SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

High Court of Australia · 2017

ReasoningStatutory Interpretation

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34

A returned asylum seeker is held in a prison whose appalling conditions the officials are taken to know about. Does an official who sends him there ‘intentionally inflict’ the suffering those conditions cause?

What happened?

SZTAL and SZTGM, whose country of origin was Sri Lanka, each applied for a protection visa. They said that there was a real risk that, if they were removed to Sri Lanka, they would suffer “significant harm” because of the treatment there of citizens who departed contrary to Sri Lankan law ([6], [104]). One criterion for a protection visa is that the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of removal, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm ([2]). Under the “complementary protection” provisions inserted into the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in 2012, significant harm includes being subjected to “cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment” or “degrading treatment or punishment” ([3]).

Section 5(1) defines the first as an act or omission by which “severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person”, and the second as an act or omission that causes and “is intended to cause extreme humiliation which is unreasonable” ([4]-[5]).

The Refugee Review Tribunal found that, if returned and charged, the appellants would likely be held in remand for a short period, which might be one day, several days or possibly two weeks, and accepted that prison conditions in Sri Lanka were poor and might not meet international standards because of overcrowding, poor sanitary facilities and limited access to food ([6]). The question for the Tribunal was whether Sri Lankan officials in sending the appellants to prison could be said to intend to inflict severe pain or suffering or to intend to cause extreme humiliation ([7]). It concluded that intention was not established, because the conditions resulted from a lack of resources which the Sri Lankan government acknowledged and was taking steps to improve ([7]).

The Federal Circuit Court (Judge Driver) and a majority of the Full Court of the Federal Court (Kenny and Nicholas JJ) dismissed the applications for review and the appeals, on the footing that the Tribunal had applied the correct meaning of intention. Buchanan J dismissed the appeals to the Full Court on other grounds ([8]). In the High Court the appellants argued that the conditions were satisfied if a person does an act knowing that it will, in the ordinary course of events, inflict pain or suffering or cause extreme humiliation, and that the Sri Lankan officials must be taken to know the conditions in the prisons to which they would send the appellants ([10]-[11]).

What did the Court decide?

In each matter the appeal was dismissed and the appellant was ordered to pay the first respondent’s costs ([30], [115]).

Three sets of reasons were given: the joint reasons of Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ ([1]-[30]), the reasons of Gageler J ([31]-[59]) and the reasons of Edelman J ([60]-[115]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

The joint reasons began with the method of construction ([14]):

“The starting point for the ascertainment of the meaning of a statutory provision is the text of the statute whilst, at the same time, regard is had to its context and purpose. Context should be regarded at this first stage and not at some later stage and it should be regarded in its widest sense.”

They added that the natural and ordinary meaning of a word remains important to construction, but that understood in its statutory, historical or other context some other meaning may be suggested, and that “if its ordinary meaning is not consistent with the statutory purpose, that meaning must be rejected” ([14]).

Applying that method, the joint reasons held that the references in the Act to intentionally inflicting and intentionally causing are “to the natural and ordinary meaning of the word ‘intends’ and therefore to actual, subjective, intent” ([26]). Following the plurality in Zaburoni v The Queen, a person is ordinarily understood to intend a result if the person means to produce it, which involves “the directing of the mind, having a purpose or design” ([15]). Knowledge or foresight of a result is not equated with intent.

Evidence that a person is aware that conduct will certainly produce a result may permit an inference of intent, but “foresight of a result is of evidential significance only” and “is not a substitute for the test of whether a person intended the result” ([27]). Because the plurality in Zaburoni had held that evidence of inevitability may go a long way towards proving intent but is not to be equated with it, the joint reasons said that “the manner in which Nettle J reasoned in Zaburoni now stands rejected” ([16]).

The joint reasons then examined whether the context told against that meaning. The context of the Act did not: the intention element is also part of the definition of torture, from which the two definitions are derived, and a torturer means to inflict suffering as part of an ultimate purpose or design ([17]). International sources did not help, because there was no settled meaning of “intentionally” in international law, the decisions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia gave none, and the European Court of Human Rights in Kalashnikov v Russia was concerned with a provision, Art 3 of the European Convention, which does not require positive intention for degrading treatment ([18]-[19]).

The alternative definition of intention in s 5.2(3) of the Criminal Code (Cth), under which a person has intention with respect to a result if aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events, was enacted in 1995 for all Commonwealth offences and reflects a policy choice about criminal responsibility; it did not form part of the context of the complementary protection regime, and the 2012 amendments made no reference to it ([20]-[23]). The Criminal Code and the Act were not statutes in pari materia: the Code makes persons criminally responsible, whereas the Act is concerned with the reality of the risk of harm from officials, assessed by reference to what they might be understood to intend ([24]-[25]).

The Tribunal was therefore right to ask whether a Sri Lankan official intended to inflict severe pain or suffering, or to cause extreme humiliation, and was entitled to conclude that it was not to be inferred that the officials did ([28]-[29]).

Edelman J agreed that the appeals be dismissed, by his own route. There was no established international meaning of intention to which the Act could be taken to refer ([84]), the Criminal Code definition was a conscious choice that was not repeated in the Migration Act ([90]), and “In ordinary or natural language, oblique intention is not intention at all” ([103]). The decision in Zaburoni could not by itself resolve the appeals, but its conclusions about the ordinary meaning of intention should be endorsed ([67]).

Gageler J dissented. Stating the task as one that “begins, as it ends, with the statutory text” construed in context ([37]), he described s 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) as “a particular statutory reflection of a general systemic principle”, quoting Thiess v Collector of Customs ([39]). He said that the concept of intention is not always to be determined by ordinary or grammatical meaning alone ([41]) and that the purpose of the regime, to align the criterion for a protection visa with Australia’s obligations under Art 7 of the ICCPR and Art 3 of the CAT ([43]), was best served by the wider reading, so that intention exists where the perpetrator means to engage in conduct aware that the result will occur in the ordinary course of events ([54], [58]). He considered the view of the majority too narrow and would have allowed each appeal ([58]-[59]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [14]–[19] (PDF p 10) (opens in a new tab), [20]–[29] (PDF p 12) (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs answer the only question the appeals raised in this Court: whether the Tribunal and the Full Court correctly read the intention element of the definitions as actual, subjective intention. The joint reasons give the meaning ([15], [26]-[27]), find that the context and the international sources do not displace it ([17]-[25]) and apply it to the Tribunal’s finding ([28]-[29]). They are necessary to the dismissal of the appeals.

Separate reasoning · Edelman J (agreeing that the appeals be dismissed)

Read judgment: [67]–[68] (PDF p 27) (opens in a new tab), [90]–[92] (PDF p 35) (opens in a new tab), [103] (PDF p 41) (opens in a new tab)

Edelman J reached the same result by a longer route: no established international meaning of intention exists, the Criminal Code’s definition was a deliberate choice not made in the Migration Act, and the ordinary meaning of intention does not include oblique intention. He also said that Zaburoni was relevant only as an illustration of the ordinary meaning ([102]). This is his own reasoning in a concurring judgment and is not attributed to the joint reasons.

Separate reasoning · Gageler J (dissenting)

Read judgment: [41]–[44] (PDF p 19) (opens in a new tab), [58]–[59] (PDF p 24) (opens in a new tab)

Gageler J held that the concept of intention could not be fixed by ordinary meaning alone, that the purpose of the complementary protection regime favoured the wider notion, and that the view of the majority was too narrow. He would have allowed each appeal. This is a dissent and is not the law stated by the Court.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [14] (PDF p 10) (opens in a new tab)

The statement of method at [14] is the premise on which the joint reasons examine the context (the Criminal Code, the Convention sources) before confirming the ordinary meaning of intention, so the construction that decided the appeals depends on it.

Separate reasoning · Gageler J (dissenting)

Read judgment: [37]–[39] (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab), [41]–[43] (PDF p 19) (opens in a new tab)

These are statements of method made in a dissenting judgment, as the premise for a different construction. The statement about s 15AA is not repeated in the joint reasons and is not the Court’s holding.

Why does this case matter?

Students often reduce statutory interpretation to a contest between “literal” and “purposive” readings and name a winner. A problem built on this decision is a better test of the skill, because the Justices wrote three sets of reasons on one word, and an answer has to show whose reasons carry each step.

Exam and application relevance

Name the statute and the word in issue, set out how each Justice approached it, and attribute each step to the Justices whose reasons it is, because a statement made in one Justice’s separate reasons is not a holding of the Court.

The decision concerns the definitions in s 5(1) of the Migration Act as inserted in 2012. It does not decide what intention means in other statutes, whose own words and setting must be examined. The meaning of intention under a State Criminal Code, where the result is an element of an offence, is a separate question decided in Zaburoni.

Check your understanding

1. What did the appellants say the intention element in s 5(1) covered, and why did they say Sri Lankan officials satisfied it ([10]-[11])?

2. What did the joint reasons say about the manner in which Nettle J reasoned in Zaburoni, and what had the plurality in Zaburoni held ([15]-[16])?

3. What did the joint reasons say about the relevance of the Criminal Code definition of intention to the context of the complementary protection regime ([20]-[25])?

4. Whose reasons discuss s 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), and did that Justice agree with the orders ([39], [58]-[59])?

5. How did Edelman J’s reasons for dismissing the appeals differ from the joint reasons ([67], [84], [90], [103])?