Barton v The Queen

High Court of Australia · 1980

Criminal Law And ProcedureCriminal Process

Barton v The Queen (1980) 147 CLR 75

The Attorney-General filed indictments straight in the Supreme Court while a committal hearing was nearly over, and the accused said the Premier had told him to. Could a court look behind that decision?

What happened?

Alexander and Thomas Barton were charged in the “Harbourside indictment” with conspiring to cheat and defraud, and the Bartons and Laurence Gruzman in the “Bounty indictment” with conspiracy and other offences (at 85). Informations had been laid against the Bartons under the Justices Act 1902 (NSW), and committal proceedings on the offences later charged in the Harbourside indictment were well advanced: the magistrate had found a prima facie case, the Bartons had gone into evidence and closed their case, and the informant’s counsel had said he would call Sir Peter Abeles in reply (Gibbs ACJ and Mason J at 86).

On 23 October 1978, when the hearing resumed, counsel told the magistrate that the Attorney-General had that day filed an ex officio indictment in the Supreme Court, and the informations were withdrawn and dismissed. The Attorney-General filed a second ex officio indictment, the “Bounty indictment”, the same day; committal proceedings on those charges had not begun (at 86).

The accused alleged that the indictments were filed for an improper purpose, capriciously, or at the Premier’s direction, and that they were prejudiced by losing the committal proceedings. The allegations were not admitted and no evidence was taken, because it was convenient first to decide whether there was any legal foundation for the challenge (at 88). O’Brien J dismissed the Bartons’ suit in the Equity Division for declarations and an injunction, and the motions to quash the indictments and for a stay, although his reasons on those motions dealt only with the Bounty indictment (at 86-87). The accused appealed to the High Court by special leave (at 87).

What did the Court decide?

The High Court allowed the appeals in part. The orders affirmed the dismissal of the motions to quash the indictments, dismissed the application for a stay of proceedings on the Harbourside indictment, and remitted to the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Criminal Division) the question whether a stay of proceedings on the Bounty indictment should be granted. Gibbs ACJ and Mason J wrote joint reasons, and Stephen, Aickin, Murphy and Wilson JJ each gave shorter reasons. Stephen J and Aickin J concurred in the orders (at 106, 109), while Murphy J and Wilson J would have dismissed the appeals (at 109, 117).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Joint reasons of Gibbs ACJ and Mason J. The source of the power is s 5 of the Australian Courts Act 1828 (9 Geo IV c 83), under which crimes are to be prosecuted “by information in the name of his Majesty’s attorney general” (at 88). Their Honours rejected the argument that a statutory power is necessarily reviewable. The section “imposes no duty on the Attorney-General to consider whether a prosecution shall be instituted”, and “because the language leaves the Attorney-General at large in deciding what course he shall take, it makes his decision immune from judicial review” (at 94).

That was consistent with the position in England, with the Supreme Court’s consistent practice, and with the function of the grand jury which the Attorney-General replaced (at 90-94). Their Honours then separated that conclusion from the court’s control of its own process: “The courts exercise no control over the Attorney-General’s decision to commence criminal proceedings, but once he does so, the courts will control those proceedings so as to ensure that the accused receives a fair trial” (at 96). “There is ample authority for the proposition that the courts possess all the necessary powers to prevent an abuse of process and to ensure a fair trial”, extending in an appropriate case to a stay (at 97).

On the committal proceedings, their Honours treated them as an important protection that the accused would be denied (at 99-101) and said that “a trial held without antecedent committal proceedings, unless justified on strong and powerful grounds, must necessarily be considered unfair”, adding that “It is for the courts, not the Attorney-General, to decide in the last resort whether the justice of the case requires that a trial should proceed in the absence of committal proceedings” (at 101). For the Bounty indictment the court must weigh the interests of the accused in a fair trial against the Crown’s interest in bringing the accused to trial, and that weighing was for the Supreme Court (at 101-102). For the Harbourside indictment no abuse of process was shown, because the whole of the available evidence except perhaps that of Sir Peter Abeles had been tendered to the magistrate (at 102).

Aickin J agreed with the joint reasons and the conclusions that follow from them (at 109).

Stephen J. His Honour agreed that the filing is not subject to judicial review and that the courts may postpone or stay the trial where necessary to ensure a fair trial (at 103). He did not accept that committal proceedings are an essential prerequisite of a fair trial (at 104). Their absence calls for careful evaluation of all the circumstances, and the Attorney-General’s right to file an ex officio indictment means that the mere absence of committal proceedings, though it costs the accused the chance to cross-examine Crown witnesses before trial, “will not of itself suffice as grounds for a stay”; circumstances making that loss particularly prejudicial weigh heavily in favour of one (at 105-106).

Wilson J. His Honour adopted the joint reasons’ conclusions that the decision to file is not reviewable and that the courts may postpone or stay a trial on any indictment to prevent an abuse of process and ensure a fair trial (at 109-110). But he was “unable to agree” that a trial without antecedent committal proceedings must necessarily be considered unfair unless justified on strong and powerful grounds (at 110). Abuse of process, in his view, implies a defect going to the root of the trial that nothing a trial judge can do will relieve (at 111-114), and he could not “comprehend how the mere absence of committal proceedings of itself could ever sustain an allegation of abuse of process” (at 114).

Murphy J. His Honour agreed generally with Wilson J (at 106). The Attorney-General “is not examinable in any court for alleged absence of good faith or for considering extraneous matters in filing an indictment” (at 107). A court may stay proceedings to avoid injustice, but “this does not entitle any court to decline to proceed on an indictment filed by the Attorney-General until there have been committal proceedings” (at 107).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Ratio · Gibbs ACJ and Mason J, with Stephen, Aickin and Wilson JJ agreeing

Read judgment: pp 94–97 (opens in a new tab)

The joint reasons held that s 5 leaves the Attorney-General at large, so his decision to file is immune from judicial review, and separated that from the courts’ power to control the trial to ensure fairness. Both points were needed to dispose of the appeals: the first answered the quashing and equitable relief claims, and the second framed the stay application. Stephen J, Aickin J and Wilson J each said they agreed with these conclusions, and Murphy J agreed generally with Wilson J.

Classification unresolved · Gibbs ACJ and Mason J, with Aickin J agreeing

Read judgment: pp 99–102 (opens in a new tab)

The joint reasons used the statement that a trial without antecedent committal proceedings, unless justified on strong and powerful grounds, must necessarily be considered unfair, to remit the Bounty stay application. It was not accepted by Wilson J, and Stephen J and Murphy J reached their positions on different reasoning, although Stephen J concurred in the orders. A ratio or obiter label would conceal that the statement was not shared by half of the bench.

Separate reasoning · Stephen J

Read judgment: pp 103–106 (opens in a new tab)

Stephen J agreed with the joint reasons on reviewability and the stay power, but held that a fair trial does not require committal proceedings as a prerequisite and that their mere absence will not of itself suffice as grounds for a stay; the loss is weighed with other considerations. He concurred in the orders, so his reasoning concurs in the result by a distinct route.

Separate reasoning · Wilson J

Read judgment: pp 109–117 (opens in a new tab)

Wilson J agreed with the joint reasons on reviewability and the stay power, but could not accept that the absence of committal proceedings could of itself found an abuse of process, and would dismiss the appeals. His reasons are a distinct route that departs from the orders made.

Separate reasoning · Murphy J

Read judgment: pp 106–107 (opens in a new tab)

Murphy J agreed generally with Wilson J. He held that the Attorney-General is not examinable in any court on his reasons for filing, that a court may stay proceedings, but that this does not entitle a court to decline to proceed on an indictment until there have been committal proceedings; he would dismiss the appeals.

Why does this case matter?

Barton is short to cite and long to read, and its worth in an answer depends on attributing each point to the right Justices. Writing “the High Court held” for a point that only some of them accepted overstates the authority, and an examiner who sets the case for its divisions will notice.

A common error in problem questions is to treat a challenge to a prosecutor’s decision and a complaint about the fairness of the resulting trial as one question. These facts raise both: the alleged direction from the Premier, and the loss of the committal hearing.

Exam and application relevance

Identify which of two questions is being asked. A challenge to the decision to prosecute, however it is framed in terms of motive or the Premier’s direction, is one question; a complaint about unfairness in the proceedings that follow is another. Work out which the facts raise, and then check what the joint reasons say about each (at 94-97) before you apply either.

The power considered here was the Attorney-General’s under s 5 of the Australian Courts Act, and the decision was a decision to commence proceedings. A problem about another prosecutor’s decision, or about a decision not to prosecute or to discontinue, needs that prosecutor’s own statute and authority, and Barton is relevant by analogy, with that difference stated.

On the committal question, name the Justices whose view you rely on instead of writing “the Court held”.

Check your understanding

1. Why did the accused’s allegations about the Premier’s direction and the Attorney-General’s motives not go to the High Court’s decision on the motions to quash?

2. What distinction did Gibbs ACJ and Mason J draw between the Attorney-General’s decision to commence proceedings and the court’s control of them?

3. Which Justices agreed with the joint reasons on reviewability and the stay power, and which of those Justices did not accept the statement about trials without committal proceedings?

4. Why was the Harbourside stay application dismissed while the Bounty application was remitted?

5. How did Stephen J’s approach to a stay for want of committal proceedings differ from the joint reasons, and how did he nonetheless concur in the orders?