Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen

High Court of Australia · 1982

International Law And Conflict Of LawsTreaty Incorporation

Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168

A Queensland Minister refuses consent to a pastoral lease transfer because Aboriginal people would use the land. A federal Act forbids race discrimination, but the refusal happened wholly inside Australia. Which power could support the Act?

Clarified by Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416

In Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416 the joint reasons of Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ said that Stephen J, who joined Mason, Murphy and Brennan JJ in upholding the Act under the external affairs power, took a narrower view of federal legislative competence, and that the plaintiff States relied on that view to narrow the proposition for which Koowarta is authority ([29]). Their Honours said that the majority in the Tasmanian Dam Case subsequently adopted the broader view, so that it was not to the point that the same result might have been reached on Stephen J’s reasoning ([30]).

What happened?

John Koowarta, an Aboriginal man, belonged to a group of Aboriginal people, the Winychanam Group, who lived at Aurukun and elsewhere in Queensland. The Aboriginal Land Fund Commission, a body constituted by Commonwealth Act, made a written contract in February 1976 to buy the lease of the Archer River Pastoral Holding in northern Queensland so that the land could be used by the group. Transfer of the lease needed the approval of the Queensland Minister for Lands under the Land Act 1962 (Q) ([2]).

The statement of claim alleged that in June 1976 the Minister refused consent, giving as his reason a Queensland Government policy, expressed in a Cabinet decision of September 1972, not to view favourably proposals to acquire large areas of additional land “for development by Aborigines or Aboriginal groups in isolation” ([2]). Mr Koowarta sued Johannes Bjelke-Petersen and others, including the Minister for Lands, in the Supreme Court of Queensland, alleging that the refusal contravened ss 9 and 12 of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). The defendants challenged the validity of the Act and Mr Koowarta’s standing, and parts of the cause were removed into the High Court. Queensland also sued the Commonwealth in the High Court for a declaration that the Act was invalid. Argument was confined to ss 9 and 12 ([3]-[4]).

The Act had been passed to give effect to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and a copy of the Convention is set out in a schedule to the Act ([5]).

What did the Court decide?

On 11 May 1982 the Court overruled the demurrer in Mr Koowarta’s action, with costs, and in Queensland’s action against the Commonwealth allowed the demurrer and dismissed the action with costs. Seven Justices sat and each gave separate reasons: Gibbs CJ, Stephen, Mason, Murphy, Aickin, Wilson and Brennan JJ. There were no joint reasons.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The external affairs power. Stephen, Mason, Murphy and Brennan JJ held ss 9 and 12 supported by s 51(xxix), and Gibbs CJ, Aickin J and Wilson J dissented. Their reasons differed.

Mason J: the power “would enable the Parliament to legislate not only for the ratification of a treaty but also for its implementation by carrying out any obligation to enact a law that Australia assumed by the treaty” ([6]). “The Constitution does not draw any distinction between external affairs and internal affairs so as to give power over the former but deny all power over the latter” ([12]). “Agreement by nations to take common action in pursuit of a common objective evidences the existence of international concern and gives the subject-matter of the treaty a character which is international”, spoken “at least in the case of a multi-lateral treaty brought into existence under the auspices of the United Nations or another international agency”, and of a treaty that is genuine and not colourable ([23]).

Stephen J: “It will not be enough that the challenged law gives effect to treaty obligations” ([24]), but international concern is a valid criterion of whether a subject forms part of a nation’s external affairs ([25]), and “there exists a quite precise treaty obligation, on a subject of major importance in international relationships, which calls for domestic implementation within Australia. This in itself, without more, suffices” ([36]).

Murphy J: “it is necessary and sufficient that it be with respect to external affairs”, and the Act’s operative provisions “would be valid even in the absence of the Convention” ([12]-[13]).

Brennan J: “to subject an aspect of the internal legal order to treaty obligation stamps the subject of the obligation with the character of an external affair” ([12]), but a law would not necessarily attract the power if the treaty obligation had been accepted “merely as a means of conferring legislative power upon the Commonwealth Parliament” ([14]).

Gibbs CJ, in dissent, held that “a law which gives effect within Australia to an international agreement will only be a valid law under s. 51 (xxix) if the agreement is with respect to a matter which itself can be described as an external affair” ([31]), warned that otherwise “the executive can, by its own act, determine the scope of Commonwealth power” ([28]), and found that the operation of ss 9 and 12 “is entirely internal, within Australia, and involves no relationship with any person, thing or country outside Australia” ([40]). Wilson J agreed entirely with his reasoning and added that the power does not “extend to enable the Parliament to implement every obligation which Australia assumes in its international relations” ([18]). Aickin J was “in full agreement”.

The race power. The Commonwealth also relied on s 51(xxvi). Gibbs CJ held that ss 9 and 12 were not valid laws of the kind it describes because they “apply generally to people of all races” ([17], [40]). Stephen J called the Act “a perfectly general law, addressed to all persons regardless of their race” and beyond that grant of power ([9], [11]). Brennan J said that “It is of the essence of a law falling within par. (xxvi) that it discriminates between the people of the race for whom the special laws are made and other people, whereas the Act seeks to eliminate racial discrimination” ([18]). Mason J had “no need to embark on an examination” of it ([1]), and Murphy J thought it unnecessary to say how far it could support the sections, although in his opinion it could ([14]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Mason J

Read judgment: p 224 (opens in a new tab), p 231 (opens in a new tab)

Mason J’s conclusion that the external affairs power supported implementation of the Convention was necessary to his decision that ss 9 and 12 were valid. His reasons treated a genuine multilateral treaty made under international auspices as giving its subject matter the international character needed to support the implementing law.

Ratio · Stephen J

Read judgment: pp 220–221 (opens in a new tab)

Stephen J’s narrower route was necessary to his conclusion that the challenged provisions were valid: international concern was required, and the precise obligation on a subject of major importance in international relations, calling for domestic implementation, supplied the connection in this case.

Ratio · Murphy J

Read judgment: pp 241–242 (opens in a new tab)

Murphy J’s view that a law operating internally is supported when it is with respect to external affairs was the stated basis for holding the challenged sections valid. He also treated the international concern in eliminating racial discrimination as independently sufficient, even without the Convention.

Ratio · Brennan J

Read judgment: pp 259–261 (opens in a new tab)

Brennan J’s conclusion that a genuine treaty obligation stamps its subject with the character of an external affair, and that ss 9 and 12 implemented this Convention, was necessary to his holding that those sections were valid. His colourable-treaty qualification formed part of that route.

Separate reasoning · Gibbs CJ, Aickin and Wilson JJ

Read judgment: p 201 (opens in a new tab), p 207 (opens in a new tab), p 243 (opens in a new tab), p 244 (opens in a new tab)

Gibbs CJ dissented, reasoning that the treaty provisions implemented must themselves concern an external affair and that ss 9 and 12 operated entirely within Australia. Aickin J adopted Gibbs CJ’s reasons and conclusions, and Wilson J expressly agreed with them; this was distinct dissenting reasoning, not the ratio supporting the Court’s orders.

Proposition 2

Separate reasoning · Gibbs CJ, Aickin and Wilson JJ

Read judgment: p 187 (opens in a new tab), p 243 (opens in a new tab), p 244 (opens in a new tab)

Gibbs CJ’s conclusion that the generally applicable provisions were not special laws for the people of a race was necessary to his dissenting conclusion that neither relied-on head of power supported ss 9 and 12. Aickin and Wilson JJ adopted his reasoning and conclusions. It is classified as separate reasoning because all three dissented from the Court’s disposition.

Obiter · Stephen J

Read judgment: pp 210–211 (opens in a new tab)

Stephen J concluded that the Act’s general application put it beyond s 51(xxvi), but his disposition did not depend on that conclusion because he separately upheld the challenged provisions under s 51(xxix). On the necessity criterion used here, the race-power conclusion is obiter.

Obiter · Brennan J

Read judgment: p 262 (opens in a new tab)

Brennan J rejected s 51(xxvi) as a foundation for ss 9 and 12, but his conclusion that they were valid rested on their implementation of the Convention under s 51(xxix). The race-power conclusion was therefore unnecessary to his stated ground for the result and is obiter.

Obiter · Murphy J

Read judgment: p 242 (opens in a new tab)

Murphy J expressly said it was unnecessary to decide the extent to which s 51(xxvi) supported the provisions because the external affairs power completely authorised them. His opinion that the race power could also support them was accordingly obiter.

Why does this case matter?

Koowarta comes up whenever a Commonwealth law is justified by a treaty and reaches conduct that happens entirely inside Australia, and the common weakness is to report it as if seven Justices had agreed on a test.

Exam and application relevance

Identify the treaty, the provision of the Act said to give effect to it, and the link between them. Then state the reasoning of the Justice you rely on, and say what the others held on the point.

When you cite the case, say that the result is the majority’s, and name the Justice for each statement of principle.

Check your understanding

1. Which four Justices upheld ss 9 and 12 under the external affairs power, and how did Stephen J’s reasoning differ from Mason J’s?

2. What did Gibbs CJ say the executive could do if the power extended to every treaty, and what did he say about the operation of ss 9 and 12?

3. Why did the argument based on s 51(xxvi) not decide the case in the reasons of Gibbs CJ, Stephen J and Brennan J?