Mabo v Queensland (No 2)

High Court of Australia · 1992

PropertyFirst Nations And Australian LawFirst Nations Law And Native Title Framework

Mabo v Queensland (No 2) [1992] HCA 23

If the Crown became sovereign over inhabited land, did it also become the owner of it?

Clarified by legislation: Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 223

The Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) now supplies the statutory framework, and s 223(1) defines native title as the communal, group or individual rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders in relation to land or waters where they are possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged and traditional customs observed, where those laws and customs give a connection with the land or waters, and where the rights and interests are ‘recognised by the common law of Australia’. That last limb matters for how this case is used: the statute does not replace the common law recognition established here, it incorporates it as a condition of the statutory definition. A present-day claim proceeds under the Act, and the connection requirement in s 223(1)(b) is where much of the subsequent litigation has been fought.

Qualified by Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422; [2002] HCA 58

Mabo (No 2) is now applied through the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), not as a source of common law requirements for native title. In Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria the joint reasons of Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ said, at [70], that undue emphasis may have been given to what was said in Mabo (No 2), “at the expense of recognising the principal, indeed determinative, place that should be given to the Native Title Act”. At [75] their Honours said that to speak of the “common law requirements” of native title “is to invite fundamental error” and that “Native title is not a creature of the common law”; Mabo (No 2) decided that rights and interests rooted in traditional law and custom survived the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty and radical title, and it was that native title which was then recognised and protected in accordance with the Act. At [76] they said that the reference in s 223(1)(c) to recognition by the common law cannot be understood as bringing a pre-existing body of common law defining native title into the Act, and that “to speak of there being common law elements for the establishment of native title is to commit the same error”. At [77] they said that the reference to recognition by the common law may require refusal of recognition to rights or interests antithetical to fundamental tenets of the common law, a point put aside in that case, and that it emphasises that the intersection between the legal systems occurred at sovereignty. So rely on Mabo (No 2) for the survival of native title through the change in sovereignty, and decide whether native title exists today by the definition in s 223(1) rather than by common law requirements.

What happened?

The Meriam people brought proceedings claiming rights to the Murray Islands, which they and their ancestors had occupied and cultivated under their own laws and customs long before and ever since the Crown asserted sovereignty. Queensland’s answer was that sovereignty had carried beneficial ownership with it, so the islands were simply Crown land.

What did the Court decide?

The Court declared that the land in the Murray Islands is not Crown land within the Queensland Land Act, and that the Meriam people are entitled as against the whole world to possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of it — setting aside Dauer and Waier, a parcel leased to the Trustees of the Australian Board of Missions, and any parcels validly appropriated to uses inconsistent with that enjoyment. The title was declared subject to the power of the Parliament of Queensland and of the Governor in Council.

Proposition

What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added

Principle analysis

A mere change in sovereignty does not extinguish native title: the rights and interests possessed under the traditional laws and customs of the indigenous inhabitants survive, to the extent not validly extinguished, as a burden on the radical title the Crown acquires. Radical title underpins the doctrine of tenure and accompanies sovereignty; its acquisition does not itself confer absolute beneficial ownership of occupied land where the common law recognises the inhabitants’ rights and interests.

Why does this case matter?

Two limits are built into the decision and both matter constantly in practice. The first is extinguishment: a grant or appropriation inconsistent with the rights can end them. The second is that the entitlement is defined by the community’s own laws and customs, so what it consists of is a question of fact about a particular people and a particular place, and not a standard bundle that can be asserted in the abstract.

The order repays careful reading on the first point, because the parcels it sets aside were set aside for different reasons and the judges did not agree about all of them. On the two-acre parcel leased to the London Missionary Society and later held by the trustees of the Australian Board of Missions, Brennan J held that whatever native title had been enjoyed there was extinguished by the granting and renewal of the lease. Dauer and Waier drew a split: Deane and Gaudron JJ thought it likely that the purported twenty-year lease, which had recognised and protected the Islanders’ usufructuary rights and was later forfeited, neither extinguished native title nor had any continuing adverse effect even if it was valid, while Brennan J considered that a valid lease would have extinguished the traditional rights, and Toohey J left the question unanswered.

Reading a carve-out in the order as an established finding of extinguishment therefore gets the case wrong twice over — extinguishment has to be established for the particular land, and here it was genuinely contested.

Brennan J’s remarks about international law are often quoted more broadly than he put them. He said the common law had to march in step with international law in the specific sense of supplying the law applicable in newly acquired territory, and elsewhere that “the common law does not necessarily conform with international law, but international law is a legitimate and important influence on the development of the common law, especially when international law declares the existence of universal human rights”. Influence is not obligation.

Exam and application relevance

Start from the traditional laws and customs and what connection they establish, because that is where the content of the right comes from — and today, where s 223 of the Native Title Act sends you. Deal with extinguishment parcel by parcel and dealing by dealing, saying what was granted and whether it was inconsistent, rather than raising it as a general objection. And do not overstate the holding: sovereignty was not in issue in this case, so an answer that argues about it has left the question asked.

Check your understanding

What explains the Court’s rejection of Queensland’s claim about ownership of the islands?