Bradley v Commonwealth

High Court of Australia · 1973

International Law And Conflict Of LawsTreaty Incorporation

Bradley v Commonwealth (1973) 128 CLR 557

A Rhodesian information office in Sydney loses its mail and telephone after the Postmaster-General cites United Nations sanctions. An Australian Act says the UN Charter is approved. Does that give the resolutions force in Australian law?

Qualified by legislation: Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth), from 9 June 1993

Part 3 of the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth), including s 6, was added by the Charter of the United Nations Amendment Act 1993 (Cth), which commenced on 9 June 1993. In the compilation of 14 September 2021, after later amendments to s 6, s 6(1) allows the Governor-General to make regulations giving effect to decisions that the Security Council makes under Chapter VII of the Charter and that Art 25 requires Australia to carry out, so far as they require measures not involving the use of armed force. The holding that Security Council resolutions do not by their own force form part of the law of the Commonwealth or confer power on the Executive is unchanged; what has changed is that Parliament has supplied a means of carrying such decisions into effect by regulation.

What happened?

Denzil Bradley, a South African national, was the acting director of the Rhodesia Information Centre at Crows Nest in Sydney, which distributed a publication called “The Rhodesian Commentary” through the post. The Security Council of the United Nations had passed resolutions between 1965 and 1970 condemning the regime that held power in Southern Rhodesia as illegal and calling on member states not to recognise or assist it.

On 18 April 1973 the Postmaster-General directed that all postal and telecommunication services for the Centre be withdrawn. Officers stopped its mail, deregistered “The Rhodesian Commentary”, changed the lock on its post office box and disconnected its telephone, and services were restored on 24 April under an interim injunction. Mr Bradley sued the Commonwealth and the Postmaster-General for a declaration that the actions were unlawful and for an injunction. The matter came before a Full Court under s 18 of the Judiciary Act, and both parties agreed that the motion should be treated as one for a perpetual injunction so that the principal questions could be decided (joint reasons, [1]).

What did the Court decide?

On 10 September 1973 the Court, by three Justices to two, declared that the Postmaster-General’s direction was beyond his power and invalid. It ordered that the defendants be perpetually restrained from acting in furtherance of the direction, except in accordance with law, and that they pay the plaintiff’s costs.

Barwick CJ and Gibbs J gave joint reasons, Stephen J and Menzies J each gave separate reasons, and McTiernan J agreed with the reasons of Menzies J. Menzies J and McTiernan J would have dismissed the action.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Security Council resolutions and the Charter. In the joint reasons, “resolutions of the Security Council neither form part of the law of the Commonwealth nor by their own force confer any power on the Executive Government of the Commonwealth which it would not otherwise possess” (CLR 582-583). Parliament had passed the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth), s 3 of which provided that the Charter “is approved”. Their Honours held that this “does not make the Charter itself binding on individuals within Australia as part of the law of the Commonwealth”, that the section “was no doubt an effective provision for the purposes of international law”, and that, the Charter and resolutions not having been “carried into effect within Australia by appropriate legislation”, they “cannot be relied upon as a justification for executive acts that would otherwise be unjustified, or as grounds for resisting an injunction to restrain an excess of executive power, even if the acts were done with a view to complying with the resolutions of the Security Council.”

They found it unnecessary to consider whether the resolutions, properly construed, would require the action taken. Stephen J said that on the cancellation of the post office box tenancy, the de-registration, the suspension of services and the exercise of discretion he was in agreement with the joint judgment ([21]).

Since the decision, the Charter of the United Nations Amendment Act 1993 (Cth), commenced on 9 June 1993, made the approval provision s 5 of the Act and added Part 3. Section 6 allows the Governor-General to make regulations giving effect to decisions that the Security Council makes under Chapter VII of the Charter and that Art 25 requires Australia to carry out, so far as they require measures not involving the use of armed force. The reasoning in this case concerned the Act as it stood in 1973.

The Postmaster-General’s power. In the joint reasons, the Act and regulations did not give the Postmaster-General an arbitrary power over postal services: “it is right to start from the assumption that if the Parliament intended to confer on the Postmaster-General an arbitrary power, subject to no conditions and to no review, to deprive any person of the liberty to use the postal and telephone services, with all the grave consequences that might ensue, it would use clear words for that purpose.”

Their Honours held that “the direction given by the Postmaster-General exceeded his authority” (CLR 582), so the plaintiff was entitled to relief unless the Court should in its discretion refuse it. The Security Council resolutions were the first of two matters suggested for refusing relief. The second was that the plaintiff was employed by a regime that had usurped power, and their Honours held that “no justification has been shown for denying the plaintiff the relief to which he is legally entitled.”

Menzies J, with whom McTiernan J agreed, held that the plaintiff had no right unless “some law of the Commonwealth gives it positively” and based his conclusion on “the absence of any positive law granting the plaintiff the rights which he asserts by his writ”.

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Barwick CJ and Gibbs J

Read judgment: pp 582–583 (opens in a new tab)

After finding the direction beyond statutory power, the joint reasons had to decide whether the Security Council resolutions nevertheless justified withholding the injunction. Their conclusion that neither the resolutions nor statutory approval of the Charter supplied domestic authority was the ground for rejecting that argument. This classification concerns that ground under the law in 1973, not the later legislative history included in the proposition. Whether the resolutions required Australia internationally to take these measures was expressly unnecessary to decide.

Separate reasoning · Stephen J

Read judgment: p 593 (opens in a new tab)

Stephen J concurred in the declaration and injunction and expressly agreed with the joint reasons on the exercise of discretion. His concurrence supports their rejection of the resolutions as a ground for withholding relief; it does not supply a separate analysis of the Charter or classify the subsequent legislative amendments.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Barwick CJ and Gibbs J

Read judgment: pp 565–566 (opens in a new tab), p 572 (opens in a new tab), p 576 (opens in a new tab), pp 580–584 (opens in a new tab)

The joint reasons construed the Act and regulations as supplying no authority for the withdrawal of these services. The clear-words assumption guided resolution of ambiguity, including the construction of the telephone regulation. The absence of power, particular injury to Bradley and rejection of both suggested grounds for withholding relief were necessary steps to the declaration and injunction. Their suggestion that Bradley might also have a positive statutory right to use the mail was unnecessary: lack of authority for this direction sufficed.

Separate reasoning · Stephen J

Read judgment: p 593 (opens in a new tab)

Stephen J concurred in the declaration and injunction. He reasoned that the authorities supported enforcement by an affected individual where the Act indicated a duty to receive and deliver mail, and expressly adopted the joint reasons on the statutory limits, the other services and discretion. His explanation of enforceability supplements the joint reasons without treating agreement in the result as adoption of every observation.

Separate reasoning · Menzies J, with McTiernan J agreeing

Read judgment: pp 584–586 (opens in a new tab)

Menzies J dissented because he required positive legislation giving Bradley an enforceable right to the services and found none. On his approach the absence of statutory authority to deny services did not establish that right. McTiernan J expressly agreed with his reasons and also would have dismissed the action. This was the dissenting route, not a ground supporting the orders made.

Why does this case matter?

The case is a standard illustration in questions about how an obligation Australia has accepted internationally affects what its officials may do. A good answer keeps the international law step and the statutory step apart and attributes each to the Justices who took it.

Exam and application relevance

Start with the source of the official’s power in Australian law, and then ask what the international obligation adds. Check whether legislation or regulations now give effect to the obligation in the problem, since the case was decided on the Act as it stood in 1973.

Say whose reasons you rely on.

Check your understanding

1. What did Barwick CJ and Gibbs J say about the effect of s 3 of the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth) on the Charter itself?

2. Why did the Security Council resolutions come up in the case, and what did the joint reasons say about relying on them?

3. On what ground did Menzies J, with whom McTiernan J agreed, reach a different result?