Hili v The Queen
Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 45
Prosecutors argued that federal offenders should usually serve 60 to 66 per cent of their sentence in custody, so that like cases are treated alike. Why did the High Court refuse to treat that as a norm?
What happened?
Anthony Hili and Glyn Jones were friends who, in 1997, formed a company to do painting and carpentry contract work, and who later took part in a scheme run through a firm of accountants to evade tax ([3]). Each claimed deductions for fees falsely said to have been paid by a company he controlled, and the money was passed through an international round-robin of transactions into his own hands, the receipts being falsely described as loans from a foreign lender ([4]). Each lodged false returns over several years, and the tax evaded was about $398,000 by Mr Hili and his companies and about $363,000 by Mr Jones and his companies ([5]-[6]).
They pleaded guilty in the District Court of New South Wales to federal offences: Mr Hili to obtaining a financial advantage by deception from a Commonwealth entity, and Mr Jones to that offence, defrauding the Commonwealth and money laundering ([2]). Each was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment with a recognizance release order to take effect after seven months ([7]). The prosecution appealed on the single ground that the sentences were manifestly inadequate. The Court of Criminal Appeal allowed the appeal, saying that the norm for the period of imprisonment before release is between 60 and 66 per cent of the head sentence, and re-sentenced each man, in Mr Hili’s case to three years with a recognizance release order after 18 months ([9], [33]-[34]). The applicants sought special leave to appeal to the High Court.
What did the Court decide?
Special leave was granted on the grounds that raised the norm question and the sufficiency of the Court of Criminal Appeal’s reasons, and in each matter the appeal was treated as instituted and heard instanter and dismissed ([14]-[16], [69]). Seven Justices sat. French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ gave joint reasons ([1]-[69]) and Heydon J gave separate reasons agreeing in the orders ([70]-[79]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
On the norm question: the joint reasons held that there neither is, nor should be, a judicially determined norm or starting point for the period a federal offender should serve in prison before release on a recognizance release order, whether expressed as a percentage of the head sentence or otherwise ([13], [44]). A reference to a norm is ambiguous and is apt to mislead because it distracts attention from the statutory provisions in Pt IB of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ([37]-[38]).
The Court of Criminal Appeal was wrong to say that the norm was between 60 and 66 per cent, subject to special circumstances: it is wrong to begin from an assumed starting point and then look for special circumstances, and the sentencing judge should apply the principles identified in Power, Deakin and Bugmy ([44]). Heydon J would have reasoned differently on the norm question in one respect: he said that a later court’s liberty to depart from an earlier court’s sentencing conclusion is not limited to cases where that conclusion is plainly wrong ([70], [77]-[78]).
On consistency: the joint reasons held that consistency is not demonstrated by, and does not require, numerical equivalence, and that numerical tables, bar charts and graphs of sentences are not useful to a sentencing judge because referring only to the lengths of sentences passed says nothing about why they were fixed as they were ([48]). The consistency that is sought is consistency in the application of the relevant legal principles and, in federal sentencing, of Pt IB; what is sought is the treatment of like cases alike and different cases differently, which cannot be expressed mathematically or in tabular form ([49]).
The first and paramount means of achieving consistency is to apply the relevant statutory provisions ([50]). Sentencing judges must have regard to what has been done in other cases, but a range of sentences imposed in the past does not establish the correct range or fix the boundaries within which future judges must sentence, and past sentences are useful when the unifying principles they reveal are articulated ([53]-[55]).
On manifest inadequacy: it is a conclusion, reached by considering all of the matters relevant to fixing the sentence, and the Court of Criminal Appeal’s reasons sufficiently revealed the basis for its conclusion ([59]-[62]).
The decision concerns federal offenders and Pt IB of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [13] (PDF p 10) (opens in a new tab), [36]–[38] (PDF p 18) (opens in a new tab), [44] (PDF p 21) (opens in a new tab)
The joint reasons rejected the asserted norm, explained why it was misleading, and required sentencing by application of the governing principles. That reasoning answered the first question argued and was necessary to the disposition of that ground of appeal.
Separate reasoning · Heydon J
Read judgment: [70] (PDF p 31) (opens in a new tab), [77]–[78] (PDF p 34) (opens in a new tab)
Heydon J concurred in the orders and the answers to the questions but took a distinct route on one aspect of the norm question. His Honour reasoned that a later court may differ from an earlier sentencing conclusion without treating that conclusion as plainly wrong.
Proposition 2
Ratio · French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: [46]–[49] (PDF p 22) (opens in a new tab), [50] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab), [53]–[54] (PDF p 24) (opens in a new tab), [55] (PDF p 25) (opens in a new tab), [58] (PDF p 26) (opens in a new tab), [59]–[60] (PDF p 27) (opens in a new tab), [61]–[62] (PDF p 28) (opens in a new tab)
This reasoning explained the governing meaning of consistency, the proper use of comparable sentences, and the conclusion of manifest inadequacy. It was necessary to reject the numerical approach, uphold the intermediate court conclusion, and dismiss the appeals.
Why does this case matter?
Whenever a sentence is attacked as out of line with others, someone is likely to offer a ratio, a table or a bar chart as the measure of consistency. Hili is the High Court’s answer to that offer, and it is the case to reach for when a student is asked what makes sentencing reasonably consistent.
Exam and application relevance
Say first that Hili concerns the sentencing of federal offenders under Pt IB of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth); for a State offender, start with the State’s sentencing law.
Then identify what is being offered as the measure of consistency in the problem, whether a ratio, a table or a range of earlier sentences, and set out what the joint reasons said about it. Name the Justices whose reasons you rely on, because Heydon J gave separate reasons on the norm question.
A later High Court decision on the sentencing of a federal offender, The Queen v Pham [2015] HCA 39, restated points from Hili. French CJ, Keane and Nettle JJ said at [29] that intermediate appellate courts must have regard to other intermediate appellate courts’ decisions in comparable cases as yardsticks unless there is a compelling reason not to, and Bell and Gageler JJ said at [46] that the reasonable consistency to which Hili refers is with respect to sentencing outcomes. Read Hili’s statement about consistency in principle together with those passages.
Check your understanding
1. What proposition about the proportion of a sentence to be served in custody did the Court of Criminal Appeal accept, and what did the joint reasons hold about it?
2. According to the joint reasons, what use may a sentencing judge make of the sentences passed in other cases, and what may that history not do?
3. Why did the joint reasons say that the Court of Criminal Appeal’s failure to identify a specific error did not make its reasons inadequate?