George v Rockett
George v Rockett [1990] HCA 26; (1990) 170 CLR 104
A detective swears that there are reasonable grounds to suspect and believe documents in a solicitor’s office will prove perjury, and a magistrate issues a search warrant. What had to appear before the warrant could lawfully issue?
Qualified by legislation: Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld), from 23 March 2000
Section 679 of the Criminal Code (Qld), the warrant provision the Court construed, and s 680A were omitted by Schedule 2 of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) (Act No 5 of 2000), which commenced on assent on 23 March 2000. A Queensland police officer now applies for a search warrant under s 150 of that Act, and s 151 provides that the issuer may issue it only if satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the evidence or property sought is at the place or likely to be taken there within the next 72 hours, or, for prohibited items, reasonable grounds for believing that they are there or likely to be taken there. The Court’s statements were made in construing s 679 and not s 151.
What happened?
On an August day in 1989 Detective Sergeant Rockett, of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, went to the office of a stipendiary magistrate and applied for a search warrant under s 679(b) of The Criminal Code (Qld). He placed before the magistrate a statutory declaration about the existence of documents said to be in the handwriting of Sir Terence Lewis, a former Commissioner of Police, who had been charged with two counts of perjury. He also produced a form of complaint and a pro forma warrant. The magistrate asked him some questions, which he answered, and he then swore the complaint.
The sworn complaint said that there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that, in the rooms of Mr George’s firm of solicitors, there was a bundle of pages in Sir Terence Lewis’s handwriting containing his comments on evidence given before a commission of inquiry, together with part of the transcript annotated in his handwriting, which Dr Siracusa had forwarded to the solicitors on 11 August 1989. It said that there were reasonable grounds for believing that these things would afford evidence of two perjury offences: that Sir Terence had knowingly sworn falsely that he had no idea what certain notations in his notebooks referred to, and that he had never met Jack Rooklyn in a private room at the Crest Hotel. Its statement of the grounds of suspicion and belief described the pages and said that they had been in Dr Siracusa’s possession and had been forwarded to the solicitors.
The magistrate issued the warrant. It was executed at the solicitors’ office, and the documents seized were sealed in an envelope without being inspected by Rockett and delivered to the magistrate. Mr George, the solicitor against whom the warrant was issued, obtained an order calling on Rockett to show cause why the warrant should not be reviewed under s 209 of the Justices Act 1886-1989 (Qld). The Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland discharged the order to review. Mr George appealed to the High Court.
What did the Court decide?
The High Court allowed the appeal with costs. It set aside the order of the Full Court and in its place made the order to review absolute. Seven Justices, Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ, delivered one joint judgment.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
The Court said that s 679 imposes on the justice, through the words “If it appears to a justice”, the duty of satisfying himself that the conditions for the warrant are fulfilled, and that it must appear to the issuing justice, not merely to the person seeking the warrant, that reasonable grounds for the relevant suspicion and belief exist. It rejected the view of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland in Hedges v Grundmann that the justice must also entertain the suspicion and belief, saying that “[t]he latter requirement is excessive, for the language of s.679 does not import it”. The Court said that when a statute prescribes that there must be “reasonable grounds” for a state of mind, including suspicion and belief, “it requires the existence of facts which are sufficient to induce that state of mind in a reasonable person”.
The Court said that suspicion and belief are different states of mind and that s 679 prescribes distinct subject matters for each. It quoted Lord Devlin’s description of suspicion in Hussien v Chong Fook Kam as “a state of conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking”, and said that “[t]he facts which can reasonably ground a suspicion may be quite insufficient reasonably to ground a belief, yet some factual basis for the suspicion must be shown” (at 115-116). Belief is “an inclination of the mind towards assenting to, rather than rejecting, a proposition”, and the grounds that can reasonably induce it may, depending on the circumstances, leave something to surmise or conjecture.
The objective circumstances must point more clearly to the subject matter of a belief than those for a suspicion, but they need not establish on the balance of probabilities that the subject matter occurred or exists. On s 679(b) the Court held that the better construction is that the existence of the thing is the subject of suspicion, while whether the thing, if found, will afford evidence of an offence is the subject of belief, and that the description of the object of the search affects how easily each requirement is met and how wide the warrant’s powers of seizure are.
The Court held that the matters must appear “on complaint made on oath”, and accepted the statement in Bridgeman v Macalister, adopted in other jurisdictions, that the information must state the ground, the reasonable ground, for suspicion. Grounds cannot be made to appear from statements made to the justice otherwise than on oath. If the sworn complaint contains sufficient facts, the justice may seek confirmation by inquiry of the complainant. The Court left open whether the complaint on oath must be in writing.
In this case the only sworn material was the complaint, and the statutory declaration and the answers given to the magistrate were immaterial if it was insufficient. The complaint contained no facts which might have satisfied the magistrate that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the documents would afford evidence of the offences, and nothing except Rockett’s assertion that there were reasonable grounds for his own belief. The magistrate had no power to issue the warrant, and the warrant was invalid.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Only selected propositions are annotated. An unmarked proposition has not been classified.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ (joint reasons)
Read judgment: pp 115–116 (opens in a new tab)
In the passage beginning with Lord Devlin’s description of suspicion, the Court says that the facts which can reasonably ground a suspicion may be quite insufficient reasonably to ground a belief, yet some factual basis for the suspicion must be shown. The pages are those at which later High Court judgments cite and quote the passage (NSW v Robinson [2019] HCA 46, footnote 73; Ruddock v Taylor [2005] HCA 48 at [71], footnote 39). The distinction is necessary to the result: the Court holds that the sworn complaint contained nothing on which the magistrate could be satisfied that there were reasonable grounds for believing the documents would afford evidence of the offences.
Why does this case matter?
Students often treat “reasonable grounds” as a label to be applied to whatever a police officer says. Examiners look for an answer that identifies what is said to give rise to the state of mind, who has to be satisfied of it and on what material, and what the statute asks to be established.
Exam and application relevance
For a statutory power conditioned on reasonable suspicion or reasonable belief, identify the statutory words, the person who must hold or be satisfied of the state of mind, and the facts said to support it.
The Court’s statements were made in construing a provision about issuing a search warrant. Where you apply them to another statute, say which statute you are applying them to and why its words are comparable.
Check your understanding
1. What material did Detective Sergeant Rockett place before the magistrate, and which of it was sworn?
2. According to the joint judgment, whose satisfaction does s 679 require, and what did the Court say about the requirement in Hedges v Grundmann?
3. How did the Court describe suspicion, and what did it say about the relationship between facts that ground a suspicion and facts that ground a belief?