Akai Pty Ltd v People’s Insurance Co Ltd
Akai Pty Ltd v People’s Insurance Co Ltd (1996) 188 CLR 418
A Sydney company’s insurance policy says English law governs and disputes go to the English courts. The insurer asks the Sydney court to stay the claim. A federal Act says its protections cannot be contracted out of.
What happened?
Akai Pty Ltd was a New South Wales company, a wholly-owned subsidiary of a Japanese company. The People’s Insurance Company Limited was incorporated in Singapore. In mid-1991 People’s Insurance issued Akai a credit insurance policy, negotiated between Akai’s broker in North Sydney and a Singapore subsidiary of the insurer, under which it undertook to indemnify Akai against loss when persons to whom Akai had supplied goods on credit failed to pay. The maximum liability and the premium were in Australian dollars.
Norman Ross Homeworks Pty Ltd, a retailer to which Akai had supplied goods, went into liquidation, and the insurer responded to Akai’s claim by alleging breaches of the policy. On 5 March 1993 Akai sued in the Commercial Division of the Supreme Court of New South Wales for a declaration that the insurer was liable to indemnify it, and on the same day issued a writ in the Queen’s Bench Division of the English High Court seeking the same relief.
Clause 9 of Article VI of the policy was headed “Governing Law” and read: “This policy shall be governed by the laws of England. Any dispute arising from this policy shall be referred to the Courts of England.” On 21 June 1993 the insurer moved for a stay of the New South Wales proceeding. The primary judge granted the stay and the Court of Appeal (Meagher and Sheller JJA; Kirby P dissenting) dismissed Akai’s appeal. Akai appealed by special leave.
What did the Court decide?
The Court allowed the appeal on 23 December 1996, by three Justices to two. It set aside the order of the Court of Appeal and, in place of it, set aside the orders of the Commercial Division and dismissed the insurer’s motion of 21 June 1993, and ordered the insurer to pay Akai’s costs in the High Court and the Court of Appeal and the costs of the motion in the Commercial Division.
Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ gave the reasons which decided the appeal. Dawson and McHugh JJ gave joint reasons and would have dismissed it.
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
Section 8 and the proper law. In the reasons of Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ, ss 52 and 8 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) “manifest a legislative intent not only that there should be no power to contract out of the provisions of the Act, but also that the regime established by the Act should be respected as regards contracts the proper law of which is, or but for selection of another law would be, that of a State or Territory.”
The Act takes the proper law as the connecting factor, determined objectively, and the parties’ selection of another law does not break that connection. On the facts, “the State of New South Wales contained the system of law with which the contract of insurance comprised in the Policy had the closest and most real connection,” so “s 8 of the Act operated to render it applicable to the Policy.”
Their Honours held that the phrase “an express provision to the contrary” in s 8(2) is not read as identifying only an express choice of law clause. They also said that a tripartite classification of express, inferred and objective choice “serves needlessly to complicate matters”, because “There is, in truth, only one question here, and that is whether, upon the proper construction of the contract (which may include an expression of choice in direct language), the court properly may conclude that the parties exercised liberty given by the common law to choose a governing law for their contract.”
Dawson and McHugh JJ thought it “unnecessary and premature to determine the proper law of the contract,” because the application for a stay could be decided by reference to the choice of courts provision alone.
The stay. In the reasons of Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ, where there is a foreign jurisdiction clause “the courts begin with a firm disposition in favour of maintaining that bargain unless strong reasons be adduced against a stay,” and “A stay may be refused where the foreign jurisdiction clause offends the public policy of the forum whether evinced by statute or declared by judicial decision.” Section 52 supplied the answer: a stay would “serve to exclude the operation of s 54 from the litigation,” and “the second sentence of cl 9 is rendered void by the Act.” The application was dealt with on the footing that an English court would not apply the Act as part of the lex causae, and with the clause void the circumstances showed “an overwhelming balance of considerations favouring the taking of the matter to trial in the Supreme Court of New South Wales.”
Dawson and McHugh JJ held that clause 9 had two parts: “They are two different things.” “A choice of law clause does not constitute a submission to the jurisdiction of the courts of a chosen legal system. A choice of courts clause does.” The second sentence was an exclusive jurisdiction clause which “the Act does not preclude,” and “no strong reasons are apparent which would justify the refusal of a stay.”
Both sets of reasons began from a firm disposition to hold parties to their bargain. Dawson and McHugh JJ said the law “has always been solicitous that when parties do contract to submit their disputes to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of another country they should be held to their bargain.” The displacement in this case came from the Act.
What the case does not decide. The reasons concern s 8 of the Insurance Contracts Act. The High Court has since said that Akai is not authority for a general proposition that, where the lex causae is foreign law, a local statute cannot apply unless it demands application irrespective of the lex causae, because s 8 chose the proper law as that Act’s own connecting factor (Karpik v Carnival plc [2023] HCA 39 at [23]). It has also read Akai as a case decided because the Court was satisfied that an English court would not apply the Act as part of the lex causae (Carmichael Rail Network Pty Ltd v BBC Chartering Carriers GmbH & Co KG [2024] HCA 4 at [43]).
Why does this case matter?
A contract with a clause naming an overseas court invites a short answer in a problem question: enforce the bargain, or do not. An examiner looks for the particular statute relied on, the facts that tie the contract to it, and a separate step for the stay.
Exam and application relevance
Separate the two questions the policy raised. First, which statute is said to apply, and how does it connect itself to the contract: ask what connecting factor it uses and how that factor is to be determined. Second, whether a stay should be granted to enforce the foreign jurisdiction clause, and what public policy or statutory provision is said to answer the clause.
Say whose reasons you are relying on, since the Justices disagreed on both questions.
Do not use the case as authority for the application of other statutes without construing each one; the limit is stated in the Proposition.
Check your understanding
1. Which Justices’ reasons decided the appeal, and what connecting factor did they say the Insurance Contracts Act used for its operation?
2. How did Dawson and McHugh JJ distinguish a choice of law clause from a choice of courts clause, and what followed for the stay?
3. What did the later High Court decisions say about how far Akai goes?