Aubrey v The Queen
Aubrey v The Queen [2017] HCA 18
A man who knew he was HIV positive had unprotected sex without telling his partner. Did he inflict grievous bodily harm, and how much did he have to foresee to act maliciously?
Clarified by legislation: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), from 15 February 2008
The definition of grievous bodily harm in s 4(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) was amended with effect from 15 February 2008 to include any grievous bodily disease, and a reference to the infliction of grievous bodily harm now includes a reference to causing a person to contract a grievous bodily disease (joint reasons at [9]). For conduct after that date the question Aubrey answered by construction is answered by the definition, and the argument starts there. Aubrey remains the High Court’s reasoning on the unamended text and on why Clarence is no longer followed.
Qualified by legislation: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), from 21 June 2012
The offence in s 35 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) no longer depends on the malice that Aubrey construed. The definition of maliciously in s 5 was repealed with effect from 15 February 2008, and from 21 June 2012 each offence in s 35 requires that the accused cause grievous bodily harm, or wound a person, and be reckless as to causing actual bodily harm to that or any other person. For conduct on or after 21 June 2012 the fault element is the one the section states. From 27 September 2007, when s 35 first spoke of recklessness in place of malice, until 21 June 2012 the section was worded differently again, so the version in force when the conduct occurred is the one to apply. Aubrey’s reasoning on foresight of possibility concerns the section as it stood in 2004.
What happened?
Between January and July 2004 Michael Aubrey had unprotected anal sexual intercourse with the complainant, knowing that he was HIV positive. The complainant contracted HIV ([2]). Aubrey was charged on two counts: maliciously causing the complainant to contract a grievous bodily disease with intent to do so, contrary to s 36 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), and, in the alternative, maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm, contrary to s 35(1)(b) ([1]). The Crown did not allege an application of direct and intentional violence. Its case was that the grievous bodily harm was inflicted because the complainant was infected as the immediate consequence of the act of intercourse ([2]).
At his trial before a jury he was acquitted of the first count and convicted of the second, and was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of three years ([5]). The Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed his appeal, adopting the reasoning of the court that had decided an earlier interlocutory appeal in the same matter ([5]).
What did the Court decide?
The appeal was dismissed. Five Justices sat. Kiefel CJ, Keane, Nettle and Edelman JJ wrote joint reasons ([1]-[52]) and Bell J wrote separately ([53]-[74]). The joint reasons answered both questions on the appeal in the affirmative ([7]). Bell J would have allowed the appeal on the first question and entered an acquittal ([53], [74]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
On the first question, whether an act of intercourse that causes the other person to contract a grievous bodily disease is capable of amounting to the infliction of grievous bodily harm under s 35(1)(b), as that section stood in 2004: Kiefel CJ, Keane, Nettle and Edelman JJ held that infliction does not require the direct application of force or immediate injury, and that R v Clarence, which had held that sexual transmission of disease was not the infliction of grievous bodily harm, should no longer be followed ([18]-[28]).
They considered that the reckless transmission of HIV by consensual intercourse without disclosing the risk could be the infliction of grievous bodily harm ([40]). Bell J dissented on this question. She regarded Clarence as having long stood as an authoritative statement that sexual transmission of disease is not the infliction of grievous bodily harm and said that if that settled understanding is ill-suited to modern society the solution lies in the legislature ([55], [73]).
On the second question, the degree of foresight needed for recklessness, which is what makes an act malicious under s 5: the joint reasons held that foresight of the possibility of harm is enough for the offence in s 35, approving the reasoning in R v Coleman. They distinguished common law murder, where foresight of probability is required, because there the reason is the near moral equivalence of intending and foreseeing the probability of death or grievous bodily harm ([46]-[47]).
They added that the requirements in other States may vary with each State’s legislation ([47]). They rejected the submission that foresight of possibility should be replaced by foresight of probability. They accepted that the reasonableness of an act and the foresight of harm needed for recklessness are logically connected, so that where the act has social utility a jury may properly require more than foresight of a bare possibility, and they left open that a trial judge may in a future case need to direct a jury on that point ([48]-[50]). Bell J agreed with the joint reasons’ analysis and conclusion on recklessness, though in her view the issue was not reached ([53]).
The Court decided the Crimes Act as it stood in 2004. The definition of grievous bodily harm was amended with effect from 15 February 2008 ([9]), and s 35 was reframed from 21 June 2012 so that its offences are now framed around causing grievous bodily harm or wounding while reckless as to causing actual bodily harm.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Kiefel CJ, Keane, Nettle and Edelman JJ
Read judgment: [26]–[28] (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab), [40] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab)
This construction of the pre-amendment s 35 was necessary to reject the first ground of appeal: transmission of HIV could constitute infliction despite the absence of force or immediately apparent symptoms. The joint reasons adopt the broader construction and decline to follow Clarence, allowing the conviction to stand on that ground.
Separate reasoning · Bell J
Read judgment: [73]–[74] (PDF p 37) (opens in a new tab)
Bell J dissented in the result. She treated Clarence as a longstanding, plausible construction of s 35 and relied on certainty in the criminal law to decline to depart from it. That route led her to allow the appeal and order an acquittal; it is not the majority’s ground of decision.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Kiefel CJ, Keane, Nettle and Edelman JJ
Read judgment: [47] (PDF p 27) (opens in a new tab), [50]–[51] (PDF p 28) (opens in a new tab)
To reject the second ground of appeal, the joint reasons upheld foresight of possibility rather than probability under the former ss 5 and 35. Their approval of Coleman and distinction of the murder standard explain that conclusion. Paragraph 51 applies it to the appellant’s admitted awareness of a real possibility of infection, so the jury had not proceeded on a bare possibility alone.
Obiter · Kiefel CJ, Keane, Nettle and Edelman JJ
Read judgment: [49]–[50] (PDF p 27) (opens in a new tab), [51] (PDF p 29) (opens in a new tab)
The discussion of socially useful activities and possible future directions goes beyond what was needed to dismiss this appeal. The joint reasons expressly contemplated a future case requiring a direction; paragraph 51 explains why this case raised no such issue. These observations qualify how students use the possibility standard, but do not establish that a social-utility direction was required here.
Separate reasoning · Bell J
Read judgment: [53] (PDF p 30) (opens in a new tab)
Bell J agreed with the joint reasons on recklessness but dissented in the result on infliction. She expressly said the recklessness issue was not reached on her approach. Her agreement therefore supplies no necessary ground for her proposed acquittal and should not be presented as a fifth judge deciding that issue as part of the disposition.
Why does this case matter?
The case answers two questions that students often run together: what the word “inflicts” covers, and how much foresight makes an act malicious. Keep them apart in an answer, because the Justices did not divide in the same way on each.
Exam and application relevance
Start with the date of the conduct and the jurisdiction. Aubrey concerns the Act as it stood in 2004. For later conduct, use the versions of ss 4 and 35 in force when it occurred: the definition of grievous bodily harm changed on 15 February 2008, and s 35 was reframed in terms of recklessness as to actual bodily harm from 21 June 2012. Separate the conduct element from the fault element, and identify which statutory version governs each.
On recklessness, say which State’s offence you are applying. A later High Court decision on s 17 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), Director of Public Prosecutions Reference No 1 of 2019 [2021] HCA 26, dismissed an appeal by a majority of four Justices to three and left the Victorian meaning of recklessness in that section as foresight of probability, although Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ would have applied the Aubrey test to s 17.
If the problem turns on an activity with social utility, examine the joint reasons at [49]-[51] and distinguish the reasoning needed to decide this appeal from guidance about future cases.
Check your understanding
1. Which Justices held that infliction of grievous bodily harm does not require the direct application of force, and what did Bell J say should happen to the appeal on that question?
2. Why did the joint reasons say a higher degree of foresight is required for common law murder than for the offence in s 35?
3. At [51] the joint reasons refer to something the appellant conceded at his trial. What was it, and why did it matter to the question of directions on social utility?