The limits of purposive interpretation
How far purpose can take a court in Australian statutory interpretation: where purpose is found, why a general purpose does not displace clear text, and how far words can be read in.
Learning outcomes
- Explain where a court finds a statute’s purpose and why it may not assume one.
- Explain why a general statutory purpose does not displace a clearly expressed definition.
- Distinguish correcting a simple drafting error from an insertion too large to be construction.
Australian courts say that a statute is read as text, in context, with its purpose in view. Students often hear “purpose” as permission to read the words so that they reach the outcome the Act seems to aim at. The High Court has said that purposive interpretation does not allow that. This article is about where the limit lies: where a court may find a statute’s purpose, what purpose can do to the words, and what happens when the words are clear.
It assumes the method set out in Statutory interpretation in Australia and does not repeat that article’s account of Project Blue Sky or of materiality. The High Court applied the principles below to a Northern Territory, a New South Wales and a Commonwealth statute, and states them as general ones. The statutory rules that tell courts to prefer a purposive reading differ in wording between the jurisdictions; they are compared in Interpretation Acts compared across Australian jurisdictions.
What this covers
Where a court finds a statute’s purpose, how the text constrains what it does with that purpose, and how far it may rewrite a provision to serve the purpose it has found.
Where purpose comes from
The statement to learn is in Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross [2012] HCA 56.1 French CJ and Hayne J said that the purpose of a statute may be found in an express statement of purpose in the statute, by inference from its text and structure and, where appropriate, from extrinsic materials, and that “[t]he purpose of a statute resides in its text and structure” ([25]). They added that the purpose of legislation “must be derived from what the legislation says, and not from any assumption about the desired or desirable reach or operation of the relevant provisions” ([26]).
The case shows the error that rule is aimed at. A New South Wales costs-limiting provision applied to claims for “personal injury damages”, and the Court of Appeal had held it did not reach claims for intentionally inflicted injury because there was “no basis” in the policy of the legislation for applying it to them. French CJ and Hayne J said that this assumed the answer to the question of construction and then asked whether the assumed answer was falsified ([40]), and that it is “not legitimate” to identify a purpose not apparent from the text, check that extrinsic material is not inconsistent with it, and then decide the case by that purpose ([41]). The appeals were allowed by a majority: Kiefel J agreed with the orders in separate reasons, and Crennan and Bell JJ dissented.
Text first, with context and purpose from the start
Purpose does not wait until the text proves ambiguous. In SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34, the joint reasons of Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ stated that the starting point is the text of the statute while regard is at the same time had to its context and purpose, and that context is regarded at the first stage and in its widest sense ([14]).2 They added that this does not deny the importance of ordinary meaning: if a word’s ordinary meaning is not consistent with the statutory purpose it must be rejected, and understood in its statutory context another meaning may be suggested ([14]).
SZTAL also shows that the method does not settle outcomes. The question was whether “intentionally inflicted” and “intended to cause” in the definitions of cruel or inhuman treatment and degrading treatment in s 5(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) required actual, subjective intention, or were met by a person who acts aware that harm will follow in the ordinary course of events. The joint reasons held that the ordinary meaning of intention in the statute was the first of these and that context confirmed it ([15], [17]). Gageler J, dissenting, applied the same method but identified a purpose for the complementary protection regime, taken from the explanatory memorandum, of aligning the visa criterion with Australia’s treaty obligations, and chose the wider reading because it best achieved that purpose ([43], [54], [58]). Even so he said that the words of the Act govern and that the question remains throughout the meaning of those words ([44]). The disagreement was about which reading the text, context and purpose supported, not about whether to start from the text.
A general purpose does not displace a clear definition
Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue [2009] HCA 41 is the clearest example of a purpose being given too much work.3 A Northern Territory stamp duty provision turned on the value of a company’s land, and the Act defined “lease” as not including “an option to renew a lease”. The Court of Appeal reasoned from the Territory legislature’s consistent aim of raising revenue that options to renew should nonetheless be counted. The joint reasons of Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ held that the task of construction begins with the text, that extrinsic materials and historical considerations cannot be relied on to displace the clear meaning of the text, and that the language used is the surest guide to legislative intention ([47]). Fixing on a general purpose of raising revenue carried “the danger that the text did not receive the attention it deserves” ([51]), and “[t]he general purpose of the Act to raise revenue is insufficient to support an intention to exclude a clearly expressed definition and to substitute a quite different meaning” ([53]). French CJ agreed in separate reasons.
The joint reasons quoted Gleeson CJ in Carr v Western Australia to the effect that no one would suggest that s 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) means all income tax legislation is to be construed to advance the purpose of raising revenue, and that it is ultimately the text that is controlling ([51]). The lesson concerns level of generality: a purpose stated at the level of “the Act raises revenue” or “the Act protects consumers” will rarely tell a court what a particular provision means.
How far a court may read words in
The last limit concerns correction. In Taylor v The Owners – Strata Plan No 11564 [2014] HCA 9 the question was whether a limit in s 12(2) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) on the “claimant’s gross weekly earnings” applied, in a claim by a widow for loss of expectation of financial support, to the earnings of the deceased.4 French CJ, Crennan and Bell JJ accepted that purposive construction may allow a provision to be read as if it contained additional or omitted words, but said the question is one of degree: it is readily answered in favour of correction for “simple, grammatical, drafting errors which if uncorrected would defeat the object of the provision”, and against a construction that fills gaps or makes an insertion “too big, or too much at variance with the language in fact used by the legislature” ([37]-[38]). The task remains construction of the words enacted ([39]). Because the deceased could not be “the claimant”, the phrase was “incapable of identifying the gross weekly earnings of the deceased” ([41]). The appeal was allowed; Gageler and Keane JJ would have dismissed it ([48]).
Applying this in a problem question
- Identify the purpose from the Act itself: an objects clause, the structure, or the text of the provision, and extrinsic material only where it is available and permitted.
- State the purpose at the level the provision can bear. Do not treat a general aim as sufficient, by itself, to justify a specific reading that displaces clear text.
- Ask whether each competing reading is open on the words, read in context. Purpose does not make an unavailable reading available.
- If a defined term or a clear phrase points one way, say what in the text or context displaces it. A general purpose is not enough.
- If the argument requires words to be added or removed, ask whether this is a simple drafting error or a larger insertion, and say so.
- Acknowledge the other side. In SZTAL judges using the same method divided.
Self-check
- Have I located the purpose in the statute rather than assuming it?
- Have I tested my reading against the exact words, including any definition?
- Have I said how far the words can be stretched, and why?
- Have I separated what the joint reasons held from what a separate judgment said?