Natural law arguments in Australian courts

Examines what the High Court did with arguments that unjust law is deficient as law in Durham Holdings, which concerned a State statute, and in Mabo (No 2), which concerned the common law, read against Aquinas’s classical statement.

Learning level
Foundation
Jurisdictions
au-national, nsw
Subjects
jurisprudence-and-legal-theory
Topics
natural-law-theory

Learning outcomes

  • Identify whether a natural-law-style argument is aimed at a statute, a common law rule or the reading of a statute, and state what the High Court said about each in the authorities discussed.
  • State the status of Durham Holdings, including that it is a refusal of special leave concerning a State Parliament.
  • Apply the questions in Brennan J’s reasons in Mabo (No 2) at [29] to a common law rule alleged to offend contemporary values of justice.

Natural law theory holds that a rule which is sufficiently unjust is deficient as law. This article asks what Australian courts have done with arguments of that kind, using two High Court judgments as the evidence. The prior question for a student is where the argument is aimed: at a statute, at a rule of the common law, or at the way a statute is read. The answer matters because the High Court’s statements in the judgments below differ according to the target, and this article states the law of Australia only as those judgments describe it.

The classical claim, in Aquinas’s words

In the Summa Theologiae, I-II, question 95, article 2, in English translation, Aquinas argues that “every human law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law.” In the same article he adds that human law may be derived from the law of nature in two ways: as a conclusion from principles, such as that one must not kill, and by way of determination of generalities, such as the law of nature that the evil-doer should be punished while “that he be punished in this or that way” is a determination. The second mode leaves a great deal of room for legislative choice. This is the strong form of the claim, and it is the form most often tested when a litigant says a statute is too unjust to be law.

Aimed at a statute: Durham Holdings

In Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2001] HCA 71 a company whose coal had been acquired by a New South Wales statute, with compensation capped well below the assessed value, argued that a State Parliament’s lawmaking power was subject to limits imposed by the common law. The application for special leave was refused, so the reasons record how six Justices approached the argument and are not a decision on the merits of an appeal.

The joint reasons of Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ accepted at [14] that “there are limits to the exercise of the legislative powers” of a State Parliament “which are not spelled out in the constitutional text”, but held that the limit contended for was not implicit in the federal structure, and that the Court of Appeal had correctly refused to disturb what had been taken to be the settled position on State legislative power. Those limits are implications from the Constitution’s text and structure, which is a different thing from a claim that unjust law is not law.

Kirby J, in separate reasons, set out the applicant’s argument at [41]-[48], including the New Zealand judicial statements that some common law rights might lie “so deep” that Parliament could not override them. He noted at [52] that the Court in Union Steamship Co of Australia Pty Ltd v King had left the question open for State Parliaments, and that the applicant could point to no case supporting its argument. He quoted at [43] a scholar’s view that, although many lawyers maintained Parliament was bound by natural or divine law, there was no evidence of substantial support for the notion “that the judiciary rather than Parliament possessed ultimate authority to interpret and enforce that law”. His Honour concluded at [62] that the notion of common law rights that “lie so deep” that a Parliament acting within its powers cannot contradict them “has so far gathered few adherents”, and at [77] that the complaints of injustice were “of a political and not of a legal character”. Callinan J at [79] reserved his position on whether unexpressed limits on State legislative powers exist.

On the authorities discussed here, an argument that a validly enacted State statute is not law because it is unjust has not been accepted by the High Court, and the question has been described as open at the level of unexpressed common law limits. The decision concerns State legislation, and the reasons say nothing definitive about Commonwealth legislation.

Aimed at the common law: Mabo (No 2)

The common law is judge-made, so a justice-based argument meets less resistance there. In Mabo v Queensland (No 2) [1992] HCA 232 six members of the Court held that the common law of Australia recognises a form of native title. In the reasons of Brennan J, with which Mason CJ and McHugh J agreed, his Honour said at [28] that if earlier cases were right, the common law itself had taken from indigenous inhabitants any right to occupy their traditional land, and that “[j]udged by any civilized standard, such a law is unjust and its claim to be part of the common law to be applied in contemporary Australia must be questioned.”

His Honour then set a limit at [29]. The Court “is not free to adopt rules that accord with contemporary notions of justice and human rights if their adoption would fracture the skeleton of principle which gives the body of our law its shape and internal consistency”, although “no case can command unquestioning adherence if the rule it expresses seriously offends the values of justice and human rights (especially equality before the law) which are aspirations of the contemporary Australian legal system”. He asked whether a rule is an essential doctrine and whether overturning it would cause disproportionate disturbance.

Brennan J did not describe this as natural law, and the label is the article’s, not his. The reading offered is that justice operates here as a reason to reconsider a common law rule, subject to the structure of the law, and does not operate as a claim that the rule was never law. The current law of native title is statutory: in Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria (2002) 214 CLR 422; [2002] HCA 58 the joint reasons of Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ said that native title “is not a creature of the common law” but is what s 223(1) of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) defines, while Mabo (No 2) decided that rights rooted in traditional law and custom survived the acquisition of sovereignty ([75]).3 This article does not state the current law of native title; see Native title: common-law recognition and the statutory framework.

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Identify the target of the argument: a statute, a common law rule, or the reading of a statute.
  2. If the target is a statute, state the Durham Holdings position with its status: reasons on a refused application for special leave, concerning a State Parliament. Do not present it as a holding about Commonwealth legislation.
  3. If the target is a common law rule, ask the Mabo (No 2) questions at [29]: does the rule seriously offend the values of justice and human rights, is it an essential doctrine, and would overturning it disturb the law disproportionately?
  4. If the argument is that a statute should be read to protect a fundamental right, treat it as a question of meaning, and see Positivism in Australian courts: validity and justice.
  5. Name which form of the natural law claim is relied on, in line with the strong form quoted from Aquinas or the more modest form of a reason to reconsider a rule.

Self-check

  • Have I said whether the argument is aimed at a statute, a common law rule or a reading?
  • Have I attributed the Durham Holdings and Mabo (No 2) statements to the right Justices and noted that Durham Holdings was a refusal of special leave?
  • Have I avoided stating the current law of native title or of Commonwealth legislative power from these cases?

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