Zaburoni v The Queen
Zaburoni v The Queen [2016] HCA 12
A man who knew he had HIV lied to his partner and had unprotected sex with her for months. That is callous, but did it prove he intended to infect her?
Affirmed by SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34
In SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34 at [16]-[17], Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ said that the plurality in Zaburoni held that evidence a person understood a result to be inevitable may go a long way towards proving intent but is not to be equated with it, and applied the ordinary meaning of intention accepted in Zaburoni. They also said that the manner in which Nettle J reasoned in Zaburoni, that foresight of an inevitable or certain consequence entails intent, now stands rejected. So the joint reasons’ approach is the one to state, and Nettle J’s separate reasoning is not.
What happened?
Godfrey Zaburoni was told in 1998 that he was HIV positive. Doctors told him that HIV is sexually transmissible and that he should use condoms ([21]-[23]). He began a sexual relationship with the complainant after meeting her on 31 December 2006. He told her that he was not HIV positive. After about six weeks of using condoms the couple had unprotected intercourse two or three times a week, and he said he preferred it because it was more pleasurable for him ([24]). The relationship ended in September 2008, and in 2009 the complainant was diagnosed with HIV ([28]-[29]).
He was tried in the District Court of Queensland for unlawfully transmitting a serious disease to another with intent to do so, under s 317(b) of the Criminal Code, which carries life imprisonment, with an alternative count of unlawfully doing grievous bodily harm under s 320, which carries 14 years. He pleaded guilty to the alternative count, the prosecution did not accept the plea in discharge of the indictment, and the only issue for the jury was his intention ([2]-[3]). The jury convicted him on the s 317(b) count and he was sentenced to nine and a half years’ imprisonment ([3]). The Court of Appeal of Queensland dismissed his appeal by majority ([4]).
What did the Court decide?
The appeal was allowed. Kiefel, Bell, Gageler, Keane and Nettle JJ sat. Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ wrote joint reasons ([1]-[51]), and Gageler J ([52]-[64]) and Nettle J ([65]-[72]) each agreed with the orders and gave short reasons of their own. The Court set aside the order of the Court of Appeal and in its place allowed the appeal to that Court, substituted for the jury’s verdict a verdict of guilty of unlawfully doing grievous bodily harm, and remitted the proceeding to the District Court of Queensland for sentence ([51]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Where the Criminal Code (Qld) makes an intention to produce a particular result an element of liability, the prosecution must establish that the accused meant to produce that result by the conduct. Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ said that knowledge or foresight of the result, whether it is possible, probable or certain, is not a substitute in law for proof of a specific intent, and contrasted the Commonwealth Criminal Code, under which a person has intention with respect to a result if aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events ([14]).
Awareness that the conduct will certainly produce the result makes the inference of intention compelling, but the trier of fact must still be satisfied that the accused meant to produce it ([15]). Purpose is not the same as motive ([17]). Gageler J treated it as undisputed that the prosecution had to prove an actual subjective intention as distinct from awareness of the probable consequence ([55]).
Nettle J reasoned differently: he said that if an accused foresaw an inevitable or certain consequence it logically follows that the accused intended it, whether or not the accused wished for it ([66]-[67]). Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ later said in SZTAL that the way Nettle J reasoned in Zaburoni now stands rejected.
On the facts, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ held that awareness of the risk of harm, putting aside awareness of virtual certainty, does not without more support an inference of intent ([42]). A rational inference open on the evidence was that the appellant had unprotected intercourse for his sexual pleasure while reckless of the risk of transmission, and that inference lessened the force of an argument for intent from the frequency of the conduct ([44]). His lies to the complainant, his failure to take antiretroviral medication or to have his condition monitored, and his later remark that he did not want to ruin her life did not supply the missing inference ([45]-[47]).
The evidence was not capable of establishing intent to the criminal standard ([49]). Gageler J reached the same conclusion on the frequency and duration of the intercourse ([63]), and Nettle J because the evidence showed at most foresight of the risk of infection ([69]-[72]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ
Read judgment: [14] (PDF p 8) (opens in a new tab), [17] (PDF p 9) (opens in a new tab)
The requirement that the accused meant to produce the result, rather than merely foresaw a risk of it, supplied the legal standard for reviewing this conviction under s 317(b). Distinguishing purpose from motive explains what the prosecution had to prove. The classification concerns that standard, rather than every observation within these paragraphs.
Obiter · Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ
Read judgment: [14] (PDF p 8) (opens in a new tab), [15] (PDF p 9) (opens in a new tab)
The comparison with the Commonwealth Code was explanatory: liability under that Code was not in issue. The discussion of foresight of certainty likewise extended beyond the facts established here, which fell short of proving awareness of virtual certainty. These observations explain the limits of the intention test but were unnecessary to quashing this conviction.
Separate reasoning · Gageler J
Read judgment: [55] (PDF p 21) (opens in a new tab)
Concurring in the result, Gageler J treated the requirement of actual subjective intention, distinct from awareness of a probable consequence, as undisputed. His separate reasons approached the appeal as a factual review of whether the inference of that intention was open beyond reasonable doubt.
Separate reasoning · Nettle J
Read judgment: [66]–[67] (PDF p 25) (opens in a new tab)
Nettle J concurred in the orders but reasoned differently from the joint reasons: foresight of an inevitable or certain consequence logically entailed intention. That hypothetical degree of foresight was not established here. This is his separate approach, rather than the joint reasons’ test, and must be read with the subsequent treatment recorded above.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ
Read judgment: [42] (PDF p 16) (opens in a new tab), [44] (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab), [49] (PDF p 19) (opens in a new tab)
These passages give the necessary reasoning for quashing the s 317(b) conviction: awareness of risk alone did not establish intent, the evidence supported sexual pleasure coupled with recklessness, and the evidence could not prove an intention to transmit HIV to the criminal standard. This is a conclusion about the evidence in this case, not a rule that repeated unprotected intercourse can never prove intent.
Separate reasoning · Gageler J
Read judgment: [63] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab)
Concurring in the result, Gageler J held that the frequency and duration of intercourse could not safely exclude the reasonable hypothesis of selfish gratification with recklessness about infection. This identifies the reasonable hypothesis that prevented the jury’s inference of intention from satisfying the criminal standard.
Separate reasoning · Nettle J
Read judgment: [72] (PDF p 26) (opens in a new tab)
Nettle J concurred in the orders but distinguished a failure to exclude an innocent hypothesis from the more basic insufficiency he identified: even taken at its highest, the inferential evidence established only foresight of risk and reckless indifference. This explains his distinct route to allowing the appeal.
Why does this case matter?
The appeal rested on a single ground, that the verdict was unreasonable or could not be supported by the evidence ([53]-[54]). So the case is also a worked example of an appeal court asking whether the evidence could bear the inference the jury drew. Gageler J put the question as whether, on the court’s own independent assessment of the evidence, it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of intention ([56]).
Exam and application relevance
Identify the source of law before using the case. Zaburoni concerns intention as the Criminal Code (Qld) uses it in s 317(b), and a different statute or the common law needs its own analysis of what intention requires.
Then identify what the evidence shows the accused was aiming at, and separately what it shows about the accused’s awareness of risk, and apply the joint reasons at [42]-[44] and Gageler J at [63]. Where a problem includes Nettle J’s account, say that his reasoning was later described as rejected in SZTAL.
Check your understanding
1. What do the joint reasons say about foresight of a result as a substitute for intention under the Queensland Code, and how does the Commonwealth Criminal Code differ?
2. The appellant lied to the complainant to obtain and keep her agreement to unprotected intercourse. Why did the joint reasons say that did not prove an intention to transmit HIV?
3. Which verdict did the Court substitute, and why was the matter remitted to the District Court?