Interpretation Acts compared across Australian jurisdictions
Compares the purposive-interpretation and extrinsic-material provisions of the Commonwealth, State and Territory interpretation Acts, and shows where the wording differs.
Learning outcomes
- State the purposive rule of the jurisdiction governing a statute, noting whether it is a best achieve or a promote provision.
- Identify which of three designs governs the use of extrinsic material in a jurisdiction, and whether it is gated.
- Avoid applying one jurisdiction’s gate on extrinsic material to another.
Every Australian jurisdiction has legislation telling courts to prefer a reading that serves the purpose of an Act, and legislation about when a court may look beyond the Act to materials such as an explanatory memorandum. The provisions are not identical. This article states the common position first, then sets out where the wording of the purposive rule and of the extrinsic-materials rule departs from it, in the Commonwealth and each State and Territory. It covers those two rules only. It does not cover the definitions and other general rules in the same Acts, or interpretive obligations in human rights legislation, for which see Human rights charters and Acts.
The method itself is in Statutory interpretation in Australia, and its limits are in The limits of purposive interpretation. For a worked Western Australian overlay see the Western Australian supplement.
The common position
The statutory purposive rules sit on top of a common-law approach that does not vary by jurisdiction. Gageler J described s 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) as “a particular statutory reflection of a general systemic principle” ([39] of his reasons in SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34, a dissenting judgment on the outcome).1 In Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross [2012] HCA 56, Crennan and Bell JJ, dissenting on the result, noted in a footnote that the Western Australian and New South Wales provisions on extrinsic material are counterparts of s 15AB (at [70], footnote 107).2 A student can therefore state the shared method for any jurisdiction, and then identify the local provision and check its wording.
The purposive rule
Nine provisions use one of two formulas. The Commonwealth, Queensland, South Australia and the Australian Capital Territory direct that the interpretation that best achieves the purpose of the Act is to be preferred (the Commonwealth section speaks of the interpretation that “would best achieve” the purpose, Queensland’s of the interpretation that “will best achieve” it, and South Australia’s of the interpretation that “best achieves” it): Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AA, Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) s 14A, Legislation Interpretation Act 2021 (SA) s 14 and Legislation Act 2001 (ACT) s 139. New South Wales, Victoria, Western Australia, Tasmania and the Northern Territory direct that a construction or interpretation that “promotes” (in the New South Wales, Victorian and Western Australian wording, “would promote”) the purpose or object is to be preferred: Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) s 33, Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic) s 35(a), Interpretation Act 1984 (WA) s 18, Acts Interpretation Act 1931 (Tas) s 8A and Interpretation Act 1978 (NT) s 62A. Each applies whether or not the purpose is expressly stated in the Act. This article does not state a rule about whether the difference between “best achieve” and “promote” changes the result in a particular problem; read the provision that governs the legislation in issue.34567891011
Some provisions add something. Queensland’s s 14A(2) says the section does not create or extend criminal liability, and South Australia’s s 14(2) says the same. The purposive provisions of the other jurisdictions listed above contain no equivalent subsection. Queensland’s s 14A(3) declares that the section applies to an Act passed after 30 June 1991 despite any presumption or rule of interpretation, and its example states that a provision imposing taxation is to be interpreted in the way that best achieves the Act’s purpose, whether or not that would favour the taxpayer. The Australian Capital Territory’s s 139 carries a note that s 30 of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) is also relevant to interpreting territory laws. The New South Wales and Victorian provisions refer to statutory rules and subordinate instruments, and the South Australian provision refers to legislative instruments, as well as Acts.
The extrinsic-materials rule
The rules fall into three designs.
Confirm or resolve. The Commonwealth (s 15AB), New South Wales (s 34), Western Australia (s 19), the Northern Territory (s 62B) and South Australia (s 16) allow material not forming part of the Act to be considered for two purposes. The first is to confirm that the meaning of the provision is the ordinary meaning conveyed by its text, taking into account its context and the purpose or object of the Act. The second is to determine the meaning when the provision is ambiguous or obscure, or when the ordinary meaning leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or is unreasonable. The Commonwealth, New South Wales, Western Australia and South Australia also direct that regard be had, in deciding whether to consider the material and what weight to give it, to the desirability of people being able to rely on the ordinary meaning and the need to avoid prolonging proceedings without compensating advantage. South Australia’s version says “must” where the others say “shall”. The Northern Territory provision contains no equivalent subsection.
Three limbs. Queensland (s 14B) and Tasmania (s 8B) allow consideration of extrinsic material to provide an interpretation if the provision is ambiguous or obscure, to avoid a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable, and “in any other case” to confirm the interpretation conveyed by the ordinary meaning. Each defines “ordinary meaning” as the meaning conveyed having regard to the context in the Act and the purpose of the Act, and each has a weighing subsection with the same two considerations.
Open. Victoria’s s 35(b) says that consideration “may be given to any matter or document that is relevant including but not limited to” listed items, which include parliamentary proceedings, explanatory memoranda and the reports of bodies such as Royal Commissions. The Australian Capital Territory’s s 141(1) says that material not forming part of the Act “may be considered”, with s 141(2) requiring account to be taken of the desirability of being able to rely on the ordinary meaning, the undesirability of prolonging proceedings, and the accessibility of the material to the public. In neither provision is consideration made to depend on ambiguity, absurdity or confirmation. The High Court’s limits on what extrinsic material can do, discussed in the limits article, still apply. The openness of the gate is the difference most likely to matter to a student. Under the statutory provisions in the first two designs, material may be used to confirm the ordinary meaning even where nothing is ambiguous, but using it to determine a meaning requires ambiguity or obscurity, or a manifestly absurd or unreasonable result. The open designs state no equivalent condition, so an answer built on the first two designs should not be carried over to Victoria or the Territory without checking the local text. These conditions are those of the statutes and do not by themselves state everything about the common-law use of context.
Each jurisdiction’s list of material includes explanatory material for the Bill and parliamentary speeches or proceedings. The Australian Capital Territory’s list is in s 142.10
Applying this in a problem question
- Identify the Act in issue and its jurisdiction, and the interpretation legislation of that jurisdiction.
- Quote the purposive provision, and state whether it is a “best achieve” or a “promote” provision.
- Before using an explanatory memorandum or speech, identify which of the three designs applies and state the gate, if there is one.
- Check the provisions’ application and commencement for the legislation and date in issue. South Australia’s s 3(3), for example, makes the Act’s application subject to a contrary intention, and Queensland’s s 14A(3) speaks of Acts passed after 30 June 1991.
- State the common-law method first, then the local provision.
Self-check
- Have I cited the provision of the right jurisdiction, with its Act, and not a section number alone?
- Have I said whether extrinsic material is gated in this jurisdiction?
- Have I avoided applying the Commonwealth gate to Victoria or the Australian Capital Territory?
- Have I checked that the compilation I read was in force when the facts arose?