Bao v Qu; Tian (No 2)
Bao v Qu; Tian (No 2) [2020] NSWSC 588
A lender wins a judgment in China against borrowers who now live in New South Wales and asks the Supreme Court to enforce it there. What must the lender show, and what can the borrowers say in answer?
What happened?
Dexu Bao, Mei Qu and Xin Tian were citizens of China; Mr Tian was Ms Qu’s husband ([2]). Mr Bao alleged that between December 2012 and February 2013 he made four loans to the defendants totalling RMB 2,550,000 ([3]). On 23 November 2014 the People’s Court of Laoshan District Qingdao gave judgment for him in the defendants’ absence after lawful summons; counsel for the plaintiff told Rothman J that the hearing was decided on the merits ([5]-[6]). Ms Qu appealed, Mr Tian was apparently represented at the hearing of the appeal, and on 10 September 2015 the Qingdao Intermediate People’s Court of Shandong Province dismissed the appeal save in respect of one loan and ordered the defendants to pay RMB 2,050,000 plus interest (the Final Chinese Judgment) ([7]-[8]). Mr Bao recovered RMB 19,205 in China and said RMB 2,030,795 plus interest remained unpaid ([9]).
The defendants were resident in New South Wales, were personally served with the proceedings Mr Bao commenced there in September 2019, and took no step in the proceedings until the hearing in February 2020 ([10]-[13]). They filed Points of Defence but no evidence and no written submissions, and a request for a further adjournment at the hearing on 16 April 2020 was refused ([16]-[17]). In the Points of Defence they admitted the authenticity of the Final Chinese Judgment and conceded several matters about it ([18]), but alleged that they had made repayments totalling RMB 1,750,000 between about September 2013 and March 2014, which Mr Bao had not accounted for ([19]).
What did the Court decide?
Rothman J, sitting alone, rejected the defendants’ claim about the repayments and ordered them to pay Mr Bao RMB 2,802,849 together with his costs, as agreed or assessed ([53], [70], [72]). The decision was given on 19 May 2020.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Rothman J, a single judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, said that foreign judgments may be enforced in Australia either at common law or under the statutory regime in the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) ([23]). He said that the statutory regime applies where a country has been designated as a jurisdiction of substantial reciprocity under the Foreign Judgments Regulations 1992 (Cth), that as at the date of his judgment the People’s Republic of China had not been designated, with an exception for judgments of certain courts in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region noted in a footnote, and that decisions of Chinese courts may therefore be enforceable under the common law procedure ([24]-[25] and footnote 1).
At common law, he said, a foreign judgment is prima facie capable of recognition and enforcement if four requirements have been met: the foreign court exercised jurisdiction of the requisite type over the defendant (jurisdiction in the international sense); the judgment is final and conclusive; there is identity of parties between the judgment debtors and the defendants in the enforcement action; and the judgment is for a fixed, liquidated sum ([26]). The first requirement is satisfied where the defendant is personally served with originating process within the foreign court’s jurisdiction, and a defendant served outside it who nonetheless appeared to argue the merits has submitted to the jurisdiction ([27]).
A judgment is final where it puts an end to the proceedings and quells the controversy, and where it is treated as res judicata by the courts of the country in which it is made; that the judgment may be subject to appeal does not, in principle, affect finality ([28]). The onus rests on the party seeking to enforce the foreign judgment to establish the four requirements, after which the judgment is prima facie enforceable as a valid obligation ([29]).
Subject to certain exceptions, including fraud, it is not open to a defendant to challenge the merits of the foreign judgment, and the plaintiff can rely on the judgment as creating an estoppel that precludes the defendant from raising any defence that was, or could have been, raised in the foreign proceedings ([30]). He also stated that it is a defence that the plaintiff elected to sue abroad and the judgment obtained has been wholly satisfied ([31]); that a court may refuse enforcement where the foreign judgment was obtained by fraud, which falls to the defendant to establish and must be pleaded with particularity and strictly proved ([32], [34], [36]); and that the preferable view seems to be that an allegation of fraud on the part of the party who obtained the judgment must be based on evidence not available or not reasonably discoverable at the time of the foreign proceedings, a view for which footnote 2 notes a contrary one ([35]).
Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that, because of the defendants’ concessions in their Points of Defence (that the Chinese appeal court exercised jurisdiction of the requisite type, that its judgment was final and conclusive, that it was for a liquidated sum and that the defendants were judgment debtors, [18]), the Court need not be independently satisfied of the four requirements. Rothman J said that was not correct: it was not conceded that the defendants were personally served in the foreign jurisdiction, and agreements on questions of law, however commendable, do not relieve the Court of the requirement on it to determine, for itself, the jurisdiction that it is exercising ([38]-[39]).
He then agreed with the plaintiff’s alternative submission that the evidence established the four elements ([40]). The defendants appeared to have been resident in China and served there and did not contest service; the first defendant, at least, could be taken to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the appeal court by commencing the appeal, both defendants appeared to have been represented on appeal, and in his view each defendant, whether or not properly served, had submitted to that jurisdiction ([41]).
The first instance judgment, although heard in the defendants’ absence, appeared to have been determined on the merits, and the Final Chinese Judgment determined the matters in controversy and itself noted that it is final, with no evidence of any later step in the Chinese proceedings ([42]). The parties were the same and the judgment sum was a specified and fixed amount ([43]). On the defendants’ claim that they had made repayments of RMB 1,750,000 before the Final Chinese Judgment, Rothman J treated the claim, on one view, as an allegation that the judgment was obtained by fraud ([44]).
He held that the alleged repayments could have been raised, and ought to have been raised, in the Chinese proceedings, which determined whether the loans were repayable and in which the defendants had the opportunity to contest the matter ([45]); that the second defendant appeared to have raised an alleged repayment of RMB 200,000 on appeal and the appeal court declined to consider it as outside the scope of his appeal ([46]-[47]); that either the matter was raised and determined or it should have been raised, there being no suggestion that evidence of the alleged repayments was not reasonably discoverable at the time, so that the defendants impermissibly sought to reopen the merits ([49]-[50]); and that in any event there was nothing to show that the alleged payments related to the loans, and no evidence that they occurred at all ([51]). He rejected the claim and held the plaintiff entitled to enforcement of the judgment amount less the amount recovered in China ([53]).
The Final Chinese Judgment awarded interest from the commencement of the Chinese proceedings until 10 days from the effective date of the judgment at the benchmark rate for loans of the same type, and, if the debt was not satisfied by 20 September 2015, interest on the debt for the period of delay at double the amount under Article 253 of the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China ([56]). Rothman J said that, in the ordinary course, it is appropriate to order pre-judgment interest in accordance with the foreign judgment, but that on one view the Article 253 interest might be considered penal and so unenforceable because Australian courts will not enforce a penal law directly at the suit of a foreign government or indirectly in a suit between private citizens ([59]).
He set out Bergin J’s refusal in Schnabel v Yung Lui to enforce the punitive damages part of a United States judgment and Bleby J’s observation in Benefit Strategies Group v Prider, in obiter, that not all foreign judgments for punitive damages are unenforceable on public policy grounds ([60]-[62]). In this case no evidence or submissions were before the Court on whether the Article 253 interest had a public element of the kind described in Benefit Strategies, and, having regard to the interest rate imposed, which was not substantially dissimilar to the rate for the general interest, he considered it appropriate to award pre-judgment interest in accordance with the Final Chinese Judgment, including the Article 253 interest ([63]). The sum ordered was made up of the judgment amount less the amount recovered in China (RMB 2,030,795), general interest (RMB 167,181.72) and Article 253 interest (RMB 604,872.29) ([65]-[70]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Rothman J (single judge)
Read judgment: [23]–[30] (opens in a new tab)
Rothman J states the route, the four requirements, the onus and the bar on reopening the merits as the principles he then applies in [40]-[53] to decide that the plaintiff is entitled to enforcement.
Obiter · Rothman J (single judge)
Read judgment: [31]–[34] (opens in a new tab), [36] (opens in a new tab)
Rothman J records the defences of election and satisfaction and the general law of fraud (its meaning, onus and pleading) although fraud was not pleaded ([32]); the order did not depend on them.
Ratio · Rothman J (single judge)
Read judgment: [35] (opens in a new tab)
The preferable view that a fraud allegation must rest on evidence not available or not reasonably discoverable in the foreign proceedings is applied in the repayments reasoning: Rothman J considers the repayments claim as a possible fraud allegation ([44]) and relies on there being no suggestion that the evidence was not reasonably discoverable ([49]), as one of two alternative grounds for rejecting it (the other is the absence of evidence, [51]).
Proposition 2
Ratio · Rothman J (single judge)
Read judgment: [38]–[47] (opens in a new tab), [49]–[53] (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs are Rothman J’s reasons for holding that the four requirements were established despite the concessions and that the claimed repayments could not be relied on to resist enforcement.
Obiter · Rothman J (single judge)
Read judgment: [48] (opens in a new tab)
Rothman J says in terms that no natural justice submission was made and states what would have followed had one been made, which is a hypothetical not needed for the order.
Proposition 3
Ratio · Rothman J (single judge)
Read judgment: [59] (opens in a new tab), [63] (opens in a new tab), [70] (opens in a new tab), [72] (opens in a new tab)
Rothman J’s decision to award the Article 253 interest on the evidence and submissions before him is part of the reasoning for the sum he orders.
Ratio · Rothman J (single judge)
Read judgment: [60]–[62] (opens in a new tab)
Rothman J draws on Schnabel and Benefit Strategies for the distinction between a penal sanction and an award with a public element, and applies it at [63] to the evidence before him in deciding whether to enforce the Article 253 interest. Bleby J’s observations in Benefit Strategies were obiter in that case (Rothman J says so at [62]); their status in Bao is that of reasoning he adopts and applies.
Why does this case matter?
Does a foreign judgment from a country outside the registration scheme have any force in an Australian court, and how far may a defendant who lost abroad re-argue the debt in Australia? This decision answers both for a judgment of a Chinese court, and it also shows what a court does with concessions that a defendant has made in its pleadings.
Exam and application relevance
In a problem about enforcing a foreign money judgment, start by asking whether the country is within the statutory scheme under the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth), and say how you know. If it is not, take each common law requirement in turn against the evidence the claimant can produce for it, and then ask what the defendant raises in answer and how it relates to the foreign proceedings.
Rothman J’s statement that the People’s Republic of China had not been designated is stated as at 19 May 2020, so check the current Foreign Judgments Regulations 1992 (Cth) before saying anything about the position now. The decision is that of a single judge at first instance, so it is persuasive and not binding authority in other courts.
Check your understanding
1. What did the Final Chinese Judgment order, and what had Mr Bao recovered in China by the time of the hearing ([8], [9])?
2. Which concessions did the defendants make in their Points of Defence, and what did they allege that they had paid before the Final Chinese Judgment ([18], [19])?
3. What are the four common law requirements Rothman J listed, and who bears the onus of establishing them ([26], [29])?
4. How did Rothman J say that the first requirement is satisfied, and what did he say about a defendant served outside the foreign court’s jurisdiction who has argued the merits ([27])?
5. Why did Rothman J say the plaintiff’s submission about the defendants’ concessions was not correct ([38], [39])?
6. On what basis did Rothman J conclude that each defendant had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Chinese appeal court ([41])?
7. Why could the alleged repayments not be relied on to resist enforcement ([45], [49]-[51])?
8. What did Rothman J say about the Article 253 interest, and on what basis did he award it ([59], [63])?