Nulyarimma v Thompson
Nulyarimma v Thompson (1999) 96 FCR 153
Appellants sought arrest warrants for genocide against the Prime Minister and three other parliamentarians, relying on a crime recognised by customary international law. If no Australian statute creates it, can an Australian court try it?
Qualified by Thorpe v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria [2026] VSCA 239
Parliament has since legislated: Division 268 of the Criminal Code (Cth), inserted in 2002, contains genocide offences in ss 268.3 to 268.7. The Court of Appeal of Victoria in Thorpe v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria [2026] VSCA 239 at [77]-[78] saw no reason to depart from the majority in Nulyarimma and considered that Division 268 makes it very difficult to sustain a parallel common law offence of genocide. At [80] it held that, having regard to the text, context and purpose of ss 268.3 to 268.7, the right to exercise jurisdiction over the universal crime of genocide in Australian courts is derived exclusively from Division 268, notwithstanding that s 268.120 provides that Division 268 is not intended to exclude or limit any other law of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory.
What happened?
Two proceedings were heard together by a Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia ([1]). Each involved claims by members of the Aboriginal community that Commonwealth Ministers or members of Parliament had committed genocide ([1]).
In the first (A5 of 1999), four appellants (Wadjularbinna Nulyarimma, Isobel Coe, Billy Craigie and Robbie Thorpe) appealed from Crispin J of the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory. His Honour had upheld the refusal of the Registrar of the Magistrates Court of the Territory, Mr Thompson, to issue warrants for the arrest of four people: the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, a Senator and a member of the House of Representatives. The informations charged the criminal offence of genocide in connection with the formulation of the Commonwealth government’s “Ten Point Plan” on native title and the presentation and support of the Bill that, as extensively amended, became the Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth) ([2]).
The Registrar had declined to issue the warrants on the ground that the offence of genocide was not known to the law of the Territory ([68] Merkel J). Crispin J had concluded that no offence of genocide was known to the domestic law of Australia and had also considered whether, if it were, the material raised an arguable case ([69] Merkel J).
In the second (S23 of 1999), Kevin Buzzacott, on behalf of the Arabunna People, sued Senator Hill (Minister for the Environment), Mr Downer (Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade) and the Commonwealth. He alleged that they had committed genocide by failing to apply to include the Arabunna lands, which include Lake Eyre, on the World Heritage List, and he sought civil remedies including a mandatory injunction. The respondents moved to strike the proceeding out ([3]).
Before the Full Court the appellants and Mr Buzzacott relied on a single argument about genocide: that, as a universal crime under customary international law, it is part of the common law of Australia and can found criminal liability (and, in Mr Buzzacott’s case, civil remedies) in an Australian court, and that their submissions rested on customary, not conventional, international law ([75]-[76] Merkel J). The respondents said that customary international law forms part of Australian law only if legislation enacts it ([77] Merkel J).
What did the Court decide?
The Full Court (Wilcox, Whitlam and Merkel JJ) dismissed the appeal in A5 of 1999 and dismissed the proceeding in S23 of 1999 (orders of 1 September 1999). Each Justice wrote separately: Wilcox J at [1]-[34], Whitlam J at [35]-[59] and Merkel J at [60]-[235].
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
All three Justices accepted that genocide is a crime under customary international law (Wilcox J at [17] and [18]; Whitlam J at [36] and [57]; Merkel J at [78], recording what was common ground between the parties). Wilcox J accepted that the prohibition is a peremptory norm giving rise to an obligation, independent of the Genocide Convention, to extradite or prosecute ([18]).
Wilcox J and Whitlam J, each in separate reasons, held that genocide was nevertheless not cognisable in an Australian court in the absence of legislation. Wilcox J held that the Commonwealth Parliament could legislate to provide for the trial of genocide in Australia ([19]), but that an international obligation does not of itself allow a person to be tried without legislation. It would be curious if a customary obligation had greater domestic consequences than an obligation under a ratified convention, which does not directly affect Australian law until implemented ([20]).
Showing that international law treats genocide as a crime does not show that Australian law permits a trial, so the question is one for the common law ([22]). A norm criminalising conduct differs from a civil rule such as foreign state immunity ([25]). As a matter of policy, a criminal case should be resolved by declining to enforce the international norm in the absence of legislation, because the presumption that there is no crime unless expressly created by law applies and ground rules about courts, procedure and punishment are needed ([26]). His Honour concluded: “In the absence of enabling legislation, the offence of genocide is not cognisable in the courts of the Australian Capital Territory” ([32]).
Whitlam J held that universal jurisdiction in international law does not by itself give municipal courts jurisdiction to try international crimes ([49]-[52]); that courts can no longer create new criminal offences ([53]); that s 1.1 of the Criminal Code (Cth), operating from 1 January 1997, abolished common law offences under Commonwealth law ([54]); that the courts of the States and Territories have no authority to proscribe conduct as criminal under the common law simply because it has become an international crime with the status of jus cogens ([57]); and that genocide is therefore not an offence in respect of which an information may be laid under the Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) ([55]-[58]).
Merkel J, who disagreed with Wilcox J and Whitlam J on this question ([17]), held that customary international law is received into Australian law by a common law adoption approach. A rule that has attained general acceptance by the community of nations is received into, and becomes a source of, domestic law unless it is inconsistent with a statute or with the general policies of the common law (inconsistency being “inconsistency with the general policies of our law, or lack of logical congruence with its principles”), and the rule is then declared to be part of the common law ([132]).
He concluded that this approach applies to a universal crime having the status of jus cogens and that legislation is not required for such a crime to be adopted ([157], [160]-[161]); that s 1.1 of the Criminal Code (Cth) refers to Commonwealth laws and does not prevent adoption of a universal crime as part of the common law generally ([163]); and that adopting an existing international crime is not the creation of a new offence by the courts ([167], [177]-[179]). His Honour held that “the offence of genocide is an offence under the common law of Australia” ([186]).
Merkel J nevertheless held that the appeal should be dismissed. The Registrar’s ground for refusing the warrants was wrong in law ([187]), but the relief sought was discretionary and is refused where the Registrar was bound in law to reach the same decision on another basis ([190]-[191]). Merkel J assumed without deciding that an information can be laid before a magistrate in respect of a common law offence ([188]). He held that Crispin J’s conclusions, that s 16 of the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth) and related principles protected the members of Parliament in respect of the conduct alleged ([193], [195]) and that the material did not raise an arguable case that the acts alleged fell within the definition of genocide ([196]), were plainly open on the evidence and clearly correct ([197]), and he concluded that the Registrar was bound in law to refuse the warrants ([203]).
In Buzzacott v Hill he held that the conduct complained of was not capable of constituting genocide under international or municipal law ([231]), and that the strike-out motion should succeed ([235]). Wilcox J found it unnecessary to express views on the other obstacles to the appeal and agreed that it should be dismissed ([32]); Whitlam J said that if genocide were an offence in the Territory the appeal must nonetheless be dismissed for Merkel J’s reasons ([59]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Separate reasoning · Wilcox J
Read judgment: [18]–[32] (opens in a new tab)
Wilcox J reached the conclusion that genocide is not cognisable in the courts of the Australian Capital Territory without enabling legislation by his own route (the distinction between the international obligation and its domestic enforcement, the criminal-law policy against enforcement without legislation). He wrote alone and concurred in the order dismissing the appeal; no other Justice adopted his reasoning, although Whitlam J reached the same conclusion on a different basis.
Separate reasoning · Whitlam J
Read judgment: [49]–[58] (opens in a new tab)
Whitlam J reached the conclusion that genocide is not an offence in respect of which an information may be laid under the ACT Act by a different route from Wilcox J (universal jurisdiction as a component of sovereignty, the end of judicial creation of offences, s 1.1 of the Criminal Code and the position of the States and Territories). He concurred in the order dismissing the appeal and said at [59] that, if he were wrong, the appeal must nonetheless be dismissed for the reasons given by Merkel J.
Proposition 2
Separate reasoning · Merkel J
Read judgment: [132]–[186] (opens in a new tab)
Merkel J’s conclusion that genocide is an offence under the common law of Australia is contrary to the conclusion of Wilcox J and Whitlam J on the same question. He concurred in the order dismissing the appeal on another ground, so this is a separate and dissenting route on cognisability, not a holding of the Court.
Separate reasoning · Merkel J (Whitlam J agreeing conditionally at [59])
Read judgment: [187]–[203] (opens in a new tab)
The reasons for refusing relief even if genocide is a common law offence are Merkel J’s. Whitlam J said at [59] that if he were wrong about cognisability the appeal must be dismissed for Merkel J’s reasons; Wilcox J found it unnecessary to express a view on the other obstacles ([32]). No Justice joined these reasons on the appeal in A5 of 1999 without qualification; Wilcox J agreed with Merkel J on the other causes of action in S23 of 1999 ([34]).
Why does this case matter?
Examiners use this case to test whether a student can keep apart what international law requires of Australia and what an Australian court may do about it, and whether the student attributes each line of reasoning to the Justice who wrote it. A student who treats the order as the whole of the case, without reading how each Justice arrived at it, will misdescribe a decision that is easy to cite from a headnote and hard to cite accurately.
Exam and application relevance
Name the Justice whose reasoning you rely on and give his paragraph numbers, because each Justice wrote separate reasons. The decision is a Full Court of the Federal Court on appeal from the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, not a decision of the High Court. It concerned the Registrar’s refusal in 1998 to issue process in the Australian Capital Territory and was decided on 1 September 1999, so ask before applying it which law governs the conduct and the forum in your problem, including whether legislation now deals with the offence you are asked about.
Check your understanding
1. What orders did the Court make in each proceeding, and which Justice wrote each of the three judgments?
2. What did all three Justices accept about genocide in customary international law, and which of them recorded that it was common ground between the parties?
3. What did Wilcox J say at [20] about the relationship between a customary obligation and an obligation under a ratified convention?
4. How did Whitlam J use s 1.1 of the Criminal Code (Cth) in reasoning about the Australian Capital Territory?
5. On what basis did Merkel J nevertheless dismiss the appeal in A5 of 1999?