Dow Jones & Co Inc v Gutnick

High Court of Australia · 2002

International Law And Conflict Of LawsChoice Of Law And Jurisdiction

Dow Jones & Co Inc v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575

A New York publisher puts a magazine article on servers in New Jersey. Subscribers in Victoria can open it, and a Melbourne businessman sues at home. Where was he defamed, and does it matter which court hears the case?

Qualified by legislation: Defamation Act 2005 (SA)

The joint reasons left open complaints of injury to reputation said to result from publication in a number of places. For a multiple publication in more than one Australian jurisdictional area, s 11(2) of the Defamation Act 2005 (SA) now requires the substantive law of the area with which the harm occasioned by the publication as a whole has its closest connection to be applied to determine each cause of action for defamation based on the publication. Section 11(1) provides that a matter published wholly within a particular area is governed by the substantive law applicable in that area. This is the South Australian provision.

What happened?

Dow Jones & Company Inc prints and publishes the Wall Street Journal and Barron’s magazine and, since 1996, has operated WSJ.com, a subscription news site on the World Wide Web. The edition of Barron’s Online for 28 October 2000 contained an article called “Unholy Gains” that referred several times to Mr Joseph Gutnick, who lives in Victoria and has his business headquarters there. He claimed that part of the article defamed him and brought an action for damages in the Supreme Court of Victoria ([2]).

Dow Jones prepared the material in New York and loaded it onto servers it maintained in New Jersey ([17]). The originating process was served on it outside Australia, in reliance on rules of the Victorian court that allowed service outside Australia without leave ([3]). Dow Jones entered a conditional appearance and applied to set aside service or to stay the proceeding permanently ([5]). Mr Gutnick offered an undertaking to sue in no place other than Victoria on the matters founding his proceeding ([6]).

Hedigan J dismissed the application. The Court of Appeal of Victoria refused leave to appeal, and Dow Jones appealed to the High Court by special leave ([7]-[8]).

What did the Court decide?

The Court dismissed the appeal with costs on 10 December 2002. Seven Justices sat. Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ gave joint reasons ([1]-[55]), Gaudron J agreed with them and added her own comments ([56]-[65]), and Kirby J ([66]-[167]) and Callinan J ([168]-[203]) each gave separate reasons and would also have dismissed the appeal.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Where defamation on the Internet is committed. In the joint reasons, “ordinarily, defamation is to be located at the place where the damage to reputation occurs.” Ordinarily that is where the defamatory material is available in comprehensible form, “assuming, of course, that the person defamed has in that place a reputation which is thereby damaged” ([44]). Publication “is a bilateral act” in which the publisher makes the matter available and a third party has it available for comprehension, and harm to reputation is done only when the publication is comprehended ([26]).

For material on the Web, that is when it is downloaded: “It is where that person downloads the material that the damage to reputation may be done. Ordinarily then, that will be the place where the tort of defamation is committed” ([44]). The joint reasons rejected Dow Jones’s contention that publication is a singular event located only by the conduct of the publisher ([42]).

The joint reasons also declined to adopt the United States single publication rule as fixing a single place of publication: “the application of these principles does not require that a single place of publication be identified in every defamation case no matter how widely the defamatory material is disseminated” ([36]). Callinan J likewise treated the question as one of “identifying the place of publication as the place of comprehension” ([199]).

The stay. The Victorian rules allowed service out where the proceeding was brought in respect of damage suffered wholly or partly in Victoria and caused by a tortious act or omission wherever occurring, so the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Victoria was regularly invoked ([46]-[47]). Both parties accepted that a court declines jurisdiction regularly invoked, on forum non conveniens grounds, only when the forum is clearly inappropriate, and that matters of substance in a tort are governed by the law of the place of commission of the tort ([9]). Mr Gutnick confined his claim to the damage to his reputation in Victoria, so the place of commission of the tort was “readily located as Victoria”, Victorian law governed the substantive issues, and the claim was for a tort committed in Victoria ([48]). There was “no reason to conclude that the primary judge erred” in refusing a stay ([48]).

What was left open. The joint reasons said that “More difficult questions may arise” if the complaint were of injury to reputation said to have resulted from publications in a number of places ([49]). Gaudron J agreed with those observations and added that, in the case of multiple and simultaneous publications, if an issue arises as to whether an Australian court is a clearly inappropriate forum, “a very significant consideration will be whether that court can determine the whole controversy” ([64]).

Kirby J would have preferred to ask whether the Victorian court was the natural forum or whether another was more appropriate, but accepted that the Court had adopted a different approach and that the primary judge was bound to apply the clearly inappropriate forum test ([157]-[159]). Callinan J concluded that Victoria was a clearly appropriate forum ([202]).

After this decision the Defamation Act 2005 (SA) added its own choice of law provision, s 11. Section 11(2) applies, to a multiple publication of matter in more than one Australian jurisdictional area, the substantive law of the area with which the harm of the publication as a whole has its closest connection. Section 11(1) provides that a matter published wholly within a particular area is governed by the substantive law applicable in that area. This is the South Australian provision.

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ (Gaudron J agreeing at [56])

Read judgment: [26] (PDF p 12) (opens in a new tab), [36] (PDF p 16) (opens in a new tab), [42] (PDF p 19) (opens in a new tab), [44] (PDF p 19) (opens in a new tab), [48] (PDF p 21) (opens in a new tab), [56] (PDF p 24) (opens in a new tab)

The bilateral nature of publication and the location of reputational damage were necessary to reject Dow Jones’s argument that uploading in New Jersey fixed the place of the tort and the governing law. The single publication argument did not require a single place of publication. Applied to the claim confined to Victorian reputational damage, this reasoning located the tort in Victoria and defeated the asserted basis for a stay. The ordinary-location formulation retains the requirement of a reputation damaged there; it does not decide every claim involving worldwide publication.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ (Gaudron J agreeing at [56])

Read judgment: [9] (PDF p 7) (opens in a new tab), [46] (PDF p 20) (opens in a new tab), [47] (PDF p 20) (opens in a new tab), [48] (PDF p 21) (opens in a new tab), [56] (PDF p 24) (opens in a new tab)

Rule 7.01(1)(j) supplied the necessary basis for service out because the proceeding alleged damage in Victoria, wherever the tortious act occurred. The joint reasons then applied the accepted choice of law and clearly inappropriate forum principles to the claim confined to Victorian reputational damage. Victorian law governed, and no error justified disturbing the refusal of a stay. These were grounds for dismissing the appeal, applying principles accepted from earlier authorities rather than newly creating those tests. The later South Australian statute is not part of this judgment’s ratio.

Obiter · Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ

Read judgment: [49] (PDF p 21) (opens in a new tab)

The discussion of difficulties arising from claims for reputational injury through publications in several places concerns a wider claim than Gutnick brought. His claim was confined to Victoria, so resolving those difficulties was unnecessary to dismiss the appeal. This passage marks questions for another case rather than deciding them.

Obiter · Gaudron J

Read judgment: [64] (PDF p 26) (opens in a new tab), [65] (PDF p 26) (opens in a new tab)

Gaudron J’s observation that a court’s ability to determine the whole controversy is a very significant forum consideration addresses multiple simultaneous publications across jurisdictions. It was unnecessary to decide that broader situation: she explained that Gutnick had limited his controversy to Victoria and that the Victorian court could determine it in its entirety. She concurred in dismissal; this additional observation is not a new majority forum test.

Separate reasoning · Kirby J

Read judgment: [157] (PDF p 59) (opens in a new tab), [159] (PDF p 60) (opens in a new tab), [163] (PDF p 61) (opens in a new tab)

Kirby J concurred in dismissing the appeal, while preferring the natural or more appropriate forum approach. He nevertheless accepted that the primary judge was bound to apply the clearly inappropriate forum test. With a local cause of action governed by Victorian law and no demonstrated error in the discretion, he found no basis to disturb the refusal of a stay. His preferred test was not adopted as the governing rule.

Why does this case matter?

Online publication tempts students to answer a defamation problem as a question about technology. Examiners reward the answer that works from the facts of the problem: who published what, to whom, where, and what the plaintiff is suing for.

Exam and application relevance

Separate the questions the case keeps apart: whether the court has jurisdiction on the pleaded facts, which law governs substance, and whether the forum is clearly inappropriate. For each, say what the joint reasons said and what the plaintiff had claimed.

Where a problem involves publication in more than one State or Territory, check the statutory choice of law provision of the Defamation Act that applies before applying the common law rule.

Say whose reasons carry each point you rely on, since the Justices did not all write the same reasons.

Check your understanding

1. In the joint reasons, why is the place where the material was uploaded to the publisher’s servers not the place where the tort of defamation is committed?

2. What had Mr Gutnick done that made it possible to locate the tort in Victoria, and what did the joint reasons say about a complaint of injury from publication in several places?

3. Which Justices gave the joint reasons, and what did Gaudron J, Kirby J and Callinan J each add or say separately?