Customary international law in Australian courts
Custom as a source, and who it binds
Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute tells the International Court to apply “international custom” when deciding disputes. Custom here means general practice that states accept as law. This rule is addressed to that Court, not to Australian courts.
In Al-Kateb v Godwin, McHugh J treated article 38 as a list of sources of international law: treaties, custom, and general principles. He noted custom can be proved by many kinds of evidence. This was his reasoning in a 4:3 decision, not a majority holding.
McHugh J used this point to argue it is “impossible to believe” Parliament knows every rule of international law when it legislates.
The High Court later overruled Al-Kateb’s constitutional holding in NZYQ, with six judges agreeing. But the Court declined to reopen Al-Kateb’s separate holding on statutory interpretation.
Article 38 does not say domestic courts must treat custom as part of their own law. Whether Australian courts do so is treated as a separate question of Australian law, covered elsewhere.
Two leading International Court cases on how custom is proved, North Sea Continental Shelf and Nicaragua v United States, are mentioned but not explained here.
Custom yields to a statute
Polites v Commonwealth (1945) 70 CLR 60 concerned Greek nationals living in Australia. A regulation required them to serve in the military. They argued international law banned conscripting resident aliens.
Latham CJ agreed such an international law rule existed. But he held a valid Commonwealth statute stays valid even if it conflicts with international law. Courts should still try to read statutes so they avoid breaching international law, if the wording allows it.
Dixon J set out a rule of construction: general words in a statute are normally read subject to established international law, unless the statute shows a contrary intention. He held this did not help the plaintiffs here, and said the Constitution’s defence power should not be read as limited this way either.
McTiernan J agreed the presumption only applies if the statute’s wording fits it. He held the defence power is not limited by international law rules about aliens’ duties during wartime. All six judges upheld the regulations as valid.
Two separate points come from this case. First, a statute within power stays valid even if it conflicts with international law. Second, if a statute’s wording is genuinely ambiguous, courts prefer the meaning that matches international law.
Note these passages concern a statute and regulations, not the common law. The case is from 1945, and its later treatment isn’t covered by the sources here.
Custom and the development of the common law
In Mabo v Queensland (No 2), Brennan J said international law does not automatically become part of Australian common law. But he said it is a legitimate and important influence on how common law develops, especially for universal human rights.
He made this point when rejecting an old common law rule that denied Indigenous peoples rights to their land.
This statement is about influence on the content of the common law, not automatic adoption. It did not decide how a customary rule actually becomes part of the common law.
Where the sources meet Australian law
Custom does not beat an Australian statute. This was confirmed in Polites.
Custom may shape how common law develops. Brennan J said this in Mabo (No 2).
Whether custom alone can create liability, without legislation, is unsettled. Judges disagreed on this in Nulyarimma. Parliament later legislated for genocide in Division 268.
Treaties work differently and are covered in a separate article. In Nulyarimma, Wilcox J noted it would be odd if custom had more domestic effect than a ratified treaty.
Applying this in a problem question
First, name the source you rely on. If it is custom (a rule from state practice, not a statute), say so clearly. Keep two questions apart: does the international rule exist, and will an Australian court apply it?
Next, check for a statute on point. A valid Commonwealth statute prevails over a conflicting customary rule (Polites, Latham CJ and Dixon J). Do not argue that custom can override it.
If the statute’s wording is unclear, apply the presumption of consistency with international law. This presumption yields if the statute’s language shows a contrary intention (Dixon J and McTiernan J in Polites).
For arguments about developing the common law, cite Brennan J in Mabo (No 2). Use this only to show custom’s influence, not automatic adoption into Australian law.
If the claim is that custom alone creates liability, especially criminal liability, note that Nulyarimma judges were divided on this point. Remember it is a Full Federal Court decision. Also check for a statute: for genocide, this means Division 268 of the Criminal Code (Cth) and Thorpe.
Finally, follow the order set in the companion article. Deal with sources first, then judicial decisions as evidence of them, before considering what Australian law does with the result.
A Quick Read uses simpler language and may leave out detail, including whole topics, to stay short. The full article is the complete statement.