Radaich v Smith

High Court of Australia · 1959

PropertyLeases

Radaich v Smith (1959) 101 CLR 209

The document says licence. The occupier controls who comes in and can shut the owner out for the next five years. What did they actually get?

What happened?

A deed of 29 May 1954 granted Mrs Radaich, for a term of five years, “the sole and exclusive license and privilege to supply refreshments to the public admitted to premises situated at ... Mosman and to carry on the business of a milk bar therein”. The instrument “consistently avoids the use of the expressions ‘lease’, ‘lessors’, and ‘lessee’ and carefully uses the words ‘licence’, ‘licensors’, and ‘licensee’”. She went to a magistrate to have a fair rent determined for the premises, which she could do only if she was a tenant, and the case came up on a stated question about his jurisdiction.

What did the Court decide?

She had a lease. The appeal was allowed with costs, the Supreme Court’s order discharged, and the stated question answered that the magistrate’s decision “that he had jurisdiction and authority to determine the fair rent of the premises was not erroneous in law”.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Whether an arrangement is a lease or a licence turns on whether the occupier was granted a legal right to exclusive possession for a determinate period, regardless of what label the document uses. A grant carrying that right is a lease however it is described.

Taylor J framed the inquiry: “where there is a grant of a right for a determinate period in respect of land and the question is posed whether the grant creates a lease or a licence the question may be resolved by considering whether the right in question is a right to exclusive possession” (at 218). Sole occupation in fact is not the same thing, and Windeyer J’s caution is the one that matters in practice — the cases where exclusive occupation produced no tenancy “are all explicable if they mean ... that persons who are allowed to enjoy sole occupation in fact are not necessarily to be taken to have been given a right of exclusive possession in law” (at 223).

Windeyer J adds a general point that disposes of a common objection: a reserved right of entry to view the state of the premises or repair them “is, of course, not inconsistent with a grant of exclusive possession” (at 222). This deed reserved no such right — Menzies J notes at 221 that an entry-and-inspect provision was the “most significant difference” counsel pressed between this deed and the one in Addiscombe Garden Estates Ltd v Crabbe, and says a point-for-point comparison gains nothing.

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · Taylor J

Read judgment: pp 217–218 (opens in a new tab)

Taylor J held that the deed conferred a right to exclusive possession for the prescribed term and therefore created a leasehold interest. His test at 218 explains the ground necessary to that conclusion: where the transaction must be classified as a lease or licence, the legal right granted is decisive. This concerns the right created by the instrument, rather than its label or the mere fact of occupation; it does not treat every admission into possession as a lease.

Why does this case matter?

Because the classification is worth money. A lease is a proprietary interest and a licence is a personal permission, and which one an occupier has affects whether the right binds a purchaser — subject to the registration and priority rules of the jurisdiction, which do their own work; in New South Wales, for example, s 42(1) of the Real Property Act 1900 protects a registered proprietor subject to specified exceptions, including a qualified short-tenancy exception in s 42(1)(d). It also affects which statutory protections attach — but check the statute rather than reasoning from the common-law label, because the modern regimes do not track it.

In BA v The King [2023] HCA 14, Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Gleeson JJ point out that under the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW) the “right of occupation need not be exclusive”, so “a residential tenancy agreement spans the divide between leases and licences at common law”. Classification still decides the proprietary question; whether a protective statute applies is its own question, on its own definition.

It is also why the case is reached for so often. A dispute about a lease or a licence is almost always a dispute where the document and the arrangement on the ground point in different directions, and that is a situation someone drafted deliberately.

Exam and application relevance

Before opening the principle, identify the decisive right and explain how the deed’s clauses bear on it. Compare the provisions about running the milk bar, keeping business hours and access to the premises. Which clauses would you use to support each party’s argument?

For a problem involving inspection rights, shared rooms or a power to relocate the occupier, identify the relevant clauses and explain how the facts compare with the milk bar arrangement. Distinguish what the judges decided from an inference you draw for the new facts. After opening the principle, check your reasoning against Taylor J’s formulation and Windeyer J’s discussion of entry rights.

Check your understanding

How would you analyse a reserved right of entry to inspect, and how might your analysis change if the occupier had to share the premises with the owner? Explain your answer by reference to the right you identified.