Polites v Commonwealth
Polites v Commonwealth (1945) 70 CLR 60
Two Greek nationals living in Australia are ordered to report for military service. International law, they say, forbids compelling resident aliens to fight. Does that settle the matter for an Australian court?
What happened?
Speros Polites, a Greek national aged 29, and Orpheus Kandiliotes, a Greek national aged 25, lived in Australia. Each was served with a notice requiring him to serve in the military forces of the Commonwealth. Polites’s notice was served under reg 7 of the National Security (Aliens Service) Regulations (Statutory Rules 1942 No 39) and Kandiliotes’s under reg 6 in Part II of regulations substituted by Statutory Rules 1943 No 108. The regulations authorised an area officer to require any male allied national to serve, and a person served became subject to the Defence Act as if he were a British subject or serving under Part IV of it.
Each plaintiff sued the Commonwealth for declarations that the regulation was unauthorised by the National Security Act and that he was not liable to serve. The Commonwealth demurred. The plaintiffs argued that statutes are presumed not to violate rules of international law, that a rule of international law prevents a State from compelling resident aliens to serve in its armed forces, and that the general words of s 13A of the National Security Act, the provision the regulations depended on, should be read down accordingly.
What did the Court decide?
On 10 April 1945 the Court allowed the demurrers in both actions and gave judgment for the defendants. Latham CJ, Rich, Starke, Dixon, McTiernan and Williams JJ each delivered separate written reasons, and all six held the regulations valid.
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
Validity. Latham CJ said that all the authorities recognised that “courts are bound by the statute law of their country, even if that law should violate a rule of international law.” His Honour held: “It must be held that legislation otherwise within the power of the Commonwealth Parliament does not become invalid because it conflicts with a rule of international law, though every effort should be made to construe Commonwealth statutes so as to avoid breaches of international law and of international comity.”
So “The question, therefore, is not a question of the power of the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate in breach of international law, but is a question whether in fact it has done so.” He accepted that there was an established rule against imposing ordinary military service on resident aliens and said of the regulations, “They must be held to be contrary to an established rule of international law,” but held that s 13A authorised them.
On the constitutional question, Dixon J said the contention that s 51(vi) should be read subject to the presumption “ought not to be countenanced.” McTiernan J said the defence power “is not subject to the rules of international law governing the responsibilities of aliens for the defence of the State in whose territory they are resident.” Williams J held that the power could not be limited by such a presumption any more than the power of the Imperial Parliament. Starke J, leaving “Cases of ambiguity” on one side because there was none in the regulations, said that treating the rule “as a restriction upon the legislative capacity of sovereign States or as an overriding principle governing the construction of legislative acts ignores the fundamental principle of government that a State is sovereign within its territory.”
The presumption of consistency. McTiernan J stated that “There is a presumption that the legislature does not intend to violate by a statute any established rule of international law. But the presumption does not govern the construction of a statute if its language shows that it was not the intention of the legislature that the statute should be in harmony with international law.” The general term “persons” in s 13A plainly included aliens within the jurisdiction, so the presumption did not apply.
Dixon J stated the rule of construction that “unless a contrary intention appear, general words occurring in a statute are to be read subject to the established rules of international law,” and held that s 13A “should not be read subject to the restriction contended for,” given its purpose of clothing the Executive with the most ample authority in the emergency of 1940. Rich J was “unable to construe s. 13A as subject to any such rule.” Williams J accepted the rule of construction and presumption but held that Parliament intended to confer complete authority on the Executive, adding that the regulations were “a departure from established British practice and a breach of the comity of nations.”
Why does this case matter?
Questions about international law in an Australian court tend to start from the rule of international law and stop there. An examiner looks for the Australian source of the power and the Australian instrument under challenge, and for whose reasons support each step.
Exam and application relevance
Keep two questions apart: whether a Commonwealth law is within a head of power, and how the statute or regulation is to be read. For each, say which Justice’s reasons you rely on.
The decision concerned wartime regulations of 1942 and 1943, made under a provision conferring wide power on the Executive.
Check your understanding
1. Which Justice said that legislation within the power of the Commonwealth Parliament does not become invalid because it conflicts with a rule of international law, and what did he say the question therefore was?
2. How did McTiernan J and Dixon J each deal with the presumption that a statute is not intended to violate international law?
3. What did Starke J say about restricting legislative capacity, or construing legislation, by reference to a rule of the law of nations?