Johnson v The Queen
Johnson v The Queen [2004] HCA 15
Two drug-import charges arising from one pick-up at a Perth hotel. Is there a fixed order of steps for sentencing on several offences, and what follows when the appeal court gets the facts wrong?
What happened?
Schwarz, a “drug runner”, entered Australia on 2 November 2000 carrying a substantial quantity of ecstasy and also had cocaine in his possession. He was apprehended and agreed to take part in a controlled delivery in which inert substances were substituted for the drugs ([7]). Following instructions, he checked into a hotel at Como in Perth, and was told that a person would call to collect the drugs and pay him. The person who was to collect the substituted parcel was the appellant, Chad Johnson, who came to Schwarz’s room and was arrested as he tried to leave ([8]).
The appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of attempting to obtain possession of prohibited imports to which s 233B of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) applied: on count 1, ecstasy in not less than the commercial quantity, and on count 2, cocaine in not less than the trafficable quantity ([9]). Scott J in the Supreme Court of Western Australia considered the appropriate sentence on count 1 to be 10 years and on count 2 to be 5 years served cumulatively, reduced the sentence on count 2 on account of the “totality principle”, and allowed 3½ years for the appellant’s “fast-track” plea of guilty ([11]). He ordered 8 years on count 1 and 3½ years on count 2, to be served cumulatively, with a single minimum term of 5½ years ([11]).
The Court of Criminal Appeal of Western Australia (Malcolm CJ, Wallwork J and White AUJ) unanimously dismissed the appellant’s appeal. It rejected his argument that the sentencing judge should have fixed a separate sentence for each offence and then reduced the aggregate by directing concurrency ([12]). On the argument that the two offences shared common elements, Malcolm CJ said that there was no common element and that the case involved “two separate parcels of two separate drugs” ([29]). In the High Court the appellant argued that the sentencing judge had applied sentencing practices peculiar to Western Australia rather than Pt 1B of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth); that Mill v The Queen and Pearce v The Queen were inconsistent about the order of sentencing steps; and that the “one transaction” rule and the totality principle had not been properly applied ([13]-[20]).
What did the Court decide?
The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Court of Criminal Appeal dismissing the appeal, and remitted the proceeding to that Court for consideration and determination in accordance with the reasons of the High Court (orders; [36]). There were three sets of reasons: Gleeson CJ ([1]-[5]), the joint reasons of Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ ([6]-[36]), and Kirby J ([37]-[46]). The questions the Court addressed were whether Mill and Pearce prescribe a fixed order for sentencing on several offences, and whether the Court of Criminal Appeal’s reasoning on the common elements of the two offences could stand.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ, in joint reasons with which Gleeson CJ agreed, rejected the appellant’s argument that Mill v The Queen and Pearce v The Queen are inconsistent. Their Honours said that the joint judgment in Mill “expresses a preference for what should be regarded as the orthodox, but not necessarily immutable, practice of fixing a sentence for each offence and aggregating them before taking the next step of determining concurrency” ([26]). “Pearce does not decree that a sentencing judge may never lower each sentence and then aggregate them for determining the time to be served”, because doing so is not what the joint judgment in Pearce holds to be undesirable, which is “to have regard only to the total effective sentence to be imposed on an offender” ([26]).
“The preferable course will usually be the one which both cases commend but neither absolutely commands”, and judges of first instance “should be allowed as much flexibility in sentencing as is consonant with consistency of approach and as accords with the statutory regime under which the sentencing is effected” ([26]).
Gleeson CJ separately rejected the submissions that Mill and Pearce are inconsistent and that Pearce eliminated one of the two alternatives said in Mill to be available to sentencing judges ([2]), and noted that a sentencing judge in a suitable case may respond to the considerations discussed in Tichy by lowering individual sentences rather than making them wholly or partly concurrent ([5]). Kirby J wrote separately on a different question. He said that it was not necessary to revisit the controversy between “instinctive synthesis” and transparent stages in sentencing, that the Court had not conclusively held which approach the law requires, and that, to the fullest extent possible, the stages described in Pearce should where applicable be followed so far as cumulation, concurrence and totality are concerned ([40]-[44]).
The joint reasons treated as the appellant’s better argument the statement in Pearce that, to the extent that two offences of which an offender stands convicted contain common elements, it would be wrong to punish the offender twice for the commission of the elements that are common ([27]). They found errors in the Court of Criminal Appeal’s reasons ([29]-[34]). It described two parcels where there was one ([30]). It referred to the range of sentences commonly imposed for possession of cocaine, an offence with which the appellant was not charged ([31]).
And it rejected the principle that account must be taken of the commonality of the elements of the offences because applying it would obscure the fact that the appellant took possession of two separate parcels of two separate drugs: “Application of a principle cannot obscure a fact” ([34]). The two offences had “much in common: one inducement, one payment for performance, one occasion, one package and one receipt of it by the appellant”, which required careful regard to the totality principle in deciding the appeal ([33]).
The joint reasons accepted that the appellant had shown error in the Court of Criminal Appeal, but said that it did not necessarily follow that the sentencing judge had erred, and that this had given them reason to pause in allowing the appeal ([35]). They allowed it because the High Court is not a sentencing court in any conventional sense, and the appellant, having been granted leave to appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal, was entitled to a proper consideration of his appeal and had been denied it ([35]-[36]).
Gleeson CJ agreed with those reasons and with the statement that the errors identified did not necessarily require the conclusion that the sentencing judge had erred, and said that the ultimate question was whether there was adequate consideration of the contention that the sentences imposed paid insufficient regard to the common aspects of the two offences ([1]-[3]). Kirby J agreed that the Court of Criminal Appeal had erred, including in failing to apply the common-elements principle, but did not share the joint reasons’ reaction to the resulting sentence, which in his opinion was excessive ([38]-[39], [45]-[46]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ (joint reasons); Gleeson CJ agreeing at [1]-[2]
Read judgment: [18]–[20] (PDF p 16) (opens in a new tab), [26] (PDF p 19) (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs state the alleged inconsistency between Mill and Pearce and reject it. They dispose of the appellant’s argument that the sentencing judge acted contrary to Pearce by structuring the sentences as he did, a ground of appeal in this Court ([14], [25]).
Separate reasoning · Kirby J
Read judgment: [40]–[44] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab)
Kirby J concurs in the orders and in the joint reasons’ identification of error ([38], [46]). He writes separately on instinctive synthesis and transparent stages, which he says the case does not require the Court to decide ([40]), so these paragraphs record his own view and do not adopt the joint reasons’ discussion of Mill and Pearce.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ (joint reasons); Gleeson CJ agreeing at [1]-[3]
Read judgment: [27]–[36] (PDF p 19) (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs identify the errors of the Court of Criminal Appeal and explain why they warranted allowing the appeal and remitting the matter although they did not necessarily show error by the sentencing judge. They are the ground of the orders.
Separate reasoning · Kirby J
Read judgment: [38]–[39] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab), [45]–[46] (PDF p 25) (opens in a new tab)
Kirby J agrees that the Court of Criminal Appeal erred and concurs in the orders, but gives his own view that the sentence was excessive and that the common elements should have been reflected in concurrence or a substantial allowance. The joint reasons did not take that view of the sentence ([35]).
Why does this case matter?
Johnson helps you separate a challenge to a sentencing judge’s method from a challenge to the way an appeal court dealt with the case. A problem built on this case asks you to identify exactly what the sentencing judge did to each offence and to the total, and then to say what, if anything, is wrong with that. It also asks you to read an appeal court’s account of the facts critically, because the account may be the thing under challenge rather than the sentence.
Exam and application relevance
Start with the offences charged and the facts that connect them: how many occasions, how many acts, what is common to the elements. Then set out the steps the sentencing judge took for each offence and for the total, and ask which step the appellant attacks. Distinguish an argument that the judge misstated or ignored a principle from an argument that the judge reached the result by a different route. If the problem concerns an intermediate appeal court’s reasons, compare its description of the facts with the sentencing remarks and the agreed facts, and say what follows for the appeal if they differ.
Johnson concerned a State court sentencing a person for federal offences under Pt 1B of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), so check the sentencing statute that applies to the offences in your problem. When describing the Justices’ positions, name the joint reasons ([6]-[36]), Gleeson CJ ([1]-[5]) and Kirby J ([37]-[46]) separately.
Check your understanding
1. What did the appellant argue was the inconsistency between Mill and Pearce, and whose reasons answered it ([18]-[20], [26])?
2. Which facts did the Court of Criminal Appeal misdescribe, and why did the joint reasons say that they mattered ([29]-[34])?
3. The joint reasons found error in the Court of Criminal Appeal’s reasoning ([29]-[34]). What did they say about whether the sentencing judge had erred, and why did they allow the appeal ([35]-[36])?
4. How did Kirby J’s view of the resulting sentence differ from the joint reasons’ ([35], [39])?