victoria v Commonwealth (the Industrial Relations Act case) (1996) 187 CLR 416, of Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ, consolidated the tests.11 Their Honours accepted that some treaties may not enliven the power, citing a suggestion that a treaty “expressed in terms of aspiration” cannot support a law, and said that the law “must prescribe a regime that the treaty has itself defined with sufficient specificity to direct the general course to be taken by the signatory states” ([33]). The law must be “reasonably capable of being considered appropriate and adapted to implementing the treaty”, the legislature choosing the means ([34]), and a deficiency in implementation is fatal only if it is so substantial that the law loses its character as an implementing measure or makes the law substantially inconsistent with the treaty ([38]). Applying the test, the Court held ss 170DE(2) and 170EDA(1)(b) of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) invalid, because the “harsh, unjust or unreasonable” ground and its shifting onus went beyond the termination convention ([130]-[133]). It upheld other challenged provisions, subject to qualifications in the Court’s answers, including as to their application to the States.

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Ask whether the treaty has been enacted. If a statute merely approves it, as with the Charter in Bradley, that is not incorporation.
  2. If it is unincorporated, do not argue that ratification creates a legitimate expectation. State Teoh and then the doubts of McHugh and Gummow JJ, Hayne J and Callinan J in Lam and the position in WZARH.
  3. Identify the statute and ask whether its words are ambiguous. An unincorporated treaty can inform an ambiguous statute, but unambiguous words prevail, as McHugh J held in Al-Kateb, and say that the High Court divided there and that its constitutional holding was later overruled.
  4. If a Commonwealth law implements a treaty, test it against the external affairs power: is the treaty genuine, does it define the obligation with sufficient specificity, and is the law reasonably capable of being considered appropriate and adapted to implementing it?
  5. Check that the law does not go beyond the treaty so far that it ceases to implement it, using the invalid provisions in the Industrial Relations Act case as the example.
  6. Attribute each view in the divided decisions to its Justices, and do not treat the narrower reasons of Stephen J in Koowarta as the Court’s own.

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