Nyunt v First Property Holdings Pte Ltd
Nyunt v First Property Holdings Pte Ltd [2022] NSWCA 249
A man ignores a Singapore lawsuit, then resists registration in Sydney of the US$66 million judgment. He says the court lacked jurisdiction, he never saw the amount claimed and enforcement offends policy. Which complaints can succeed?
What happened?
In 1996 Mr Nyunt, a dual citizen of Myanmar and Australia, and First Property Pte Ltd, a Singaporean company, made a joint venture agreement for the joint purchase and development of investment properties in Myanmar, to be carried out through a Myanmar company, TCC ([2]-[3]). Clause 14 chose Singapore law and said the parties agreed “to submit to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the Singapore courts” ([6]).
From 2003 First Property began a series of proceedings in Myanmar about two of the properties. They included a private prosecution in which Mr Nyunt was acquitted on 8 April 2008, proceedings for a declaration about one property that were dismissed on 14 January 2015 because First Property’s representative lacked the required power of attorney, and proceedings for possession of the other property that were decided in Mr Nyunt’s favour on 25 October 2017 ([7], [34], [37], [42], [49]).
In 2015 First Property sued Mr Nyunt in the High Court of Singapore. He was personally served in Sydney on 19 December 2015 and read the endorsement warning that judgment could be entered without further notice, but he deliberately did not enter an appearance, having been advised that a Singapore judgment could not be enforced in Myanmar ([10], [103], [105]). On 14 January 2016 the Singapore court entered default judgment, with damages for breach of fiduciary duty to be assessed, and on 8 November 2016 it fixed those damages at US$66,243,572.84 ([8]-[9]).
The statement of claim stated no amount, and First Property’s affidavits on quantum were not served on Mr Nyunt ([22]). On 16 June 2016 he started proceedings in Myanmar for a negative declaration, including that he was not a fiduciary of First Property and had not borrowed from it, which were dismissed on 30 June 2016 for want of jurisdiction ([105]-[107]).
The Singapore judgments were registered in the Supreme Court of New South Wales on 2 March 2017 under s 6 of the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) ([11]). Mr Nyunt applied to set the registration aside under s 7 ([12]). McCallum J dismissed the application on 13 March 2019, and also refused him leave to reopen it to put in the October 2017 Myanmar judgment ([14], [49]). He appealed.
What did the Court decide?
The Court of Appeal (Bell CJ, Macfarlan JA and Gleeson JA) heard the appeal on 2-4 March 2022 and delivered judgment on 6 December 2022. The Court varied the registration order, reducing the amounts registered by US$585,143.67 and SG$3,000 and the interest by US$54,022.51 and SG$213.40, amended order 2 to refer to the Singapore Judgment in the singular, and otherwise dismissed the appeal with costs ([153]). The reduction of US$585,143.67 reflected the setting aside in Singapore, on 18 December 2020, of the default judgment for that liquidated sum, a ground First Property did not dispute ([18], [26]). It refused to admit fresh evidence about later Myanmar proceedings as irrelevant to the appeal, and said that any application to stay enforcement should be made to a judge of the Common Law Division ([64]-[65], [152]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Bell CJ, with whose reasons Macfarlan JA and Gleeson JA agreed ([154]-[155]), rejected Mr Nyunt’s argument that the Singapore High Court lacked jurisdiction in the international sense because First Property had earlier sued him in Myanmar. Under s 7(3)(a)(iii) of the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) (the Act), the courts of the original country are taken to have had jurisdiction if the judgment debtor was a defendant in the original court and had agreed, in respect of the subject matter of the proceedings and before they commenced, to submit to the jurisdiction of that court or of the courts of that country ([66], [70]).
Bell CJ said first that the focus of that subsection is “on what the judgment debtor had agreed to prior to the commencement of the original foreign proceedings, and not on any conduct of the judgment creditor” ([73]). He said secondly that, even if election and waiver were relevant, the argument failed ([74]). A clause by which parties agree to submit to the jurisdiction of a country’s courts, being in the nature of a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause, “does not implicitly preclude a party bound by it from bringing proceedings elsewhere”, and “non-preclusion is of the essence” of it ([76]).
Mr Nyunt had not identified the two inconsistent contractual rights between which First Property was said to have elected ([82]), and “the commencement and continuation of simultaneous proceedings per se does not necessarily involve any act of election” ([84]). The Myanmar proceedings relating to immoveable property were a further reason, because actions about possession of real property typically must be brought where the property is ([86]), and none of the Myanmar proceedings gave Mr Nyunt a res judicata or issue estoppel: the Burma Companies Act proceedings were criminal and were not relied on for that purpose, the Natmauk Lane declaration proceedings were not decided on the merits, and the Tarmway possession proceedings were decided only after the Singapore judgments ([87]-[88]).
On the scope issue, the clause did not say what the submission covered. Bell CJ said that, in the context of an ongoing joint venture, no narrow view should be taken of it ([97]), that where parties do not delimit the scope of their submission by any nexus “it may readily be inferred that their intention was to cast the net very broadly indeed”, and he accepted First Property’s submission that the clause captured disputes about whether Mr Nyunt breached fiduciary duties owed as a consequence of the joint venture ([98]-[99]).
Bell CJ held that, assuming the foreign court had jurisdiction in the sense contemplated by s 7(3), the registration of a judgment following proceedings in which the judgment debtor did not appear is required to be set aside under s 7(2)(a)(v) of the Act only if insufficient notice was given so as to have prevented the judgment debtor from having an opportunity to defend the proceedings ([101]). He rejected an argument that, for the purposes of s 7(2)(a)(v), a party does not have notice of foreign proceedings where it is aware of the fact of the proceedings but does not know the quantum of the claim, adding that this was “especially so” where there was a ready means of ascertaining it ([113]).
He accepted that notice “requires more than simply informing” the defendant that proceedings exist or will exist ([114], citing Maschmann v Wenzel [2007] NSWSC 850 at [21]), but found the notice here extensive. Mr Nyunt had been served with the writ and statement of claim in Sydney, had the amended statement of claim and the directions for the assessment hearing, knew the hearing dates, was told within a day that First Property had served its documents and affidavits, was in communication with First Property’s solicitors and deliberately chose not to participate ([102]-[104]).
The amended statement of claim gave particulars of the loss claimed even though it stated no figure ([114]), and neither Mr Nyunt nor his counsel sought to ascertain the quantum ([118]). First Property’s non-service of its affidavits, which Mr Nyunt said breached a Singapore order of 3 March 2016, did not mean he lacked sufficient notice of the proceedings ([23], [109]-[111]). Bell CJ concluded that the answer to the question whether Mr Nyunt received notice in time to defend was “unequivocally in the affirmative” ([107]).
Bell CJ said that public policy as a basis for refusing recognition or setting aside registration, both at common law and under the Act, “has a narrow compass” ([135]). He gave two reasons: a court asked to recognise or enforce a foreign judgment will not examine its merits, and that principle is not to be circumvented by broad conceptions of public policy; and it is “a positive aspect of Australian public policy that foreign judgments and arbitral awards will be enforced as part of a reciprocal practice” ([136]).
He set out Martin CJ’s review in Kok v Resorts World at Sentosa Pte Ltd [2017] WASCA 150 and Whelan J’s remarks in Jenton Overseas Investment Pte Ltd v Townsing [2008] VSC 470 on the narrow range of cases in which the ground has succeeded ([137]-[139]). Applying that approach, he rejected Mr Nyunt’s public policy arguments. The October 2017 Myanmar judgment could be put aside because evidence of it was not admitted before the primary judge and it is difficult to see how a later judgment could make earlier issues res judicata ([142]); the other Myanmar proceedings produced no res judicata, and s 7(2)(b) of the Act is discretionary, using the word “may” ([143]).
On the abuse of process arguments, whether a judgment was procured by abuse of a foreign court’s process is “pre-eminently a matter for the foreign court” ([147]); whether there had in fact been an abuse would be a matter of evidence depending at least in part on the law relating to issue estoppel and res judicata of the foreign jurisdiction, and there was no evidence that the application for default judgment was an abuse of process according to Singapore law ([148]); and Mr Nyunt could have sought a stay in Singapore ([149]).
Ground 4(b) also approached an attempt to review the merits, which nothing in the Act invites ([150]). On the argument that the lack of the quantum or the affidavits was a denial of natural justice, Bell CJ said that the accuracy and breadth of the proposition that substantial injustice relating to notice may engage public policy “may be open to doubt”, given that s 7(2)(a)(v) expressly deals with notice ([123]), and that there was a question whether s 7(2)(a)(v) leaves room for a broader conception of procedural fairness relating to notice ([126]).
He recorded Griffiths J’s observation in LFDB v SM (No 3) [2017] FCA 80 at [102] that there is a high threshold but no sound reason to exclude from public policy a judgment obtained through a gross denial of procedural fairness ([124]), and noted that LFDB was decided under an Act with no counterpart to s 7(2)(a)(v) and that Adams v Cape Industries was a common-law case, very different on its facts ([127], [131]). He concluded that, “whether or not” the ground may extend to a denial of substantial justice in exceptional circumstances under the Act, this case involved no denial of substantial justice or gross denial of procedural fairness ([133]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Bell CJ (Macfarlan JA and Gleeson JA agreeing)
Read judgment: [73] (opens in a new tab)
Bell CJ’s statement that s 7(3)(a)(iii) looks to what the judgment debtor had agreed before the foreign proceedings and not to the judgment creditor’s conduct was the first reason he gave for rejecting the election argument, and so was part of the ground of decision on that issue.
Ratio · Bell CJ (Macfarlan JA and Gleeson JA agreeing)
Read judgment: [74]–[91] (opens in a new tab)
The second reason, that even if election or waiver were relevant the argument failed because a non-exclusive clause does not preclude suit elsewhere and no inconsistent rights were identified, was an alternative ground that was itself sufficient to reject the argument.
Ratio · Bell CJ (Macfarlan JA and Gleeson JA agreeing)
Read judgment: [97]–[99] (opens in a new tab)
The construction of the clause as reaching the fiduciary claim was necessary to the conclusion that the Singapore courts were taken to have had jurisdiction under s 7(3)(a)(iii).
Proposition 2
Ratio · Bell CJ (Macfarlan JA and Gleeson JA agreeing)
Read judgment: [101] (opens in a new tab), [112]–[120] (opens in a new tab)
Bell CJ’s reading of s 7(2)(a)(v) as directed to notice of the proceedings sufficient to allow the debtor to defend, his rejection of the argument that notice of quantum was required, and his findings on the extent of notice given were the grounds on which he dismissed the sufficient notice ground.
Proposition 3
Ratio · Bell CJ (Macfarlan JA and Gleeson JA agreeing)
Read judgment: [135]–[136] (opens in a new tab), [142]–[143] (opens in a new tab), [148]–[150] (opens in a new tab)
Bell CJ’s statement that the public policy ground has a narrow compass and does not permit merits review, and his reasons for rejecting each of the public policy and abuse of process arguments, were the grounds on which he dismissed those grounds of appeal.
Classification unresolved · Bell CJ (Macfarlan JA and Gleeson JA agreeing)
Read judgment: [123]–[127] (opens in a new tab), [133] (opens in a new tab), [146]–[147] (opens in a new tab)
Bell CJ doubted the breadth of the argument that notice-related injustice may engage public policy and asked whether s 7(2)(a)(v) leaves room for it, but at [133] said that whether or not the ground may extend to a denial of substantial justice in exceptional circumstances the facts did not involve one; at [146]-[147] he said the abuse-of-foreign-process proposition was problematic for three reasons without deciding that it could never succeed. A single label would hide that these questions were left open.
Why does this case matter?
A debtor’s complaint about a foreign proceeding can be labelled as jurisdiction, notice, public policy or an earlier judgment, and an examiner rewards the student who puts each complaint under the right paragraph of s 7 and asks what that paragraph actually requires. Several of this debtor’s arguments were pleaded under more than one ground. For each of them, which paragraph is the real home, and what would the debtor have had to show?
Exam and application relevance
Take the debtor’s complaints one at a time and attach each to the part of s 7 it belongs under: jurisdiction through s 7(2)(a)(iv) and s 7(3), notice through s 7(2)(a)(v), public policy through s 7(2)(a)(xi), and an earlier final judgment through s 7(2)(b). Quote the statutory words as the judgment sets them out at [66], and check the current Act.
Separate what Bell CJ decided from what he said it was unnecessary to decide, and give the paragraph for each.
This is a decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal on a Commonwealth Act. It binds courts within the New South Wales hierarchy on the construction of the Act, and under Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 22 at [135] intermediate appellate courts and trial judges elsewhere in Australia should not depart from it on the interpretation of Commonwealth legislation unless they are convinced that it is plainly wrong; it is not a High Court decision.
FW Aviation (Holdings) 1 Limited v VietJet Aviation Joint Stock Company [2026] QSC 63 at [41] and [44] later cited it. Special leave to appeal to the High Court was refused with costs on 16 June 2023 (Nyunt v First Property Holdings Pte Ltd [2023] HCATrans 87) because the proposed appeal had insufficient prospects of success; that refusal is not an endorsement of every reason given. The position is stated as at December 2022; check for later treatment before relying on it.
Check your understanding
1. How and when was Mr Nyunt served with the Singapore proceedings, and what did he do next ([103], [105]-[107])?
2. Which paragraph of s 7(3) did Bell CJ treat as the relevant one on jurisdiction, and what did he say its focus was ([70], [73])?
3. What did Bell CJ say about a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause and the election argument ([76], [82], [84])?
4. What did Bell CJ say about the nature of the Myanmar proceedings that concerned immoveable property ([86])?
5. What did Mr Nyunt know about the Singapore claim, and what had he not been given ([22], [104], [109])?
6. What did Bell CJ say about a debtor who knows of the proceedings but not the quantum ([113]-[114])?
7. What two reasons did Bell CJ give for the narrow compass of the public policy ground ([136])?
8. What did Bell CJ say at [133] about denial of substantial justice, and what differences did he note in LFDB and Adams v Cape ([127], [131])?