NZYQ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs
NZYQ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 37
A stateless man has served his sentence, but no country will take him, and the Migration Act says he must be kept in detention until he is removed or granted a visa. Is there a limit on how long the executive can hold him?
What happened?
The plaintiff is a stateless Rohingya Muslim, born in Myanmar between 1995 and 1997, who arrived in Australia by boat in 2012 and was held in immigration detention under s 189 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) before being granted a bridging visa in 2014 ([1]). In 2016 he pleaded guilty in the District Court of New South Wales to a sexual offence against a child and was sentenced to imprisonment, and when he was released on parole in 2018 he was taken again into immigration detention under s 189(1) ([2]).
A delegate found that he had a well-founded fear of persecution in Myanmar and so was a refugee, but refused his application for a protection visa because of the finding that he was a danger to the Australian community. The Tribunal affirmed that decision, and the Federal Court dismissed an application for judicial review in 2022 ([3]-[4]). The duties in s 198(6), and in s 198(1) on his written request, to remove him from Australia as soon as reasonably practicable were then engaged ([4]). He could not be removed to Myanmar, had no right to enter or reside in any other country, and there was no real prospect of him being given one ([5]).
On 5 April 2023 he began a proceeding in the High Court’s original jurisdiction claiming that his detention was not authorised by ss 189(1) and 196(1), or alternatively that those provisions contravened Ch III of the Constitution. The parties agreed on a special case, heard on 7 and 8 November 2023 ([6]-[7]).
What did the Court decide?
At the end of the hearing on 8 November 2023 the Full Court made an order answering the questions of law in the special case. Reasons were published on 28 November 2023. The order answered each of the six questions of law in the special case. It declared that the plaintiff’s detention was unlawful as at 30 May 2023 and had been unlawful since then, directed that a writ of habeas corpus issue requiring his release, and ordered the defendants to pay the costs.
The order was announced as agreed to by at least a majority, because Gleeson and Jagot JJ did not agree that orders should be made without reasons. After considering the matter they agreed with the order ([8]). The reasons are a single set, in the names of all seven Justices.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
The statutory holding was not reopened. In the reasons of the Court, the statutory construction holding in Al-Kateb was left in place. “Informed by that strongly conservative cautionary principle, the applicable considerations weigh against reopening of the statutory construction holding in Al-Kateb but in favour of reopening of its constitutional holding” ([18]). The reasoning of the majority in Al-Kateb “cannot be said to have overlooked any principle of statutory construction on which the minority in Al-Kateb relied or on which the plaintiff and amici placed emphasis in argument” ([19]).
Parliament had not altered the critical text, had inserted in 2005 provisions that assumed the correctness of that construction and had inserted s 197C(3) in 2021 ([20]-[21]), and the majority in The Commonwealth v AJL20 had “endorsed key aspects of the reasoning of the majority on the issue of statutory construction in Al-Kateb” ([22]). The conclusion was that “leave to reopen the statutory construction holding in Al-Kateb should not be granted” ([23]).
The constitutional holding was overruled. The Court granted leave to reopen the constitutional holding, which was that ss 189(1) and 196(1), construed that way, did not contravene Ch III when applied to an unlawful non-citizen with no real prospect of removal becoming practicable in the reasonably foreseeable future ([14], [24], [37]). The Court said that background principle in Lim, repeatedly applied since Al-Kateb, makes detention of an alien lawful only where the law is reasonably capable of being seen as necessary for a legitimate and non-punitive purpose, and that “a Commonwealth statute which authorises executive detention must limit the duration of that detention to what is reasonably capable of being seen to be necessary to effectuate an identified statutory purpose which is reasonably capable of being achieved” ([39]-[41]).
“This Court is unanimous in concluding that this is an incomplete and, accordingly, inaccurate statement of the applicable principle”, referring to McHugh J’s statement in Al-Kateb that a law requiring detention of an alien takes its character from the purpose of the detention ([42]-[43]). There were two approaches.
Six members said that “The Lim principle would be devoid of substance were it enough to justify detention” by a purpose, namely “an identified legislative objective that there is no real prospect of achieving in the reasonably foreseeable future”, so the constitutional holding in Al-Kateb, “having been reopened, must be overruled” ([45]). Where there is no real prospect of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, that absence “refutes the existence of the first” legitimate purpose ([46]), and “The purpose of separation of an alien from the Australian community is outside the limited range of legitimate purposes identified in Lim” ([48]).
Edelman J’s approach was “slightly different” ([51]). It treated the purpose of the provisions as legitimate, detention pending removal, and located the problem in the Al-Kateb majority having “either ignored or paid insufficient attention to the proportionality requirement of Lim” ([53]-[54]).
The constitutionally permissible period of executive detention of an alien who has failed to obtain permission to remain “follows directly from the principle in Lim” as coming to an end when there is no real prospect of removal becoming practicable in the reasonably foreseeable future ([55]). The defendants conceded, correctly, that once the plaintiff put the lawfulness of his detention in issue they “bore the legal burden of proving that the constitutional limitation was not transgressed” ([59]).
What followed. Gageler CJ, Gleeson and Beech-Jones JJ later said in Abdel-Hady v Commonwealth [2026] HCA 17 that the result of this constitutional holding is that ss 189(1) and 196(1) must be taken always to have been invalid in their application to an unlawful non-citizen with no real prospect of removal becoming practicable in the reasonably foreseeable future, and that no novel common law defence to false imprisonment should be recognised for officers who acted on Al-Kateb ([5]-[7] of that decision).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ
Read judgment: [18]–[23] (PDF p 14) (opens in a new tab)
These are the cumulative reasons for refusing leave to reopen the statutory construction holding: no overlooked construction principle, legislative reliance and endorsement, and AJL20. The refusal determined the plaintiff’s construction claim and the answers to the statutory construction questions. It does not treat the constitutional validity of continued detention as settled by that construction.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Gageler CJ, Gordon, Steward, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ
Read judgment: [43]–[49] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab)
The six Justices’ ground for overruling the constitutional holding was that detention cannot be justified by removal where there is no real prospect of achieving it in the reasonably foreseeable future. Their rejection of separation from the community as an independent purpose answers the defendants’ proposed justification. This reasoning was necessary to their conclusion that the provisions could not validly authorise this detention.
Separate reasoning · Edelman J
Read judgment: [51]–[54] (PDF p 26) (opens in a new tab)
Edelman J concurs in the result through a distinct route expressly identified within the joint reasons. He accepts detention pending removal as a legitimate purpose but concludes that detention without a real prospect of removal becoming practicable in the reasonably foreseeable future fails Lim’s requirement of proportionality. This is his concurring reasoning, rather than the six Justices’ analysis of purpose.
Ratio · Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ
Read judgment: [55] (PDF p 28) (opens in a new tab), [59]–[60] (PDF p 29) (opens in a new tab), [70]–[71] (PDF p 32) (opens in a new tab)
These passages state and apply the constitutional limit on detention under this removal scheme. Once the plaintiff discharged the initial evidential burden putting lawfulness in issue, the defendants had to prove a real prospect of removal becoming practicable in the reasonably foreseeable future. Their failure to do so meant the provisions did not validly authorise detention and the plaintiff was entitled to liberty. These steps were necessary to the declaration and habeas corpus relief; they classify NZYQ’s reasoning, rather than the later Abdel-Hady discussion.
Why does this case matter?
NZYQ is the decision students meet in questions on immigration detention, the judicial power of the Commonwealth and when the High Court departs from its own decisions. The weakness an examiner sees most often is a summary pitched at the plaintiff’s result. The marks are for the reasoning that connects executive detention to the limits on Commonwealth power, and for care over whose approach is being described.
Exam and application relevance
Name the earlier decision the Court addressed and say which of its holdings is in issue in the problem before stating what NZYQ did with it. State the principle from Lim as the Court stated it, then apply it to the facts of the problem, including what is known about the prospect of removal.
Say whose approach you are describing, since the reasons record two.
Check your understanding
1. What did the Court conclude about whether to reopen each of the two holdings in Al-Kateb, and what considerations did it give for the first?
2. In what respect was the Court unanimous about McHugh J’s statement in Al-Kateb, and how did the approach of six members differ from that of Edelman J?
3. Who bore the legal burden of proving that the constitutional limitation was not transgressed, and what did they have to prove?