Positivism in Australian courts: validity and justice
Shows how the High Court keeps meaning, constitutional validity and justice apart in Al-Kateb, NZYQ and Durham Holdings, and what a positivist account of judicial duty does and does not claim.
Learning outcomes
- Separate, in an answer about a harsh statute, a question of meaning, a question of constitutional validity and a question of merit.
- State the positions taken in Al-Kateb v Godwin, including the dissent, and the later treatment of its constitutional holding in NZYQ.
- Explain why a limit on legislative power found in the Constitution’s own terms is consistent with positivism.
Legal positivism, introduced in Legal positivism, holds that whether a rule is law depends on its source and not on its moral merit. This article asks what that idea looks like in the High Court’s reasoning, mainly about Commonwealth migration legislation and the Constitution, with one passage on a State Act and one from Holmes for contrast. The prior question for a student is which of three things an argument is really about: what a statute means, whether Parliament had power to enact it, or whether it is just. Running the three together is a common way to misuse the theory, and the High Court’s own judgments show them being kept apart.
Three questions, kept apart
A problem question can be approached as a sequence of three questions, which is a way of organising an answer rather than a test taken from a decision. First, meaning: what do the enacted words require? Second, validity: was the law within the power of the body that made it? Third, merit: is the result just or wise? A positivist account says the first two decide what the law is and the third does not. Holmes put the point in 1897, in “The Path of the Law”, when he wrote that the distinction between law and morals was “of the first importance” for a lawyer’s purposes, and observed that “wrong statutes can be and are enforced, and we should not all agree as to which were the wrong ones.” Holmes was writing about how lawyers should study law, and the passages relied on here do not set out a full theory of validity.
Clear words and a harsh result: Al-Kateb
The appellant in Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 5621 was a stateless person who arrived in Australia without a visa. His visa application failed, he asked to be removed, and no country could be found to accept him. The question was whether the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), as the Justices described it, required his detention to continue although there was no real prospect of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. By four Justices to three the Court held that it did. McHugh J, one of the majority, began with the words that matter for this article: “tragic as the position of the appellant certainly is, his appeal must be dismissed” (at [31]). His Honour held at [33] that “the words of ss 196 and 198 are unambiguous” and too clear to be read down by an intention not to affect fundamental rights.
Gleeson CJ, dissenting, did not deny that Parliament could curtail liberty. His principle of legality (at [19]) is that courts “do not impute to the legislature an intention to abrogate or curtail certain human rights or freedoms (of which personal liberty is the most basic) unless such an intention is clearly manifested by unambiguous language”. His complaint at [21] was that the Act had not dealt with indefinite detention in terms. On the statutory question both sides therefore treated the issue as one of meaning, and they differed about whether the Act spoke clearly. The Chief Justice’s stated objection at [21] was that indefinite detention “is not one to be dealt with by implication”, which is consistent with a positivist reading: the dispute was about what Parliament had enacted, not about whether an enactment could be law if it were unjust. He described the principle at [20] as “an expression of a legal value, respected by the courts”, so it is a rule of Australian law applied by judges, not an appeal to a morality outside the law.
When validity is the question: from Al-Kateb to NZYQ
McHugh J also addressed validity. His Honour said at [74] that, so long as detention was for the purpose of deportation or of preventing entry, “the justice or wisdom of the course taken by the Parliament is not examinable in this or any other domestic court”, and that the courts’ function was “simply to determine whether the law of the Parliament is within the powers conferred on it by the Constitution”. That second question was later answered differently. In NZYQ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 372, the Court granted leave to reopen the constitutional holding in Al-Kateb and overruled it at [45], while declining at [23] to reopen the statutory construction holding. The test the Court applied, stated at [39], is that a Commonwealth law authorising detention, other than through a court’s exercise of judicial power in adjudging and punishing criminal guilt, will contravene Chapter III of the Constitution unless it is reasonably capable of being seen to be necessary for a legitimate and non-punitive purpose.
The limit on Parliament came from the Constitution’s own terms, so it is a limit on source and power, which a positivist accepts. The test at [39] is framed by reference to Chapter III and to whether detention is punitive, not by reference to whether detention is unjust. Positivism therefore does not predict that courts will uphold harsh laws: it predicts that the reasons for invalidity will be found in the legal system’s own rules of power.
The judge’s duty of obedience
Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2001] HCA 73 was an application for special leave, and special leave was refused, so the reasons show how Justices approached an argument rather than deciding it on the merits. In separate reasons Kirby J described a conception of the judicial role in which “the duty of obedience to a law made by a Parliament of a State derives from the observance of parliamentary procedures and the conformity of the resulting law with the State and federal Constitutions” (at [61]). His Honour said most judges in Australia “would probably share” that “relatively modest conception” and that it “rests on political facts” (at [61]-[62]). That is a positivist account of why judges obey statutes, given by a judge, about State legislation. It is one Justice’s description and is not a holding of the Court.
What the theory does not decide
Positivism does not say that harsh laws are good, and it does not say that a judge has no view of justice. It says that a court’s answer to “is this law?” is found in sources and powers. Whether an unjust enactment could ever fail to be law is the question taken up in Natural law arguments in Australian courts, and how far judges’ choices are shaped by something other than rules is taken up in Legal realism and judicial law-making in the High Court.
Applying this in a problem question
- Identify which of the three questions the argument raises: meaning, validity or merit, and say so.
- For meaning, start with the enacted words and ask whether they speak clearly to the situation. If the words are general, ask whether the principle of legality applies, remembering that it operates through the words used and, as Gleeson CJ put it in Al-Kateb (dissenting), yields to unambiguous language.
- For validity, identify the source of power and the constitutional limit relied on, and state it in the Court’s own terms, such as the test in NZYQ at [39] for detention under Commonwealth law.
- State the Al-Kateb decision with its treatment: the statutory construction holding was not reopened in NZYQ, and the constitutional holding was overruled.
- Present any complaint about injustice as a merit argument, labelled as such, unless a legal rule of meaning or power gives it force.
Self-check
- Have I said whether I am arguing about meaning, validity or merit?
- Have I attributed the views in Al-Kateb to the right Justices, and noted the dissent?
- Have I stated what NZYQ did and did not overrule?