Inflicting harm: recklessness, intent and the serious disease cases

What the High Court has said about the conduct word ‘inflicts’, the fault word ‘reckless’ and the difference between intent and foresight, through two serious disease cases from New South Wales and Queensland.

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
nsw, qld
Subjects
criminal-law-and-procedure
Topics
non-fatal-offences-against-the-person

Learning outcomes

  • State what ‘inflicts’ covers under the New South Wales provision considered in Aubrey, and say where the Justices divided.
  • State the foresight that made an accused reckless in Aubrey, and say why that holding is tied to the text then in force.
  • Distinguish intent from foresight and recklessness under the Queensland Code, using Zaburoni.

Two High Court decisions about transmitting HIV by sexual intercourse, one from New South Wales and one from Queensland, bear on three questions that recur in the upper rungs of the non-fatal offences, each decided on one State’s text: how far the verb “inflicts” reaches, how much foresight makes an accused reckless, and why foresight of a result is not the same as intending it. The article is confined to those two States. The ladder of offences and the harm definitions are set out in Non-fatal offences against the person; this article adds what the High Court has said about the conduct and fault words in the upper rungs.

What “inflicts” covers

In Aubrey v The Queen [2017] HCA 18, the accused knew he was HIV positive and had unprotected anal intercourse with the complainant, who contracted the virus. He was convicted of maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm contrary to s 35(1)(b) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), as that section stood in 20041. The question was whether infliction requires a direct application of force producing immediate injury, as the English R v Clarence (1888) 22 QBD 23 had been taken to hold.

Kiefel CJ, Keane, Nettle and Edelman JJ held that it does not. They gave a series of reasons why Clarence should no longer be followed, among them that “inflicts”, “causes” and “occasions” in the nineteenth-century legislation were essentially synonyms, and that it is as natural to speak of inflicting a disease as of inflicting psychiatric injury. They treated s 35 as capable of reaching what was not understood when it was enacted, so that the reckless transmission of HIV by consensual intercourse, without disclosing the risk, could be the infliction of grievous bodily harm. Bell J dissented on this question: she considered that Clarence had long been understood to settle the construction, and that any change was for the legislature. That is a four-to-one split, and a student should say so.

Parliament has since acted. Section 4(1) of the Act now defines grievous bodily harm as including “any grievous bodily disease”, and says that a reference to infliction of grievous bodily harm includes causing a person to contract such a disease4. The majority noted the same amendment, made in 2008, in Aubrey itself.

Reckless: possibility, not probability

The second question was whether “maliciously”, which s 5 of the Act as then in force extended to acts done “recklessly”, requires foresight of the probability of harm or only of its possibility. The Court was unanimous on this: foresight of the possibility is enough. The joint reasons accepted the reasoning of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in Coleman, that the High Court’s insistence on probability in R v Crabbe concerned common law murder, where intending or foreseeing death or grievous harm as probable is the moral equivalent of intending it, and does not necessarily carry over to statutory offences other than murder. They described the Victorian Court of Appeal as having required probability for reckless infliction under s 17 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), and said that requirements in States other than New South Wales may vary with their own legislation.

The Court declined to replace foresight of possibility with foresight of probability, as English decisions requiring that the risk be unreasonable to take had been urged to justify. It said that the reasonableness of an act and the degree of foresight needed are logically connected: where an act has social utility, such as driving or playing a contact sport, a jury may properly require more than foresight of a bare possibility, while an act with none will more readily amount to recklessness on that foresight. Juries ordinarily weigh this by common sense without a direction, though the Court left open that a case may arise in which the judge should draw the jury’s attention to the social utility of the act. Here it did not arise, because the accused conceded he knew of a real possibility of infecting the complainant.

The current s 35 is worded differently. Each of the four offences in s 35(1) to (4) requires that the accused cause grievous bodily harm or wound and be “reckless as to causing actual bodily harm to that or any other person”4. Aubrey was decided on the earlier text and on s 5; this article does not say how its reasoning on “possibility” applies to the current words.

Intent is not foresight

Zaburoni v The Queen [2016] HCA 12 concerned s 317(b) of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), which makes it a crime, punishable by life imprisonment, to transmit a serious disease to a person with intent to do some grievous bodily harm or to transmit a serious disease5. The accused knew he was HIV positive, lied to the complainant about it, and had frequent unprotected intercourse with her over about 21 months; she contracted HIV. The jury convicted under s 317(b). The Court of Appeal had reasoned that repeated acts of that kind “defied description as mere recklessness”.

The High Court allowed the appeal2. Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ held that where the Code makes intention to produce a result an element, the prosecution must prove the accused meant to produce that result by the conduct, and that knowledge or foresight of the result, “whether possible, probable or certain”, is not a substitute in law. They distinguished the Commonwealth Criminal Code, under which a person has intention with respect to a result if aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events. Awareness that conduct will certainly produce a result makes the inference of intent compelling, but it remains for the trier of fact to be satisfied of intent. Recklessness, by contrast, is advertence to a risk and proceeding anyway; awareness of risk does not, without more, support an inference of intent. Gageler J agreed and, like the joint reasons, found the frequency of the conduct insufficient to exclude the hypothesis that the accused acted for his own gratification while reckless of infection. Nettle J agreed in the result and added observations on foresight of an inevitable result; in SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34, Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ said that the manner in which Nettle J reasoned in Zaburoni “now stands rejected”, the plurality having held that awareness of inevitability is not equated with intent3.

Because an alternative count under s 320, unlawfully doing grievous bodily harm, had been pleaded and the accused had pleaded guilty to it, and it was not in issue that his conduct constituted that offence, the Court substituted a verdict of guilty under s 320 and remitted the matter for sentence5.

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Name the jurisdiction and the offence. The same conduct is charged under different sections in New South Wales and Queensland, with different fault words.
  2. Identify the conduct word. For “inflicts” or its statutory equivalent, ask whether the harm needs to follow a direct application of force; Aubrey says it does not, on the New South Wales provision it considered.
  3. Identify the fault word and state it as the statute words it. For New South Wales s 35, the fault is recklessness as to actual bodily harm; for the earlier “maliciously”, the test in Aubrey was foresight of possibility.
  4. Where the offence requires intent to cause a result, separate foresight from purpose. Ask whether the evidence shows the accused meant to produce the result, and treat evidence of awareness of risk as evidence, not as the element.
  5. Ask what the lesser offence would be if intent is not proved, and who bears the onus on each.

Self-check

  • Have I said that Aubrey was four Justices to one on “inflicts” and unanimous on recklessness?
  • Have I said that Aubrey applied the 2004 text of s 35 and s 5, and not the current s 35?
  • Have I kept the Queensland meaning of intent in s 317(b) apart from recklessness and from the Commonwealth Criminal Code?
  • Have I avoided applying either case to a jurisdiction it did not consider?

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