Neilson v Overseas Projects Corporation of Victoria Ltd

High Court of Australia · 2005

International Law And Conflict Of LawsChoice Of Law And Jurisdiction

Neilson v Overseas Projects Corporation of Victoria Ltd (2005) 223 CLR 331

A Western Australian woman is hurt in a fall in a Chinese apartment and sues in Perth. She says Chinese law would itself have sent the case to Australian law. Does an Australian court look at only part of China’s law?

What happened?

Mrs Neilson, a long-term resident of Western Australia, went to Wuhan in the People’s Republic of China with her husband, who had been employed by Overseas Projects Corporation of Victoria Ltd (“OPC”), a company owned by the State of Victoria. The couple lived in an apartment OPC provided ([67]). In October 1991 she fell down stairs in the apartment and was injured ([68]); the stairs had no balustrade (McHugh J at [23]). In July 1997 she sued OPC in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, and her statement of claim made no reference to the law of China ([68]).

OPC pleaded that under Chinese law the claim was barred after one year ([70], [72]). The trial judge, McKechnie J, accepted that under Zhang the law of the People’s Republic of China was the proper law to apply ([76]). He then relied on Art 146 of the Chinese General Principles of Civil Law, the second sentence of which says that where both parties are nationals of, or domiciled in, the same country, the law of that country or domicile “may also be applied” ([75]).

His Honour treated Art 146 as giving him a power to choose to apply Australian law, applied Australian negligence principles and gave judgment for Mrs Neilson ([78]-[79]). OPC’s insurer, which had been joined as a third party, appealed, and the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia set the judgment aside. McLure J, giving the Court’s reasons, held that the primary judge should have applied Chinese domestic law and held the claim statute barred ([80]). Mrs Neilson appealed to the High Court by special leave ([81]).

What did the Court decide?

The appeal was allowed with costs. The High Court set aside the Full Court’s orders that had set aside the trial judgment and the costs order, and in their place dismissed the appeal to the Full Court with costs (order page; [136]). Five Justices would allow the appeal: Gleeson CJ ([18]), Gummow and Hayne JJ ([136]), Callinan J ([262]) and Heydon J ([263]). McHugh J ([61]) and Kirby J ([221]) would have dismissed it. No set of reasons was joined by more than two Justices: the Court delivered six sets of reasons, with Gummow and Hayne JJ writing jointly.

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

What “the lex loci delicti” refers to. Gummow and Hayne JJ restated that the double actionability rule has no application to intranational or foreign torts and that no exception, flexible or otherwise, is recognised to the rule that the lex loci delicti applies to substantive questions ([64]). In their reasons, choosing the lex loci delicti to govern questions of substance in a foreign tort “is not to be confined to reference to what the forum classifies as the domestic law of that jurisdiction” ([102]).

Their Honours’ conclusion is framed for a particular kind of case: “At least where the choice of law rules of the lex loci delicti depend upon a connecting factor other than place, such as nationality or domicile, the lex loci delicti is the whole of the law of that place.” ([102]). They drew two consequences: if the foreign jurisdiction would choose to apply the law of the forum, the forum applies its own law, and if it would look to a third jurisdiction, the forum looks to and applies that jurisdiction’s law ([103]).

In this case they understood Art 146 as a once for all reference out of Chinese law into the law of the country of nationality or domicile, not as requiring regard to Australian choice of law rules ([131]). They said that no concluded answer was called for on this occasion on whether a reference by the foreign law to the law of the country of nationality or domicile includes that country’s own choice of law rules, or on what follows where that country is a federation ([128]-[129], [135]).

The other Justices wrote separately. Gleeson CJ doubted the argument that Zhang directed the court to the Chinese General Principles but excluding Ch VIII and was “unable to accept that conclusion” ([13]); he said that Australian law does not accept a flexible exception to its rule that the lex loci delicti governs foreign torts ([16]). Heydon J held that “in this case at least the Australian rules of the conflict of laws refer to the entirety of the lex loci delicti” ([278]), said the problem was to be solved by construing Art 146 rather than by a principle of universal or general application ([277]), and distinguished “flexible exceptions” from the consequences of applying the foreign law’s own rules ([283]).

Callinan J stated the principle in his own terms: the lex loci delicti is applied, but “if the evidence shows that the foreign court would be likely to apply Australian law by reason of its choice of law rules or discretions, then the Australian common law of torts should govern the action” ([261]). Kirby J agreed that Zhang did not require the exclusion of Art 146 and that applying one sentence of it while ignoring another “would be unacceptably arbitrary” ([171], [174]), but held that the appellant had not proved how a Chinese court would apply it, so that the Chinese one-year limitation applied ([207]-[220]). McHugh J held that choice of law rules do not form part of the category of the lex loci delicti’s laws that the forum court makes applicable ([39], [59]).

The foreign court’s discretion, and proof of foreign law. In the reasons of Gummow and Hayne JJ, the primary judge was wrong to treat Art 146 as permitting him to exercise “a right to choose to apply the law of Australia”; the question was “how, if at all, would a Chinese court exercise the power or discretion given by that Article” ([113]). Gleeson CJ ([15]), Callinan J ([244]) and Heydon J ([274]) also treated what a Chinese court would do as the question, and Kirby J agreed with the majority’s identification of the primary judge’s error ([191]).

Foreign law is a question of fact ([115]). On the limited evidence, Gummow and Hayne JJ held that the trial judge was bound to conclude that Chinese law, applied to these facts, would look to the law of the parties’ nationality or domicile, whether the evidence is analysed as deficient (so that the presumption that foreign law is the same as the law of the forum comes into play) or as a complete account of the relevant principles ([124]-[127]). Callinan J presumed that Chinese principles of statutory construction are the same as the Australian ones ([249]), and Heydon J employed Australian principles of construction because there was no evidence of the principles to be applied ([267]).

Gleeson CJ found no assistance in the presumption in this case but held Mr Liu’s evidence “barely sufficient, but it is just enough” to support the primary judge’s conclusion ([16]-[17]). McHugh J held that Mrs Neilson had not discharged the burden of proving that a Chinese court would choose Australian law ([35]-[37]), and Kirby J rejected the presumption as unavailable and held that “Possibilities are insufficient to fill the gap in the evidence” ([203]-[208]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Gummow and Hayne JJ

Read judgment: [102]–[103] (PDF p 37) (opens in a new tab)

The whole-law conclusion, within the stated qualification about nationality or domicile, and the first consequence in paragraph 103 were necessary to these joint reasons: they permitted consideration of Art 146 and application of Australian law. This identifies the ground of their joint judgment allowing the appeal; it does not attribute every part of their formulation to the other Justices.

Obiter · Gummow and Hayne JJ

Read judgment: [103] (PDF p 37) (opens in a new tab)

The second consequence, concerning a reference to a third jurisdiction, extends the whole-law reasoning beyond the facts requiring decision. This dispute concerned Chinese and Australian law, so the third-jurisdiction limb was unnecessary to their ground for allowing the appeal.

Separate reasoning · Heydon J

Read judgment: [277]–[282] (PDF p 100) (opens in a new tab)

Heydon J concurred in allowing the appeal but grounded the result in the construction of Art 146. His acceptance of the entirety of the lex loci delicti was expressly confined to this case at least, and his construction led to Australian domestic law without remission to China. His separate route does not adopt a universal doctrine of renvoi.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Gummow and Hayne JJ

Read judgment: [113] (PDF p 40) (opens in a new tab), [115] (PDF p 40) (opens in a new tab), [124]–[127] (PDF p 42) (opens in a new tab)

These steps were necessary to the joint reasons allowing the appeal: the question was what a Chinese court would do, with foreign law established as fact, rather than an Australian judge exercising a Chinese discretion. Their conclusion on the limited evidence supported application of Australian law on either evidentiary premise. The presumption operated conditionally if the evidence was deficient; they did not decide that it was deficient or rely on the presumption alone.

Separate reasoning · Gleeson CJ

Read judgment: [16]–[18] (PDF p 9) (opens in a new tab)

Gleeson CJ concurred in allowing the appeal by a distinct evidentiary route. He found the presumption of identical foreign law unhelpful here, but considered the expert evidence just sufficient. Agreement in the orders therefore does not establish his adoption of the joint reasons about curing an evidentiary deficiency with the presumption.

Why does this case matter?

Foreign-tort problems commonly involve two countries whose rules differ on something that decides the claim; in Neilson it was a limitation period ([72]; Gleeson CJ at [4]). Stopping the analysis once the place of the wrong is named leaves untouched the question on which the Justices divided.

Exam and application relevance

Use Neilson when identifying the place of the wrong does not resolve the applicable limitation period. Distinguish the Justices’ reasons and identify the evidence supporting the proposed outcome.

Compare the facts of the problem with those in Neilson, including where the parties lived and how their relationship arose. Explain which differences could affect the analysis, and check whether the reasons you rely on resolved the issue your problem raises.

Check your understanding

1. Whose reasons say that the lex loci delicti is the whole of the law of the place, and for what kind of case is that framed?

2. What did Gummow and Hayne JJ say was wrong with the primary judge’s use of Art 146, and what was the question about it instead?

3. Kirby J agreed that Art 146 could not be excluded from the law applied, yet would have dismissed the appeal. Why?

4. Which Justice held that choice of law rules do not form part of the lex loci delicti’s laws that the forum court makes applicable?