Native title: common-law recognition and the statutory framework
How native title in Australia has three distinct origin points - pre-existing traditional laws and customs, common-law recognition in Mabo v Queensland (No 2), and the statutory framework in the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) - and why each is a separate question from the others.
Learning outcomes
- Distinguish the pre-existing basis of native title from its common-law recognition and its statutory framework.
- State when and how Australian common law first recognised native title.
- State when the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) commenced and what it established.
A common student question - “when did native title start?” - actually asks about three different things, and Australian law gives a different, more precise answer to each.
A pre-existing basis, not a grant
Native title is not a form of title that the Crown or the Commonwealth Parliament created and then handed to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. It arises from the traditional laws acknowledged and the traditional customs observed by those peoples, and from their connection to particular land and waters under those laws and customs. The statutory definition enacted later turns on the same material: s 223(1) describes rights and interests possessed under traditional laws acknowledged and traditional customs observed, a connection with the land or waters by those laws and customs, and recognition of the rights and interests by the common law of Australia.2 That connection existed before, and independently of, British acquisition of sovereignty over Australia. What later changed was whether the Australian legal system recognised rights and interests of that kind; whether particular peoples presently possess native title rights and interests, and presently have the connection the definition requires, is a separate question, decided under s 223(1).
Common-law recognition: Mabo v Queensland (No 2)
Australian common law recognised native title in Mabo v Queensland (No 2) [1992] HCA 23, decided by the High Court on 3 June 1992.1 The Court rejected the earlier assumption that Australia was terra nullius - land belonging to no one - for the purposes of denying any pre-existing property rights, and held instead that native title survives, to the extent it has not been extinguished, as a burden on the Crown’s radical title acquired at sovereignty.
This is a recognition case, not a creation case: the Court did not invent a new right, it removed a legal fiction that had previously prevented the common law from recognising a right that, on the Court’s own reasoning, already existed under Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander law and custom.
The statutory framework: the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth)
Following Mabo (No 2), the Commonwealth Parliament enacted the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), which received Royal Assent on 24 December 1993. Its commencement was staged: ss 1 and 2 commenced on Assent, the principal provisions (ss 3-200 and 202-253) on 1 January 1994 by proclamation, and s 201 on 1 July 1994. The Act does not itself create native title; it provides the statutory mechanism for recognising, protecting, determining and dealing with native title rights and interests, including the processes for making and resolving native title claims and for regulating “future acts” that may affect native title.
A claim for a determination of native title is accordingly considered by reference to the Act’s own provisions. In Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422, the joint reasons of Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ said that the determination the claimants sought was “a creature of that Act, not the common law”, and that “Native title is not a creature of the common law”: for present purposes native title is what s 223(1) defines and describes, and the reference in par (c) of s 223(1) to recognition by the common law of Australia does not bring a pre-existing body of common law defining native title into the Act.3 Their Honours said it may be that undue emphasis was given in the primary judge’s reasons to what was said in Mabo (No 2), at the expense of the determinative place that should be given to the Act. On that approach Mabo (No 2) is relied on for its decision that certain rights and interests relating to land, rooted in traditional law and custom, survived the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty and radical title, while whether native title exists today is decided by applying the definition in s 223(1) rather than by asking whether “common law requirements” are satisfied.
Because the Act’s title carries the year 1993 but its provisions commenced later, and on more than one date, and because the Act has since been amended multiple times, always check the specific provision and the current compiled version on the official legislation register rather than assuming the year in the Act’s short title tells you when a particular rule took effect.
Why the distinction matters
A complete answer to “when did native title start” should identify all three points that are actually being asked about, rather than picking one and treating the others as if they did not exist:
- the pre-existing traditional basis, which has no single “start date” because it is not a creature of Australian statute or common law;
- common-law recognition, dated to Mabo v Queensland (No 2), 3 June 1992; and
- the statutory framework, whose principal provisions in the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) commenced on 1 January 1994.
Collapsing these into one date - or assuming the Act created the right it merely regulates - is a common and avoidable error.
Self-check
Before answering a question about native title’s origin, check whether it is really asking about the traditional/customary basis, the common-law recognition case, or the commencement of the statutory framework, and answer the one(s) actually asked rather than defaulting to whichever is easiest to state.
For the surrounding constitutional and jurisdictional context, read Commonwealth, state and territory law.