Customary international law in Australian courts

Explains what Australian courts do with customary international law: it does not override a statute (Polites), it influences the common law (Mabo (No 2)), and whether it creates liability without legislation divided the Full Federal Court in Nulyarimma.

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
au-commonwealth, act, vic
Subjects
international-law-and-conflict-of-laws
Topics
sources-of-international-law

Learning outcomes

  • Separate the international question (is there a rule of customary international law?) from the Australian question (does an Australian court give it effect?).
  • State, with the cases, why a Commonwealth statute within power prevails over a conflicting rule of international law and when the presumption of consistency applies.
  • Explain the influence of international law on the common law in Mabo (No 2), without overstating it as automatic reception.
  • Set out the competing positions of Wilcox, Whitlam and Merkel JJ in Nulyarimma v Thompson on whether custom can create criminal liability without legislation, attributing each to its judge.

The companion article on sources of international law explains where international law comes from. This article asks what an Australian court does with one of those sources, customary international law, when it is relied on in a dispute. That is a separate question, because a rule can bind Australia internationally and still have no direct effect in an Australian courtroom. The authorities cited here are High Court decisions (Polites v Commonwealth and Mabo v Queensland (No 2)) and a Full Court of the Federal Court (Nulyarimma v Thompson), so this is a statement of Commonwealth and Australian Capital Territory law in the cases named, and where the law is unsettled the article attributes the positions to the judges who took them. The prior question is whether the rule is being used to change the outcome against a statute, to shape the common law, or to create liability that no statute creates.

Custom as a source, and who it binds

Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice directs that Court, “whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it”, to apply, among other things, “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law” (Statute of the International Court of Justice, art 38(1)(b)). That wording is addressed to the International Court. An Australian judge has used it as a list of sources: in Al-Kateb v Godwin, McHugh J set out art 38 as including international conventions, international custom and the general principles of law, and observed that custom may be evidenced by a very wide range of material ([64]).4 He treated the breadth of those sources as a reason why it is “impossible to believe” that Parliament, when it legislates, has in mind or is even aware of all the rules of international law ([65]). That is the reasons of one Justice in a 4:3 decision, and its constitutional holding was later overruled in NZYQ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 37, where the Court declined to reopen the statutory construction holding ([23]) and six members said the constitutional holding must be overruled ([45]).5 Article 38 does not say that a domestic court must treat custom as part of its own law, and the cases below show that Australian courts have treated that as a question of Australian law. The leading International Court decisions on how custom is proved, North Sea Continental Shelf and Nicaragua v United States, are not stated here.

Custom yields to a statute

Polites v Commonwealth (1945) 70 CLR 60 involved Greek nationals resident in Australia who were required by regulation to serve in the military forces.1 The plaintiffs argued that international law forbade conscripting resident aliens. Latham CJ accepted that there was a rule of international law of that kind and that the regulations were contrary to it. He held that this did not matter to validity: “legislation otherwise within the power of the Commonwealth Parliament does not become invalid because it conflicts with a rule of international law”, though “every effort should be made to construe Commonwealth statutes so as to avoid breaches of international law”. The question was therefore whether Parliament had in fact done so. Dixon J stated the rule of construction that, unless a contrary intention appears, general words in a statute are to be read subject to the established rules of international law, but held that the empowering section should not be read subject to the restriction the plaintiffs contended for, and that the contention that the Constitution’s defence power should be read subject to the same implication “ought not to be countenanced”. McTiernan J put the presumption this way: it “does not govern the construction of a statute if its language shows that it was not the intention of the legislature that the statute should be in harmony with international law”, and added that the legislative power over defence is not subject to the rules of international law governing the responsibilities of aliens for the defence of the State. All six Justices held the regulations valid.

Two separate propositions come out of that decision, and students often run them together. A statute within power is valid even if it conflicts with international law, and where a statute is genuinely open to more than one meaning a court will prefer the meaning that fits international law. The Polites passages cited here concern a statute and regulations, not the common law, and the case is a 1945 decision; its later treatment is not established by the sources cited here, so a student should check for it.

Custom and the development of the common law

In Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, Brennan J, with whose reasons Mason CJ and McHugh J agreed, said that “the common law does not necessarily conform with international law, but international law is a legitimate and important influence on the development of the common law, especially when international law declares the existence of universal human rights”.2 His Honour made that point in rejecting a common law doctrine that denied indigenous inhabitants rights in their land. The statement is about influence on the content of the common law. It is not a statement that custom automatically becomes common law, and it did not need to decide how a customary rule is received.

Custom and criminal liability: Nulyarimma v Thompson

Nulyarimma v Thompson (1999) 96 FCR 153 is where the reception question was argued directly.3 The appellants sought arrest warrants for genocide, relying on the status of genocide as a peremptory norm (jus cogens) of customary international law, which all parties accepted (Whitlam J at [36]). The Full Court of the Federal Court, Wilcox, Whitlam and Merkel JJ, dismissed the appeal, but the judges did not agree on the central question.

  • Wilcox J. The Australian position on incorporation and transformation is “far from clear” ([23]). It is one thing to say Australia must prosecute or extradite a genocide suspect and that Parliament may legislate for it, and another to say a person may be tried for genocide in an Australian court “without legislation” ([20]). In the realm of criminal law his Honour would decline, in the absence of legislation, to enforce the international norm ([26]), and concluded that in the absence of enabling legislation genocide is not cognisable in the ACT courts ([32]).
  • Whitlam J. Genocide is not an offence for which an information may be laid under the ACT statute ([58]). Section 1.1 of the Criminal Code (Cth) provides that “the only offences against laws of the Commonwealth are those offences created by, or under the authority of, this Code or any other Act”, so since 1 January 1997 genocide cannot be recognised as a common law offence under Commonwealth law ([54]), and the courts of the States and Territories cannot proscribe conduct as criminal at common law merely because it has become an international crime ([57]).
  • Merkel J. Merkel J took the opposite view of the law. He formulated an adoption approach: a rule of customary international law is received into domestic law once it has general acceptance among nations and is not inconsistent with statute or with the general policies of the common law ([132]). On that approach genocide is an offence under the common law of Australia ([186]). He nonetheless dismissed the appeal, because the Registrar was bound in law to refuse the warrants on the facts alleged ([203]).

So the result in the case, dismissal of the appeal, was unanimous, while two judges held that genocide was not cognisable without legislation and one held it was an offence at common law. Nulyarimma is a decision of the Full Federal Court, not the High Court, and none of the High Court decisions cited here resolves the disagreement.

The statutory position has since changed. Division 268 of the Criminal Code (Cth), inserted in 2002, contains genocide offences in ss 268.3 to 268.7, as the Court of Appeal of Victoria described it in Thorpe v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria [2026] VSCA 239 at [51]; the text of Division 268 itself is not among the sources cited here.6 Refusing leave to appeal, Emerton P, Orr and Osborn JJA saw “no reason to depart from the conclusion of the majority in Nulyarimma” ([77]), held that the judgments of Wilcox and Whitlam JJ were “not plainly wrong”, and said that Division 268 “makes it very difficult to sustain the argument that there exists in parallel a common law offence of genocide arising from customary international law” ([78]). That is a Victorian intermediate appellate decision, applying the principle that such a court should not depart from another’s decision on the common law unless convinced it is plainly wrong ([52]-[53]). At [56] the Court of Appeal accepted that statutes are interpreted, where language permits, consistently with Australia’s customary international law obligations, but described the question whether customary international law applies in other circumstances as one that “is unsettled”. The disagreement is also about criminal liability. Wilcox J distinguished criminal norms from a civil-law rule such as foreign sovereign immunity, which a court may be prepared to treat as part of domestic law ([25]).

Where the sources meet Australian law

Putting these together, with the qualifications above: custom is not a source that overrides an Australian statute (Polites); it may influence how the common law develops (Mabo (No 2), Brennan J); and whether it can, without legislation, create liability in a court was disputed in Nulyarimma, where the judges differed, and for genocide Parliament has since legislated (Division 268, as described in Thorpe). Treaties are treated differently and are the subject of the companion article on treaty incorporation; in Nulyarimma Wilcox J drew the comparison himself, noting that it would be curious if a customary obligation had greater domestic consequences than a ratified convention ([20]).

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Identify the source relied on. If it is custom, say so and separate the international question (is there a rule?) from the Australian one (does a court here give it effect?).
  2. Check for a statute on point. A Commonwealth statute within power prevails over a conflicting rule of international law (Polites, Latham CJ and Dixon J); do not argue that custom invalidates it.
  3. If the statute is ambiguous, apply the presumption of consistency with international law, which yields where the statute’s language shows a contrary intention (Dixon J and McTiernan J in Polites).
  4. If the argument is about developing the common law, cite Brennan J in Mabo (No 2) for influence and not for automatic reception.
  5. If the argument is that custom itself creates liability, especially criminal liability, state the divided views in Nulyarimma by judge, say that this is a Full Federal Court decision, and check for a statute: for genocide, Division 268 of the Criminal Code (Cth) and Thorpe.
  6. Keep to the order the companion article sets out for the sources, with judicial decisions as evidence of them, before turning to what Australian law does with the result.

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