Theories of justice: equal treatment and the purposes of punishment

Reads Aristotle’s two kinds of justice and Mill’s account of conflicting justice claims alongside the High Court’s treatment of like cases alike in Wong and Hili and of the conflicting purposes of punishment in Veen (No 2).

Learning level
Foundation
Jurisdictions
au-commonwealth, nsw
Subjects
jurisprudence-and-legal-theory
Topics
theories-of-justice

Learning outcomes

  • Distinguish an argument about equal treatment of like cases from an argument about the purposes of punishment.
  • State what Wong, Hili and Veen (No 2) say about consistency, equal justice and proportionality, attributing each to the right Justices.
  • Explain why a High Court sentencing approach holds several justifications in play, using proportionality as a limit.

Theories of justice surveys rights-based, consequentialist and distributive approaches in the abstract. This article takes two problems in which the High Court’s own reasoning shows justice theory at work in sentencing: what it means to treat like cases alike, and what to do when the purposes of punishment point in different directions. The prior question for a student is whether a justice argument is about equal treatment or about the purpose a rule serves, because the same outcome can be defended and attacked on both. The authorities are High Court decisions on sentencing in New South Wales, including sentencing of federal offenders there, and the theory is drawn from texts that are in the public domain.

Aristotle: two kinds of justice and a proportion

In Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics, in W D Ross’s translation, Aristotle distinguishes one kind of justice “manifested in distributions of honour or money or the other things that fall to be divided among those who have a share in the constitution” from another that “plays a rectifying part in transactions between man and man”. He says of the just that it “must be both intermediate and equal and relative (i.e. for certain persons)”. Equality there is not identical treatment: it is a proportion between persons and things. On the response to a wrong he notes that reciprocity and rectificatory justice do not always coincide, since “if an official has inflicted a wound, he should not be wounded in return, and if some one has wounded an official, he ought not to be wounded only but punished in addition”. Only the passages quoted are attributed to Aristotle here.

Equal justice in sentencing: Wong and Hili

In Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 5841, the High Court, by majority, held that the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal’s guidelines for sentencing federal drug importation offenders, which made the weight of the narcotic the chief factor, were inconsistent with s 16A of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). Gleeson CJ, who would have dismissed the appeals (at [32]-[33]) but whose statement at [6] was adopted in Hili, said at [6]: “Like cases should be treated in like manner. The administration of criminal justice works as a system; not merely as a multiplicity of unconnected single instances.” Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ said at [65] that to focus on the result of the sentencing task, to the exclusion of the reasons, “is to depart from fundamental principles of equal justice. Equal justice requires identity of outcome in cases that are relevantly identical. It requires different outcomes in cases that are different in some relevant respect.”

In Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 452, the Court, in joint reasons, quoted Gleeson CJ’s passage at [47] and said at [48]-[49] that consistency “is not demonstrated by, and does not require, numerical equivalence”, and that what is sought is “the treatment of like cases alike, and different cases differently”, which is “not capable of mathematical expression”. The article’s comparison is that this resembles Aristotle’s formula, in that equality is relative to the relevant features of the persons and the cases. The Court itself does not cite Aristotle in the passages read.

When the purposes of punishment conflict: Veen (No 2)

Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 4653 concerned a life sentence for manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility. In the joint reasons of Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ, the Court held at [8] that a sentence should not be increased beyond what is proportionate to the crime merely to protect society from the risk of recidivism, but said at [9] that protection of society may be considered among other factors. The Justices set the distinction in a controversy between C S Lewis and others on the retributive theory of punishment, which on Lewis’s thesis prevents “injustices which may be involved in detaining an offender in order, for example, to protect society or to reform the offender”. At [13] they wrote that the purposes of punishment “are various: protection of society, deterrence of the offender and of others who might be tempted to offend, retribution and reform”, that none can be considered in isolation, and that “sometimes they point in different directions”. The principle that these purposes have to be weighed against each other was applied in Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37 at [44], which cites Veen (No 2) for it; that decision is not otherwise relied on here.

Mill had named the same difficulty in a different register. In Chapter V of Utilitarianism, writing of rival justifications for punishment, he observed: “No one of them can carry out his own notion of justice without trampling upon another equally binding.” His response was to ground justice in utility, so that he accounted “the justice which is grounded on utility to be the chief part, and incomparably the most sacred and binding part, of all morality”. The High Court does not take that step, and Veen (No 2) chooses a limit, proportionality, rather than a single theory. The article’s observation is that the Court’s approach is a way of holding several justifications in play at once, with desert setting an upper limit.

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Identify the justice argument being made: equal treatment of like cases, or one of the purposes of punishment.
  2. For equal treatment, state what makes the cases relevantly alike or different, as Wong at [65] and Hili at [49] require, and avoid arguing from numbers alone, which Hili at [48] says do not demonstrate consistency.
  3. For purposes of punishment, name the purposes in play and say which direction each points, using Veen (No 2) at [13].
  4. Apply the limit from Veen (No 2) at [8]: a sentence is not to exceed what is proportionate to the crime merely to protect society.
  5. State the jurisdiction and the statute under which the offender is sentenced: Wong and Hili concern federal offenders sentenced in New South Wales, and Veen (No 2) a New South Wales sentence. Do not treat any of the three as a decision for all sentencing.

Self-check

  • Have I said whether the argument is about equal treatment or a purpose of punishment?
  • Have I said what makes the cases relevantly alike or different, rather than relying on a comparison of sentence lengths?
  • Have I attributed each quotation to the right Justices and to the right text?

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