Forum, stay and contract: when an Australian court takes or declines a case
Explains how an Australian court’s jurisdiction is invoked and declined (Voth’s clearly inappropriate forum test, Gutnick), the statutory stay and transfer rules between States and Territories, and why a contract’s choice of law differs from its choice of courts (Akai).
Learning outcomes
- Distinguish invoking a court’s jurisdiction by service from the separate question whether the court should decline to exercise it, and state the test in Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd for a stay on forum grounds.
- Apply the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) s 20 and the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (Cth) s 5(2) to a proceeding that crosses State or Territory lines, without importing the Voth test into them.
- Distinguish a contract’s choice of law clause from its choice of courts clause, and explain why the High Court refused a stay in Akai Pty Ltd v People’s Insurance Co Ltd, attributing the reasoning to the Justices who gave it.
The companion article on choice of law and jurisdiction separates the question whether a court may hear a dispute from the question which law decides it, and it covers the choice-of-law rule for tort. This article takes the parts of the area it leaves open: how a court’s jurisdiction is invoked and when the court declines to exercise it, the statutory rules for proceedings that cross State and Territory lines, and how a contract’s choice of law differs from its choice of courts. The common law rules below are stated for Australian courts generally; the Commonwealth statutes covered are the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) and the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (Cth). The rules of court on service outside Australia differ between courts, and only the Victorian rule that Dow Jones & Co Inc v Gutnick quoted is stated here. The prior question is whether the court has jurisdiction at all, or has been asked to give it up.
Invoking jurisdiction by service
An Australian court’s jurisdiction over a defendant is ordinarily invoked by serving originating process. Within Australia, s 15(1) of the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) provides that an “initiating process issued in a State may be served in another State”, and Territories are regarded as States for the Act (s 5(1)). Service under the Act has the same effect, and may give rise to the same proceedings, as if the process had been served in the place of issue (s 12).
Outside Australia the court’s own rules decide when originating process may be served. In Gutnick, the joint reasons of Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ, with which Gaudron J agreed, described the Victorian scheme: originating process could be served out of Australia without leave where, for example, the proceeding was brought in respect of damage suffered wholly or partly in Victoria and caused by a tortious act or omission wherever occurring ([3], [46]). A defendant who contests the court’s jurisdiction may enter a conditional appearance and apply for a stay or to set service aside ([3]).
Declining jurisdiction: the clearly inappropriate forum test
Once jurisdiction is regularly invoked, the question is whether the court should decline to exercise it. Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538 settled the test. The joint reasons of Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ applied the approach Deane J had stated in Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v Fay: the court is to ask whether, having regard to the circumstances and the availability of the foreign tribunal, the local court is “a clearly inappropriate forum”, so that continuing the proceeding would be oppressive or vexatious.1 The question focuses on the inappropriateness of the local court, not the comparative appropriateness of the foreign one. Their Honours said that Lord Goff’s discussion of connecting factors and “a legitimate personal or juridical advantage” in Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd, an English decision, gave “valuable assistance”, while not adopting its “clearly more appropriate forum” test. Their Honours thought the two tests would give the same result in most cases, and differ in significance only where a foreign tribunal is the more appropriate forum but the local one cannot be called clearly inappropriate.
Two features of Voth are easy to misreport. First, the test was not unanimous in its reasoning: Brennan J, who preferred a different test, joined the majority’s test because it was more important that it be authoritatively settled, and Toohey J adhered to the view he and Wilson J had expressed in Oceanic Sun that forum non conveniens should decide the stay, though he agreed in the orders. Secondly, the result shows how the test works. The Court thought Missouri was the more appropriate forum for a claim against a Missouri accountant, but observed that it did not necessarily follow that New South Wales was clearly inappropriate. It reached that conclusion after weighing the connecting factors, which pointed strongly to Missouri, against the plaintiffs’ residence and the juridical advantages of suing at home, and it stayed the action on condition that the defendant would not plead a limitation defence in Missouri. Voth applied the Phillips v Eyre choice of law rule, which is not the current rule for tort; in Regie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v Zhang (2002) 210 CLR 491 the joint reasons of five Justices held that the double actionability rule has no application in Australia in international torts ([60]) and that the lex loci delicti governs the substantive law for foreign torts ([75]).2 The companion article sets out that rule.
Gutnick applied the test to a defamation claim. The parties accepted that a court declines jurisdiction on this ground only when the forum is clearly inappropriate, and that the law of the place of the tort governs matters of substance ([9]). The joint reasons located the tort of defamation ordinarily “at the place where the damage to reputation occurs”, which for material on the World Wide Web is where it is downloaded, assuming that the person defamed has in that place a reputation which is thereby damaged ([44]). Because Mr Gutnick confined his claim to damage to his reputation in Victoria, the tort was committed in Victoria and the refusal to stay was upheld ([48]). Their Honours added that “more difficult questions may arise” where publication in several places is alleged ([49]). For multiple publication in more than one Australian jurisdictional area, s 11(2) of the Defamation Act 2005 (SA) has since supplied its own choice of law rule, which the companion article sets out and records as in substantially the same terms in the other uniform Acts.43
Within Australia: stay and transfer by statute
For proceedings that cross State and Territory lines, Parliament has supplied its own tests. Under s 20 of the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth), a person served under that Division with initiating process issued in another State may apply for a stay, and the court “may order that the proceeding be stayed if it is satisfied that a court of another State that has jurisdiction to determine all the matters in issue between the parties is the appropriate court” (s 20(3)).6 The matters the court is to take into account “include” the places of residence of the parties and of the witnesses likely to be called, the place where the subject matter is situated, the parties’ financial circumstances so far as the court is aware of them, “any agreement between the parties about the court or place in which the proceeding should be instituted”, the law that would be most appropriate to apply, and whether a related or similar proceeding has been commenced against the person served or another person (s 20(4)). The list is not closed, but the matters “do not include the fact that the proceeding was commenced in the place of issue” (s 20(4)). The section does not apply where a State Supreme Court is the court of issue (s 20(1)), leaves other stay grounds untouched (s 20(9)), and does not affect the cross-vesting legislation (s 20(10)). A court of a State that is not the place of issue must not restrain a party from taking a step on the ground that the place of issue is not the appropriate forum (s 21).
The cross-vesting scheme works by transfer. Under s 5(2) of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (Cth), a Supreme Court of a State or Territory in which a proceeding is pending “shall transfer” it to the Supreme Court of another State or Territory if it appears that the proceeding arises out of or is related to a proceeding pending there and it is more appropriate that the other court determine it, or that having regard to stated matters and the interests of justice it is more appropriate, or that it is “otherwise in the interests of justice” (s 5(2)(b)).7 Section 5(1) makes parallel provision for transfer to the Federal Court, and s 5(9) provides that nothing in the section confers on a court jurisdiction that it would not otherwise have. Both Commonwealth Acts refer to State laws on the same subject; those State and Territory laws are not covered here. This article also does not state how courts have applied the statutory words, or how they sit with the Voth test.
A contract’s choice of law is not its choice of courts
Akai Pty Ltd v People’s Insurance Co Ltd (1996) 188 CLR 418 shows why the two must be kept apart.5 A New South Wales company took out credit insurance from a Singapore insurer under a policy whose clause 9 said the policy “shall be governed by the laws of England” and that disputes “shall be referred to the Courts of England”. The insurer sought a stay of the company’s New South Wales action. The stay turned on the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth), s 8 of which applies the Act to contracts whose proper law is, or but for “an express provision to the contrary” would be, the law of a State or Territory.
The Court was divided 3:2 and the appeal was allowed, so the stay was refused. Dawson and McHugh JJ, in dissent, would have dismissed the appeal. They said a choice of law clause and a choice of courts clause are “two different things”: the first is not a submission to the jurisdiction of the chosen courts, and the second is. They treated clause 9’s second sentence as an exclusive jurisdiction clause which the Act did not forbid, and held the parties to it.
Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ, whose reasons decided the appeal, reached the opposite result by a statutory route. Section 8 ensures that the Act’s application is not avoided by a choice of some other governing law: where the parties’ provisions are disregarded, the question is which law has the “closest and most real connection” with the contract, and on the facts that was the law of New South Wales. Their Honours also rejected a “three-tiered” approach to choice of law, saying there is “only one question”, whether on construction of the whole contract the parties chose a governing law. On the stay, they held that s 52 of the Act, which avoids provisions that exclude or modify the Act’s operation to the prejudice of a person other than the insurer, rendered the second sentence of clause 9 void.
Both sets of reasons began from the same background: courts start with a firm disposition in favour of holding parties to a foreign jurisdiction clause unless strong reasons are shown. In Akai what displaced that disposition was a statute with its own rule about contracting out, so the case is not authority that Australian courts disregard foreign jurisdiction clauses generally.
Applying this in a problem question
- State whether the question is the court’s jurisdiction, a request to stay or transfer, or the law that governs, and keep them separate.
- If the parties are in different States or Territories, check the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) ss 15 and 20 and the cross-vesting legislation before turning to the common law.
- If process is served outside Australia, identify the court’s own rule that permits it; do not assume another court’s rule is the same.
- For a stay on forum grounds outside the statutory schemes, apply the Voth test: is the local court a clearly inappropriate forum, so that the proceeding would be oppressive or vexatious? Weigh the connecting factors, and note that a more appropriate foreign forum does not by itself meet that test.
- For a contract, read the choice of law clause and the choice of courts clause separately, and ask whether a statute fixes its own connecting factor, as s 8 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) did in Akai.
- State a division in the court: attribute the Voth test to the joint reasons and the Akai result to the reasons of Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ, noting the dissent.