Taylor v The Owners – Strata Plan No 11564

High Court of Australia · 2014

ReasoningStatutory Interpretation

Taylor v The Owners – Strata Plan No 11564 [2014] HCA 9

A statute tells courts to ignore a claimant’s earnings above a cap, but the high earner in this death claim is not the claimant. May a court read the statute as if it also named the deceased, or would that be rewriting it?

What happened?

Craig Taylor, a land surveyor in private practice, was killed when an awning outside a shop collapsed on him ([2]-[3]). His widow, Susan Taylor, sued several respondents in the Supreme Court of New South Wales for damages under ss 3 and 4 of the Compensation to Relatives Act 1897 (NSW), in a representative proceeding for herself and any entitled children ([2]). It was accepted for the purposes of the proceedings that, had he lived, Mr Taylor would have earned income substantially in excess of three times the amount of average weekly earnings, and the claim was for the loss of benefits she and the children expected to receive from his personal exertion, investment, capital assets and services ([3]).

Section 12(1)(c) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) applies s 12 to an award of damages for the loss of expectation of financial support, and s 12(2) directs the court, in the case of any such award, to disregard the amount (if any) by which the claimant’s gross weekly earnings would (but for the injury or death) have exceeded three times the amount of average weekly earnings at the date of the award ([7]). “Claimant” is not defined in the Act ([9]). It was not challenged in the High Court that damages under the Relatives Act are within Part 2 of the Civil Liability Act ([27]).

By consent the primary judge, Garling J, determined a separate question: whether, insofar as the plaintiffs claimed damages under ss 3 and 4 of the Relatives Act, any award was limited by s 12(2) ([4]). He answered it against Mrs Taylor ([5]). The primary judge and the majority of the Court of Appeal (McColl JA, Hoeben JA agreeing) each read s 12(2) as if it contained additional words, though not the same words ([28]). The Court of Appeal dismissed her appeal, and she was granted special leave to appeal on 6 September 2013 ([6]).

What did the Court decide?

The appeal was allowed, the orders of the Court of Appeal were set aside, and the orders of the primary judge were set aside and replaced with an order answering the separate question “No”, with costs orders in Mrs Taylor’s favour ([45]). Two sets of reasons were given: those of French CJ, Crennan and Bell JJ ([1]-[45]) and those of Gageler and Keane JJ ([46]-[72]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Statements of approach to reading in words ([35]-[40]). In the reasons of French CJ, Crennan and Bell JJ, purposive construction may allow a provision to be read as if it contained additional or omitted words, including with the effect of expanding its field of operation: they rejected Spigelman CJ’s suggestion in R v Young and R v PLV that words may be read down but never read up ([35]-[37]). Whether a court is justified in doing so “involves a judgment of matters of degree”: the judgment “is readily answered in favour of addition or omission in the case of simple, grammatical, drafting errors which if uncorrected would defeat the object of the provision”, and it “is answered against a construction that fills ‘gaps disclosed in legislation’ or makes an insertion which is ‘too big, or too much at variance with the language in fact used by the legislature’” ([38]).

Lord Diplock’s three conditions in Wentworth Securities Ltd v Jones, as reformulated in Inco Europe, accord with the statements of principle in Cooper Brookes, and McColl JA could treat satisfaction of each as a prerequisite to reading s 12(2) as if it contained additional words before requiring a fourth condition, but their Honours found it “unnecessary to decide whether Lord Diplock’s three conditions are always, or even usually, necessary and sufficient”, because “the task remains the construction of the words the legislature has enacted”; it may not be enough that a modified construction is reasonably open on the statutory scheme, because any modified meaning “must be consistent with the language in fact used by the legislature” ([39]).

Their Honours added that, in Australian law, too great a departure from the statutory text may also violate the separation of powers ([40]). Gageler and Keane JJ, who would have dismissed the appeal, put the general point in different words: implicit words are sometimes words of limitation and sometimes of extension, but “always words of explanation”, and “Construction is not speculation, and it is not repair” ([65]).

Application to s 12(2) ([41]-[45]). In the reasons of French CJ, Crennan and Bell JJ, s 12(2) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), which directs the court to disregard the amount by which “the claimant’s gross weekly earnings” would have exceeded three times average weekly earnings, could not be read as applying to the gross weekly earnings of a deceased person whose death founds a claim for loss of expectation of financial support under the Compensation to Relatives Act 1897 (NSW).

The phrase was “incapable of identifying the gross weekly earnings of the deceased”: “On no view can the deceased be ‘the claimant’”, and applying the limitation to the deceased’s earnings “cannot be reconciled with the language that the Parliament has enacted” ([41]). Their Honours rejected the premise that s 12 had the same purpose as s 125 of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW) and s 151I of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW), which refer to the deceased’s earnings: the different words enacted in s 12 gave no foundation for assuming that it pursued the same object ([43]).

The purpose of s 12 may be identified as “the limitation of the component of the award that is assessed by reference to a claimant’s high earnings”, and the infrequency of occasions for applying the limitation to Relatives Act awards was not a reason to find a different purpose outside the statute’s terms ([44]). They regarded “loss of expectation of financial support” in s 12(1)(c) as susceptible of a construction apt to encompass “any material benefit having a money value”, on which s 12(1)(c) and s 12(2) operate harmoniously, and which they preferred to a construction giving s 12(2) no work for an award under s 12(1)(c) ([42]); no component of the damages claimed in the proceeding was based on the earnings of the appellant or her children ([3]).

Gageler and Keane JJ dissented on the result. They called the Court of Appeal’s reading “a very strained construction” ([67]) but preferred to read “the claimant’s gross weekly earnings” as the gross weekly earnings on which the claimant relies in the claim for damages, so that the limitation reached awards under s 12(1)(c) ([68]-[70], [72]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · French CJ, Crennan and Bell JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [37]–[39] (PDF p 20) (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs state the approach to reading words into a provision that the joint reasons then apply to s 12(2) at [41]: the Court of Appeal’s reading-in was challenged on appeal, so the correct approach was the premise for allowing the appeal.

Obiter · French CJ, Crennan and Bell JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [40] (PDF p 21) (opens in a new tab)

The observation that too great a departure from the text may violate the separation of powers is a general remark about Australian law and is not applied to s 12(2) in the reasons that follow, so it is not necessary to the ground of decision.

Separate reasoning · Gageler and Keane JJ (dissenting on the result)

Read judgment: [65]–[66] (PDF p 30) (opens in a new tab)

Their general statement about implicit words and the limits of construction is made in reasons for dismissing the appeal and is not the Court’s holding.

Proposition 2

Ratio · French CJ, Crennan and Bell JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [41] (PDF p 22) (opens in a new tab), [43]–[44] (PDF p 22) (opens in a new tab)

These paragraphs hold that the words of s 12(2) cannot identify the deceased’s earnings and that the different words of s 12 do not show the same purpose as the other schemes, which is the ground on which the appeal was allowed and the separate question answered No ([45]).

Obiter · French CJ, Crennan and Bell JJ (joint reasons)

Read judgment: [42] (PDF p 22) (opens in a new tab)

The preference for a construction of s 12(1)(c) on which s 12(2) has work to do in the case of a component assessed by reference to a claimant’s own earnings is not necessary to the result, because no such component was claimed ([3]) and the appeal was decided on [41].

Separate reasoning · Gageler and Keane JJ (dissenting on the result)

Read judgment: [67]–[70] (PDF p 31) (opens in a new tab)

Their Honours preferred a construction of the word claimant that gave s 12(2) work to do for awards under s 12(1)(c) and would have dismissed the appeal; this is a distinct route to the opposite result and is not the Court’s reasoning.

Why does this case matter?

Students often treat a clear statutory purpose as the end of a construction question. This decision is useful because the purpose of a provision and the words it uses had to be weighed against each other in a concrete statute. An answer has to show the weighing and whose reasons carry each step.

Exam and application relevance

Identify the provision and the question, then attribute each step to the Justices whose reasons it is: the statements of approach on reading in words are in the reasons of French CJ, Crennan and Bell JJ at [37]-[40], their application to s 12(2) is at [41]-[44], and the reasons of Gageler and Keane JJ ([46]-[72]) are separate reasons, not a gloss on those paragraphs.

The decision construes s 12(2) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) in a claim under the Compensation to Relatives Act 1897 (NSW). It does not decide what other provisions mean. On the AustLII consolidation as at 30 July 2026, s 12(1) and (2) are in the terms quoted in the judgment.

Check your understanding

1. What did the primary judge and the majority in the Court of Appeal each do to s 12(2), and how did the words they added differ ([15]-[16], [26], [28])?

2. Which Justices described the question whether to read in words as a judgment of degree, and what examples did they give of how that judgment is answered ([38])?

3. Whose reasons describe the Court of Appeal’s reading as “a very strained construction”, and what reading of the claimant’s earnings in s 12(2) did those Justices prefer ([67]-[70])?

4. Why did French CJ, Crennan and Bell JJ not accept that s 12 had the same purpose as s 125 of the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW) ([20], [43])?