The Queen v Kilic

High Court of Australia · 2016

Criminal Law And ProcedureSentencing Foundations

The Queen v Kilic [2016] HCA 48

Sentencing remarks often say that an offence is, or is not, in the worst category. The High Court told sentencing judges to stop using the expression. Why?

What happened?

On 27 July 2014 the respondent, then 22, poured petrol over his partner, who was 23 and 12 weeks pregnant with his child, and set her alight, causing very serious burn injuries ([5], [9]-[11]). He pleaded guilty in the County Court of Victoria to intentionally causing serious injury, contrary to s 16 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), and to two uplifted summary offences ([1]). The sentencing judge, Judge Montgomery, sentenced him to 14 years’ imprisonment for the principal offence, and to further terms for the summary offences, making a total effective sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 11 years ([1]).

The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria held that the sentence was manifestly excessive ([2]). They described the offence as within the worst category of the offence, compared it with sentences in a small number of other cases, and re-sentenced him to 10 years and six months for the principal offence ([2], [15]-[16]). The Crown appealed to the High Court by special leave ([3]).

What did the Court decide?

The appeal was allowed. Orders 2 to 7 of the Court of Appeal were set aside, and in their place the appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed, so the sentences imposed by Judge Montgomery stood ([43]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

On the expression “the worst category”: the Court said that an offence falls within the worst category when it is an instance of the offence so grave that it warrants the maximum prescribed penalty. Both the nature of the crime and the circumstances of the criminal are considered, and once an offence is in that category it is beside the point that an even worse instance can be conceived ([18]). Where an offence is a grave instance but is not so grave as to warrant the maximum prescribed penalty, as the Court recorded was agreed here, the sentencing judge must consider where the facts of the offence and offender lie on the spectrum from the least serious instances to the worst category, and it is potentially confusing and likely to lead to error to describe such an offence as within the worst category ([19]).

Because lay people might take a statement that an offence is not within the worst category to mean that the judge has underestimated its seriousness, sentencing judges should avoid the expression and state in full whether the offence is or is not so grave as to warrant the maximum prescribed penalty ([20]).

On the use of other sentences: the requirement in s 5(2)(b) of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) to have regard to current sentencing practices is directed at consistency of approach ([21]). Other cases may provide a yardstick, but the range of sentences imposed in the past does not fix the boundaries within which future sentences must be passed ([22]). The Court held that the Court of Appeal had impermissibly treated the sentences in a few cases as defining the range ([24]). Those cases could not properly be regarded as providing a sentencing pattern: there were too few of them, one dealt with a different offence, another was more than 12 years old, and the circumstances of the offending in each were too disparate ([25]-[31]). A sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment for an offence at the upper end of the range of seriousness was not unreasonable or plainly unjust ([36]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Obiter · Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ

Read judgment: [18]–[20] (PDF p 11) (opens in a new tab)

The joint reasons explain the maximum-penalty meaning of worst category and recommend clearer sentencing language. These observations did not supply the ground for restoring the sentence: at [42] the judges expressly said the Court of Appeal’s misuse of the expression was without relevant consequence once understood as referring to the upper end of seriousness. The guidance is therefore obiter in this appeal, although it is unanimous High Court guidance.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ

Read judgment: [21]–[22] (PDF p 12) (opens in a new tab), [24]–[25] (PDF p 14) (opens in a new tab)

These principles supplied the ground for allowing the Crown appeal. The joint reasons adopted the distinction between using earlier sentences as a yardstick and treating them as binding boundaries, then held that the Court of Appeal had impermissibly done the latter. The small and disparate group of cases could not establish a sentencing pattern. That error underpinned the rejection of manifest excess and restoration of the sentencing judge’s sentence.

Why does this case matter?

Older sentencing cases and sentencing remarks use the expression freely, so a student who reads them needs to know what the Court later said about it.

Exam and application relevance

Identify the jurisdiction and the statutory source. Kilic arose under s 16 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) and s 5(2)(b) of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), and for another jurisdiction the starting point is that jurisdiction’s provisions about current sentencing practice and its maximum penalty.

When a problem asks you to compare an offender’s sentence with sentences in other cases, set out the comparable cases, what separates each from the problem in number, date, offence and circumstance, and what the comparison can and cannot show, drawing on Kilic and Hili.

Check your understanding

1. What does an offence “within the worst category” mean on the Court’s reasons, and what is beside the point once an offence is in that category?

2. What did the Court say a sentencing judge should say instead of describing an offence as within or not within the worst category, and why?

3. Why did the Court hold that the few cases the Court of Appeal relied on could not properly be regarded as providing a sentencing pattern?