Victoria v Commonwealth
Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416
Three States challenge federal industrial relations laws that rest on International Labour Organisation conventions. How closely must a law follow a treaty before it can be called a law implementing it?
What happened?
The States of Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia each sued the Commonwealth for declarations that provisions of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) were invalid. The provisions had been inserted by the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (Cth) and the Industrial Relations Amendment Act (No 2) 1994 (Cth), and allowed for the imposition of, or imposed, obligations on employers about minimum wages, equal pay, termination of employment, discrimination in employment and family leave, and provided for collective bargaining and the right to strike ([1]-[3]). The matters were heard together and Dawson J stated a case for the Full Court ([1]).
The Commonwealth relied on the external affairs power for many of the provisions, because the subjects were covered by Conventions adopted by the General Conference of the International Labour Organisation and ratified by Australia, and by Recommendations ([4]). The States argued that the power does not extend to implementing a treaty unless its subject-matter is of international concern, that the Conventions and Recommendations impose no relevant obligations, and that the provisions were not appropriate or adapted to implementing them ([4]). The Commonwealth also relied on its powers over conciliation and arbitration and over corporations ([5]).
What did the Court decide?
On 4 September 1996 the Court answered the questions in the case stated. It held that ss 170DE(2) and 170EDA(1)(b) of the Act were invalid and severable, and that the other challenged provisions were valid, subject to the qualifications in the answers, including a reading down of s 6 of the Act in its application to the States. Each plaintiff was ordered to pay one third of the defendant’s costs of the case stated.
Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ gave joint reasons. Dawson J gave separate reasons.
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
The test for a law implementing a treaty. The joint reasons said that “There may be some treaties which do not enliven the legislative power conferred by s 51(xxix)”, citing the example of a treaty expressed in terms of aspiration: “The law must prescribe a regime that the treaty has itself defined with sufficient specificity to direct the general course to be taken by the signatory states” ([33]). Where a treaty is relied on to support a law prescribing a regime for a domestic subject-matter, “To be a law with respect to “external affairs”, the law must be reasonably capable of being considered appropriate and adapted to implementing the treaty”, and “it is for the legislature to choose the means by which it carries into or gives effect to the treaty provided that the means chosen are reasonably capable of being considered appropriate and adapted to that end” ([34]).
“In this context, purpose is not something found in the head of power. Rather, it is a test for determining whether the law in question is reasonably capable of being considered as giving effect to the treaty and therefore as being a law upon a subject which is an aspect of external affairs” ([34]). “The notion of “reasonable proportionality” will not always be particularly helpful” ([35]).
A law need not comply with all the obligations assumed under the treaty, but “Deficiency in implementation of a supporting Convention is not necessarily fatal to the validity of a law; but a law will be held invalid if the deficiency is so substantial as to deny the law the character of a measure implementing the Convention or it is a deficiency which, when coupled with other provisions of the law, make it substantially inconsistent with the Convention” ([36]-[38]). The joint reasons also said that “the intrusion of Commonwealth law into a field that has hitherto been the preserve of State law is not a reason to deny validity to the Commonwealth law provided it is, in truth, a law with respect to external affairs”, and that the scope of the legislative power is not confined to the implementation of treaties ([30]-[31]).
Dawson J would have held that “a law which has an entirely domestic operation cannot ... be a law with respect to external affairs merely because it implements a treaty or is upon a subject-matter which is of international concern” ([12]). Because the parties did not contest the authority of the Tasmanian Dam Case, he proceeded on the basis of that decision and agreed with the majority’s orders ([17]).
The High Court has since restated the principle and added that its application does not involve a simple comparison of particular provisions of the impugned law with a particular provision of a treaty, but asks whether, overall, the law’s implementation was so deficient as to preclude it being characterised as a measure implementing the treaty (G Global 120E T2 Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue [2025] HCA 39 at [49]-[50]).
The termination provisions. Section 170DE(2) “goes beyond the terms of the Convention because Art 4 of the Convention only requires the employer to comply with the equivalent of s 170DE(1)” ([130]). The shifting onus in s 170EDA(1) “indicates that the inclusion of the “harsh, unjust or unreasonable” test is an additional ground of unlawful termination that goes beyond the requirement for the reason for termination to be valid” ([133]). The provisions creating that criterion “go beyond the terms of the Convention to a constitutionally impermissible degree”, but “they are structurally severable from the remainder of the Division” ([135]). By contrast the parental leave provisions were “reasonably capable of being considered appropriate and adapted to fulfilling one element of Australia’s obligations under the Family Responsibilities Convention” ([156]).
Why does this case matter?
The case is the usual reference when a Commonwealth law relies on a treaty obligation that is not itself enacted. The marks are for applying the Court’s test to the particular provision and the article of the treaty, not for reciting the head of power.
Exam and application relevance
Identify the treaty, the article said to be implemented and the provision of the Commonwealth law said to implement it. State the test in the terms of the joint reasons and apply it to that provision, in the context of the law’s implementation of the treaty overall, including any part that goes further than the treaty.
Say whose reasons you rely on.
Check your understanding
1. According to the joint reasons, what must a law be reasonably capable of being considered if it is to be supported as implementing a treaty, and who chooses the means?
2. Why were ss 170DE(2) and 170EDA(1)(b) invalid when the rest of Div 3 of Pt VIA was valid?
3. Why did Dawson J agree with the orders proposed by the majority although he disagreed with their approach to the external affairs power?