Thorpe v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria

Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria · 2026

International Law And Conflict Of LawsSources Of International Law

Thorpe v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria [2026] VSCA 239

A man tries to start a private prosecution of the King for genocide in a Victorian court, relying in part on the common law. Is there a common law offence of genocide in Australia beside the Criminal Code’s statutory offences?

What happened?

On 20 October 2023 Uncle Robbie Thorpe (“Uncle Robbie”) attempted to file a charge-sheet in the Magistrates’ Court of Victoria naming himself as informant and King Charles III as the accused ([1]). It alleged continuing acts of genocide against First Peoples since 28 September 2022, contrary to First Peoples’ sovereign laws, the common law of Victoria and Division 268 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) ([1]). It also named attempted genocide, incitement, conspiracy and complicity, and laid two further charges, cultural genocide and ecocide, under First Peoples’ laws and the common law ([12]).

At the relevant time a criminal proceeding in the Magistrates’ Court began by filing a charge-sheet with a registrar, and a registrar had to issue a summons to answer the charge “if satisfied that the charge discloses an offence known to law” ([10]-[11]). On 29 December 2023 a senior registrar refused to issue the proceeding, on the basis that no proper source of law had been particularised, that the proposed accused might be misled or prejudiced, and that issuing the proceeding would be an abuse of process ([2]). Uncle Robbie sought judicial review in the Trial Division of the Supreme Court. The Magistrates’ Court filed a submitting appearance, and the Attorney-General of Victoria was joined as second defendant ([3]-[4]).

The primary judge considered the sources of law named in the charge-sheet in turn: the laws of Australia’s First Peoples, the common law and Division 268 ([16]). She dismissed the review proceeding because the charges did not disclose an offence known to the law of Victoria ([7]). On the common law, she held that she was bound to follow two earlier decisions unless there was some compelling reason to depart from them ([23]). On Division 268, she held that s 268.121 required the written consent of the Commonwealth Attorney-General and that any prosecution be brought in the Attorney-General’s name, and that neither had been met ([25]).

Uncle Robbie sought leave to appeal on 11 proposed grounds ([28]). On 4 June 2026 the Attorney-General of Victoria filed a notice of contention supporting the primary judge’s orders on a further ground ([48]).

What did the Court decide?

The Court of Appeal (Emerton P, Orr and Osborn JJA) refused leave to appeal on 28 September 2026, because none of the proposed grounds had a real prospect of success ([9], [104]).

The Court dealt with grounds 2 to 7 and 9 together, saying that they did not challenge the primary judge’s determinations on the sources of law ([29]-[34]). It then dealt with ground 1 ([36]-[37]), ground 8 ([38]-[43]), ground 10 ([47]-[97]) and ground 11 ([98]-[103]), finding in each case no real prospect of success. It also dealt with the notice of contention ([48]-[49], [80]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The Court of Appeal (Emerton P, Orr and Osborn JJA, in joint reasons written in the first person plural, with no Justice writing separately) rejected proposed ground 10, which was that the primary judge erred in failing to find that genocide was a common law offence that allowed a private prosecution ([47], [96]-[97]). It gave two reasons.

The first concerned precedent. The primary judge was bound to follow Nulyarimma and Thorpe v Kennett ([52]). The Court of Appeal said that, as a court of three judges of appeal, it might be thought to have somewhat more latitude, but described the High Court in Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd as having stated that intermediate appellate courts in one jurisdiction should not depart from decisions of intermediate appellate courts in another jurisdiction on the interpretation of Commonwealth or uniform national legislation unless convinced that the interpretation is plainly wrong, and that, since there is a common law of Australia rather than of each jurisdiction, the same principle applies to non-statutory law ([52]).

It concluded that it would have to be persuaded that Nulyarimma was plainly wrong ([53]). It saw “no reason to depart from the conclusion of the majority in Nulyarimma” or from Warren J’s decision in Thorpe v Kennett ([77]), held that the judgments of Wilcox and Whitlam JJ “are not plainly wrong” and that “each is in its own way persuasive” ([78]), and held that the primary judge did not err in declining to revisit those decisions ([79]). It observed that Merkel J, who held that there was a common law offence, went to some lengths to find one because there was no legislation to meet Australia’s obligation to prevent and punish genocide, and said: “There is now such a vehicle”, namely Division 268 ([75]-[76]).

The second reason concerned Division 268 of the Criminal Code (Cth). The Attorney-General of Victoria’s notice of contention said that any common law offence had been abrogated or displaced because Division 268 is a complete codification of the criminal law of genocide ([48]). The Court of Appeal said that it would uphold the notice insofar as it relates to the crimes of genocide described in the Rome Statute and Division 268, holding that, having regard to the text, context and purpose of ss 268.3 to 268.7, “the right to exercise jurisdiction with respect to the universal crime of genocide in Australian courts is derived exclusively from div 268”, and that this is so although s 268.120 provides that Division 268 is not intended to exclude or limit any other law of the Commonwealth or any law of a State or Territory ([80]).

Its reasons were these. The Division 268 offences and the offence of genocide under international law are, as the Attorney-General submitted, “wholly co-extensive” ([81]-[83]). The jurisdiction of Australian courts over these offences is intended to be entirely co-extensive with that of the International Criminal Court, to take advantage of the principle of complementarity ([84]). Section 268.121 requires the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s written consent and provides that an offence against the Division may only be prosecuted in the Attorney-General’s name ([85]), and Taylor v Attorney-General (Cth), which the Court of Appeal described as concerning who may prosecute Division 268 offences, held by majority that s 268.121(2) displaced the general right to bring a private prosecution under s 13 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ([87]-[90]).

The Court of Appeal said that the High Court in Taylor did not consider whether a prosecution for genocide could only be brought under Division 268 or whether a common law offence of that kind existed ([88]), and that Taylor is not directly on point, but that it is “a very strong indication that the legislature did not contemplate the co-existence of a common law offence of genocide that could be privately prosecuted by the simple act of filing a charge-sheet in the Magistrates’ Court” ([91]).

It concluded: “To that extent, we consider the offence or offences of genocide provided for in div 268 preclude the existence of a common law offence or common law offences of the same kind” ([92]). On the saving provision, it noted that the Explanatory Memorandum gives no explanation for s 268.120, that the Attorney-General’s second reading speech recognised that some crimes in the Division were already crimes in Australia, and that Division 268 offences whose subject matter is familiar to domestic courts, such as murder, must be committed intentionally or knowingly as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population, so that they are unlikely to be replicated in State and Territory statutes or in the common law ([93]-[95]).

The Court of Appeal described the question whether customary international law applies in Australian law other than through the interpretation of statutes as “unsettled” ([56]) and did not resolve it. It set aside the question whether the Sovereign would be immune from prosecution at common law, because of its conclusion and because neither party had made submissions on it (note 88 to [96]). Its reasons on ground 10 do not discuss separately the charges of cultural genocide and ecocide that the charge-sheet laid under the common law as well as First Peoples’ law ([12]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · Emerton P, Orr and Osborn JJA (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [52]–[53] (opens in a new tab), [77]–[79] (opens in a new tab)

The Court of Appeal answers the contention that the primary judge erred in declining to revisit Nulyarimma and Thorpe v Kennett by applying the plainly wrong standard and holding the majority judgments not plainly wrong ([53], [78], [79]). This is a ground of decision on ground 10 and an alternative to the Division 268 reason: the Court’s conclusion at [96] follows from both. It is a conclusion that the earlier decisions are not plainly wrong and persuasive, not a holding that the Nulyarimma majority was correct.

Ratio · Emerton P, Orr and Osborn JJA (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [80]–[95] (opens in a new tab)

The Court of Appeal would uphold the Attorney-General’s notice of contention, which advanced the codification point as a further reason for supporting the primary judge’s orders ([48]), insofar as it relates to the crimes of genocide described in the Rome Statute and Division 268 ([80]). Its conclusion that the Division 268 offences preclude a common law offence of the same kind ([92]) is a ground of decision on ground 10 and an alternative to the precedent reason. The primary judge had said she was not sure the codification argument was correct and found it unnecessary to decide ([24]).

Obiter · Emerton P, Orr and Osborn JJA (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [54]–[61] (opens in a new tab)

The Court describes customary international law, the academic controversy about its incorporation and the High Court authorities, and says that whether customary international law applies in circumstances other than statutory interpretation is unsettled ([56]). It does not decide that question; the result on ground 10 rests on [52]-[53], [77]-[79] and [80]-[92].

Classification unresolved · Emerton P, Orr and Osborn JJA (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [96] (opens in a new tab)

Note 88 to [96] says that, given the Court’s conclusion and because neither party advanced submissions, it is unnecessary to consider whether the person of the Sovereign would enjoy immunity from prosecution at common law even if genocide were a common law offence. The Court expressly set the question aside, so it is not a decision either way.

Why does this case matter?

Genocide is a crime in international law, and that makes it easy to write as though an Australian court can hear a charge of it from whoever lays one. Examiners use this case to test whether a student can keep apart the existence of an international norm and the existence of an Australian offence, and whether the student reports accurately the weight of a Victorian Court of Appeal decision given on an application for leave to appeal.

Exam and application relevance

Within Victoria the courts below the Court of Appeal are bound to follow Thorpe; elsewhere in Australia it is persuasive, and it does not bind the High Court. When you cite it, say that it was decided on an application for leave to appeal.

In a problem about the prosecution of an international crime, ask what source of criminal liability the charge relies on and test each source on its own, as the primary judge did ([16]). Give the paragraph for each point you attribute to the Court, and keep what the Court decided on ground 10 separate from what it said in passing about customary international law ([54]-[61]). The provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) and of Division 268 are stated as the judgment describes them in 2026; check the provisions in force for your problem.

Check your understanding

1. What reasons did the senior registrar give for refusing to issue the proceeding, and what did Uncle Robbie do next ([2]-[3])?

2. Which sources of law did the charge-sheet rely on ([1], [12])?

3. What did the Court of Appeal say it would have to be persuaded of before it could depart from Nulyarimma, and where did it say that standard comes from ([52]-[53])?

4. What did the Court of Appeal say about the judgments of Wilcox and Whitlam JJ in Nulyarimma ([78])?

5. What did the Court of Appeal say about the source of the right to exercise jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide described in the Rome Statute and Division 268, and what did it say about s 268.120 ([80])?

6. What did the Court of Appeal say the High Court in Taylor did not consider, and what use did it make of Taylor ([88], [91])?

7. What did the Court of Appeal say about whether customary international law applies in Australian law other than through the interpretation of statutes ([56])?