Registering foreign judgments under the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth)
Explains how the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) registers foreign money judgments, the grounds for setting registration aside, and how that route differs from enforcement at common law.
Learning outcomes
- Decide whether a foreign judgment can be registered under Part 2 of the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth), by testing it against the reciprocity, money-judgment, finality and non-New Zealand limits.
- Work through the grounds on which a registered foreign judgment must or may be set aside, and apply the Act’s own definition of when the foreign court had jurisdiction.
- Explain how the Court of Appeal in Nyunt approached prior agreement, notice and public policy, and say which of its points are settled and which were left open.
- State the common law requirements for enforcing a foreign judgment that the Act does not reach.
The companion article on recognition of foreign judgments states the general principles. This article takes the statutory route in detail, because a student who treats registration and common law enforcement as interchangeable will apply the wrong rules. The Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) is Commonwealth legislation, so its text does not vary between States and Territories; the cases cited here are from the Supreme Court of New South Wales and its Court of Appeal, and court rules and procedure are made State by State, so this article does not state them. The statutory text here is taken from the compilation dated 18 February 2022, so check for later amendment before relying on it. The first question is whether the judgment is one the Act reaches at all.
Which judgments the Act reaches
The Act works by reciprocity. Regulations may extend Part 2 to a country’s superior courts, and to specified inferior courts, if the Governor-General is satisfied that “substantial reciprocity of treatment” will be assured for Australian money judgments there (s 5(1), (3)).1 Part 2 then applies to an “enforceable money judgment” that is “final and conclusive” and was given in a court to which the Part has been extended (s 5(4)). Three limits do much of the work in problems.
- Money, and not tax or penalty. “Enforceable money judgment” is defined as one under which an amount of money is payable, other than an amount payable in respect of “taxes or other charges of a similar nature” or “a fine or other penalty”, with exceptions for New Zealand tax and recoverable Papua New Guinea income tax (s 3(1)).
- A designated country. The Act does not itself list countries. A judgment from a country the regulations do not cover is outside Part 2. In Bao v Qu; Tian (No 2), Rothman J recorded in 2020 that the People’s Republic of China had not been designated under the Foreign Judgments Regulations 1992 (Cth), with an exception for judgments of certain Hong Kong courts that his Honour noted in a footnote, so the claimant there relied on the common law for a judgment of a mainland court.3 Check the current regulations rather than assuming a country’s status.
- Not New Zealand. Part 2 does not apply to a judgment of a New Zealand court (s 5(10)). The note to that subsection points to Part 7 of the Trans-Tasman Proceedings Act 2010 (Cth), whose provisions are not covered here.
The Act also contemplates extending Part 2 by regulation to prescribed non-money judgments (s 5(6)-(7)). Whether any regulation does so is not established here, so a non-money judgment is a question to check against the regulations.
Registration, and why it is exclusive
A judgment creditor may apply to register within six years of the judgment, or of the last judgment in any appeal proceedings (s 6(1)). The appropriate court is the Supreme Court of a State or Territory, apart from a provision naming the Federal Court for judgments given in proceedings under the New Zealand Commerce Act 1986 (s 6(2)). Subject to the Act and proof of the matters the rules of court prescribe, the court “is to order the judgment to be registered” (s 6(3)). Two points about that order matter.
First, it is not final. The order must state the period within which the debtor may apply to set the registration aside (s 6(4)), and no step may be taken to enforce the judgment during that period or while an application is undecided (s 6(10)). Secondly, a registered judgment then has the same force and effect for enforcement “as if the judgment had been originally given in the court in which it is registered” (s 6(7)), and a judgment registered in one Supreme Court can be registered in another under Part 6 of the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) (s 6(8)).
Registration is also the exclusive route for a judgment the Part covers, subject to s 10(2), which leaves untouched enforcement of an award under the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth). Section 10(1) provides that no proceedings “for the recovery of an amount payable under a judgment to which this Part applies, other than proceedings by way of registration of the judgment, are to be entertained by a court having jurisdiction in Australia”. The creditor cannot choose to sue on the judgment as a debt instead. Section 12(1) adds that such a judgment must, “whether or not it is, or can be, registered”, be recognised as conclusive between the parties on the same cause of action and may be relied on by way of defence or counterclaim, subject to s 12(2). That is the recognition side of the Act; the section 12(3) saving preserves recognition at common law.
Setting registration aside
Section 7 is where a registered judgment is contested. Under s 7(2)(a) the court “must set the registration of that judgment aside” if it is satisfied of any of eleven matters. The ones students most often need are:
- the courts of the country of the original court “had no jurisdiction in the circumstances of the case” (s 7(2)(a)(iv));
- the debtor, as defendant in the original proceedings, “did not ... receive notice of those proceedings in sufficient time to enable the judgment debtor to defend the proceedings and did not appear” (s 7(2)(a)(v));
- the judgment “was obtained by fraud” (s 7(2)(a)(vi));
- the judgment has been reversed or set aside in the original country (s 7(2)(a)(vii)); and
- enforcement “would be contrary to public policy” (s 7(2)(a)(xi)).
The remaining grounds include a judgment registered for too much, registered in contravention of the Act, discharged or wholly satisfied, or sought by a person in whom the rights are not vested (s 7(2)(a)(i)-(iii), (viii)-(x)). Section 7(2)(b) is different in kind: the court “may”, not must, set registration aside if the matter was already the subject of an earlier final and conclusive judgment by a court having jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction in ground (iv) is defined, not left to the general law. For an action in personam the original court is taken to have had jurisdiction if the debtor voluntarily submitted, was plaintiff or counterclaimed, had agreed before the proceedings began, in respect of the subject matter of the proceedings, to submit to that court or country’s courts, was resident (or, for a company, had its principal place of business) there when the proceedings were instituted, or the proceedings concerned a transaction effected through or at an office or place of business the debtor had there (s 7(3)(a)). Appearing only to contest jurisdiction, to protect seized property or to invite the court not to exercise jurisdiction is not voluntary submission (s 7(5)). Section 7(4) then withdraws that deemed jurisdiction in stated cases, including where the subject matter was immovable property outside that country, or where a debtor entitled to immunity under public international law did not submit.
How the Court of Appeal read these grounds
Nyunt v First Property Holdings Pte Ltd [2022] NSWCA 249 concerned a Singapore default judgment and a later assessment of about US$66 million, registered in New South Wales. The debtor had been served, knew of the Singapore proceedings and chose not to take part.2 Bell CJ gave the reasons, with which Macfarlan JA and Gleeson JA agreed. It is a decision of an intermediate appellate court, so it is not binding High Court authority. Four points from it are worth taking separately.
- Prior agreement looks at the debtor. Section 7(3)(a)(iii) turns on what the debtor had agreed before the foreign proceedings began, “and not on any conduct of the judgment creditor” ([73]). A creditor’s earlier suits in Myanmar did not undo a submission to Singapore’s courts.
- A non-exclusive clause does not stop other suits. Bell CJ explained that “non-preclusion is of the essence” of a submission-to-suit clause, so the creditor was free to sue elsewhere ([76]).
- Notice means notice of the proceedings. Section 7(2)(a)(v), assuming the foreign court had jurisdiction under s 7(3), requires the registration to be set aside if “insufficient notice was given so as to have prevented the judgment debtor from having an opportunity to defend the proceedings”, and not otherwise ([101]). Knowing of the claim but not its quantum did not defeat registration ([113]).
- Public policy is narrow, and unsettled at its edge. Bell CJ said the ground “has a narrow compass” and that a court asked to enforce will not examine the merits ([135]-[136]). Whether it can extend to a denial of substantial justice in exceptional circumstances was left open: his Honour said that whether or not it may, the facts did not involve a denial of substantial justice or gross denial of procedural fairness ([133]).
The common law when the Act does not apply
A judgment the Act does not reach may be enforced by action at common law. In Bao v Qu; Tian (No 2) Rothman J, at first instance and so persuasive rather than binding, listed four requirements: the foreign court exercised jurisdiction of the requisite type over the defendant (jurisdiction in the international sense); the judgment is final and conclusive; the parties are identical; and the judgment is for a fixed, liquidated sum ([26]). The party seeking enforcement bears the onus, after which the judgment is prima facie enforceable ([29]), and the defendant generally cannot reopen the merits, with fraud as an exception ([30], [32]). His Honour also held that the defendants’ concessions about the foreign court’s jurisdiction did not relieve the Court of the requirement “to determine, for itself, the jurisdiction that it is exercising” ([39]).
Applying this in a problem question
- Identify the country and court that gave the judgment, and check whether the current regulations extend Part 2 of the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) to that court; Part 2 does not apply to a judgment of a New Zealand court (s 5(10)).
- Check the judgment is a final and conclusive money judgment, remembering that amounts payable for tax or other similar charges and for fines or penalties are excluded from “enforceable money judgment”, with exceptions for New Zealand tax and recoverable Papua New Guinea income tax (ss 3(1), 5(4)); an appeal pending in the foreign court does not make it non-final (s 5(5)).
- If Part 2 applies, treat registration within six years as the route and s 10(1) as excluding an action on the judgment.
- Take the debtor’s grounds in the statute’s order under s 7(2), testing jurisdiction against s 7(3)-(5), and say which are mandatory and that s 7(2)(b) is discretionary.
- For notice and public policy, state the Nyunt reasoning with its limits, and do not treat the exercise as an appeal on the merits.
- If the Act does not apply, work through the four common law requirements and the onus, and note that Bao v Qu is a single-judge decision.