Forsyth v Blundell

High Court of Australia · 1973

PropertyMortgages

Forsyth v Blundell (1973) 129 CLR 477

A mortgagee selling up a defaulting borrower is spending someone else’s equity to recover its own debt. How carefully does it have to sell?

Clarified by legislation: Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW)

The question Forsyth left open has been answered by statute in some jurisdictions, so check the Act before arguing the common law. Section 111A(1) of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) requires a mortgagee exercising a power of sale to “take reasonable care to ensure that the land is sold for” not less than market value where the land has an ascertainable market value, or otherwise “the best price that may reasonably be obtained in the circumstances”; s 111A(2) extends that to an agent appointed to sell; s 111A(5) makes it non-excludable. Section 111A(4) then shapes the remedy FOR BREACH OF THAT SECTION and nothing wider: “[t]he title of the purchaser cannot be challenged on the ground that the mortgagee or chargee has committed a breach of any duty imposed by this section”, but a person who suffers loss “has a remedy in damages”. Two limits worth noting. Section 111A(4) is confined to challenges on the ground of a breach of s 111A -- it does not by its terms bar relief sought on some other ground, such as the reckless sacrifice of the mortgagor’s interests found in Forsyth. And s 111A(6) preserves one specific thing: “any rule of law relating to the duty of the mortgagee or chargee to account to the mortgagor or chargor”, not every mortgagee duty at large. Outside New South Wales, check the local provision; where there is none, the common law and Forsyth’s open question remain the starting point.

What happened?

Associated Securities Ltd held a mortgage over a service-station site and went to sell it. The property had a special value to a limited class of buyers — oil companies. It had been with agents for twelve months and had drawn one unconditional offer of $90,000. ASL knew of a 1966 valuation at $98,000 and of a 1967 valuation of $150,000 obtained by the mortgagors.

XL had expressed real interest in bidding at the forthcoming auction and had mentioned $150,000. Instead of going to auction, ASL sold privately to Shell for $120,000. In the negotiation ASL’s officer told Shell it held a valuation near Shell’s own $80,000 figure, and talked down XL’s interest; he did not mention the rejected $90,000 offer, the $98,000 valuation or the $150,000 one. Mason J found that the $120,000 figure was one Wilkie suggested first, and that it “represented the amount which he believed A.S.L. should receive on sale in order to meet the principal debt, interest and expenses owing to it” ([11], at 510).

What did the Court decide?

The appeals were dismissed, and Shell was restrained from completing the contract of sale.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

A mortgagee exercising the power of sale may have regard primarily to its own interests, but where those interests are not at risk it may not act in a way that sacrifices the mortgagor’s. Selling without regard to a known competing buyer, and so without caring whether the price is a proper one, is reckless and a breach of duty. Whether mere negligence in conducting the sale also breaches the duty was left open.

The finding matters more than the label. Fox J at first instance had found ASL failed “to take reasonable steps to obtain the best price available in all the circumstances”, but went further: its conduct reflected “calculated indifference” to the mortgagor, and was “reckless”, and “sacrificed” the mortgagor’s interests (at 493). On appeal Walsh J declined to resolve whether the duty is broken by negligence alone, because it did not arise: “[w]hat the mortgagee did in this case was done deliberately and not through carelessness”. A mortgagee “was entitled to have regard primarily to its own interests”, but “was not entitled, if those interests were not at risk, to act in a manner which sacrificed the interests of the mortgagor” (at 494).

Mason J made the point sharper by saying what was not established. “[N]either the evidence, nor the findings of his Honour, reveal the true value of the property”; expert evidence of value was never called; “the plaintiffs were unable to show that the sale was at an undervalue. Nor did they show that A.S.L. failed to take usual steps to test the market or bring the property to the attention of potential buyers” (at 507). The breach lay in selling privately to Shell while knowing XL was interested, “instead of proceeding to auction at which Shell and XL could be expected to compete against each other, or informing XL of the Shell offer and giving it the opportunity of improving upon that offer” (at 507).

That was acting “recklessly, without caring whether the price which it obtained was a proper price” (at 509). His Honour too found it unnecessary to decide whether a duty of reasonable care exists in addition to good faith (at 506).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · Walsh J

Read judgment: pp 493–494 (opens in a new tab)

Walsh J upheld the finding of breach because ASL deliberately sacrificed the mortgagor’s interests when protecting its own interests did not require that sacrifice. This was a necessary step in his decision to restrain completion of the sale, rather than an adoption of Fox J’s broader reasonable-steps formulation.

Ratio · Mason J

Read judgment: pp 509–511 (opens in a new tab)

Mason J found that disregarding XL’s genuine interest, failing to bring the buyers into competition and negotiating only to recover ASL’s debt showed recklessness as to a proper price. His conclusion that ASL failed to act bona fide was necessary to his finding of breach and agreement in the orders proposed by Walsh J.

Classification unresolved · Walsh J and Mason J

Read judgment: p 494 (opens in a new tab), p 506 (opens in a new tab)

Walsh J at 494 and Mason J at 506 expressly declined to decide whether negligence alone also breaches the mortgagee’s duty. Their findings went beyond carelessness, so that wider question was unnecessary to their decisions. The competing negligence standards discussed here must not be treated as an adopted rule.

Separate reasoning · Menzies J (dissenting)

Read judgment: pp 482–483 (opens in a new tab)

Menzies J would have allowed the appeal. He regarded the risk of losing Shell’s offer, after prolonged unsuccessful marketing and with only limited interest from XL, as justifying acceptance. His different assessment of good faith and commercial risk explains the dissent; it does not support the majority’s finding of reckless sacrifice.

Why does this case matter?

Because of what the mortgagors could not prove. No expert evidence of value was called, so the true value of the property was never established and no sale at undervalue was shown. Nor was it shown that the usual steps to test the market or bring the property to buyers’ attention had been skipped. On the two things a mortgagor would expect to have to prove, they had nothing.

They still won. The case rewards attention to the evidence behind the negotiations as well as the competing figures. The mortgagors had a detailed account of how one negotiation was conducted: what ASL’s officer told Shell, what he did not tell it, whose valuations were mentioned and whose were not, and what he did with an expression of interest he knew about. Findings of that kind are made from correspondence, file notes and cross-examination, not from valuers — and they are what this case is built on.

Exam and application relevance

Identify the governing statute before comparing the facts. In New South Wales, section 111A of the Conveyancing Act 1919 imposes an express reasonable-care duty as to price; subsection (4) provides damages for resulting loss and prevents challenges to purchaser title based on breach of that section. Check the applicable provision in the jurisdiction in the question.

For the common-law analysis, make a chronology of the marketing, valuations, offers and communications. Compare that chronology with the negotiations in Forsyth. Which facts would each side rely on, and which parts of Walsh J’s and Mason J’s reasoning address them? Distinguish the question each judge answered from any question left for another case.

Check your understanding

A mortgagee sells at a properly advertised auction, for less than the mortgagor believes the property is worth, and no other buyer was known to it. Has the duty been breached?