Automatism and insanity: defences that go to the mind

How the High Court separates a claim that an act was not willed from a claim of unsound mind, who must prove each, and where the Queensland Code puts the line.

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
qld
Subjects
criminal-law-and-procedure
Topics
defences

Learning outcomes

  • Distinguish a claim that an act was not willed from a claim of unsound mind, naming the Queensland Code section for each.
  • State who bears the onus on each claim and where the High Court Justices in Falconer divided on it.
  • Classify a dissociative or similar state as one a healthy mind may experience or as mental disease or natural mental infirmity, and state the verdict that follows.

When an accused says their mind was not working when they acted, two quite different claims are available: that the act was not a willed act at all, or that they were of unsound mind. The first is called automatism and, if it succeeds, ends in an outright acquittal; the second ends in an acquittal on account of unsoundness of mind, with different consequences. This article states the High Court’s analysis in R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 301 and R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 1822, read against the current text of ss 23, 26 and 27 of the Criminal Code (Qld)3. Falconer was decided on the Western Australian Criminal Code, which the Court recorded as identical in its relevant provisions with the original Queensland Code. This article does not state the mental impairment legislation of any other jurisdiction.

Two claims, two sections

Section 23(1) of the Queensland Code, which is subject to the Code’s express provisions about negligent acts and omissions, provides in paragraph (a) that a person is not criminally responsible for “an act or omission that occurs independently of the exercise of the person’s will”. Section 27(1) provides that a person is not criminally responsible if, at the time, they are “in such a state of mental disease or natural mental infirmity as to deprive the person of capacity to understand what the person is doing, or of capacity to control the person’s actions, or of capacity to know that the person ought not to do the act or make the omission”.

In Falconer, Mrs Falconer shot her husband and said she remembered nothing between his reaching for her and finding herself on the floor beside his body. Two psychiatrists were prepared to say that a dissociative state could explain this, while regarding her as sane. The trial judge rejected the evidence; the Western Australian Court of Criminal Appeal held it admissible on whether the act was willed and ordered a new trial. All seven Justices of the High Court agreed that special leave should be granted and the Crown’s appeal dismissed, so the evidence was relevant to whether the act was willed. They did not agree on who must prove what, which is the next question.

The “act” for s 23 is a bodily action together with qualities it inevitably carries. In Falconer the joint reasons of Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ identified it as the discharge of the loaded gun, not the contraction of the finger and not the death, and Gaudron J adopted that identification for the case.

Who must prove what

Two presumptions work together. As a matter of ordinary experience, an act done by an apparently conscious person is taken to be willed, and Gaudron J described that as an evidentiary presumption that only credible evidence assigning a cause can displace. Separately, s 26 presumes that every person is of sound mind until the contrary is proved.

The prosecution carries the onus of proving that the act was willed. Deane and Dawson JJ said that an accused cannot rest on an assertion of involuntariness or on loss of memory: evidence of the condition, supported by some expert medical opinion, is needed before sane automatism is realistically raised. Gaudron J said a claim of involuntariness not based on mental illness is almost certain to be treated as frivolous without medical evidence that identifies a mental state, gives a cause and postulates that the accused did or may have experienced it.

Four Justices, Toohey, Gaudron, Deane and Dawson JJ, held that once non-insane automatism is raised by evidence, the prosecution must disprove it beyond reasonable doubt, while an accused who relies on unsoundness of mind must prove it on the balance of probabilities. Where both are in play, they would have the jury ask first whether the prosecution has disproved non-insane automatism; only if it has, ask whether unsoundness of mind is proved.

Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ took a different route to the same orders. On their analysis, an accused who attributes automatism to a mental malfunction is treated as raising unsoundness of mind unless they prove that the malfunction was transient, was caused by trauma that the mind of an ordinary person would be likely not to have withstood, and was not prone to recur. Proof of those qualifications entitles the accused to an outright acquittal; proof of unsoundness only, to a qualified one. That is a view of three Justices, and the four Justices above did not adopt it. A student should state the disagreement rather than present either route as the Court’s single answer.

Where sane and insane automatism part

The Justices who addressed the point treated the line between sane and insane automatism as the line between a state that is not “mental disease or natural mental infirmity” and one that is. Whether a mental state is of that kind is a question of law; whether the accused experienced it is a question of fact (Deane and Dawson JJ; Gaudron J). Their tests were put differently. Gaudron J distinguished states that are or may be experienced by normal persons, such as one following a blow to the head, from those never experienced by normal persons, and treated a recurring abnormality as pointing to an infirm mind. The joint reasons asked whether the malfunction was transient, not prone to recur, and one that an ordinary person would have succumbed to. Deane and Dawson JJ suggested that the instances of involuntariness not arising from disease would be “quite confined”, and listed sleepwalking in some circumstances, some cases of epilepsy, concussion, hypoglycaemia and dissociative states.

The classification matters because the verdicts differ. When Falconer was decided, s 653 of the Western Australian Code required the jury to say whether an acquittal was on account of unsoundness of mind, and the court then to order custody until Her Majesty’s pleasure was known. This article does not state what follows a finding of unsoundness of mind in Queensland today.

The insanity limbs

The Code’s s 27(1) names three incapacities: to understand what one is doing, to control one’s actions, and to know that one ought not to do the act. The joint reasons in Falconer noted that the M’Naghten Rules speak only of not knowing the nature and quality of the act or that it was wrong, and that incapacity to control actions is a Code addition. Section 27(2) adds that a person with delusions on a specific matter, who is not otherwise within s 27(1), is responsible as if the real state of things had been as the delusions led them to believe.

At common law, Dixon J’s directions to the jury in Porter (a summing-up at a trial, not a decision of the Full Court) were cited in Falconer for the distinction between a diseased mind and mere excitability or passion. His Honour said the mind must be in a state of disease, disorder or disturbance, distinct from mere excitability, passion, stupidity, lack of self-control and impulsiveness, and that “wrong” means wrong by the everyday standards of reasonable people, asked of the particular act at the particular time. Porter was a common law case. The sources cited here do not decide whether its account of “wrong” fixes the meaning of the Code’s “ought not” in s 27(1).

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Name the jurisdiction and the provisions. If it is not Queensland, say that the Code analysis here may not apply and that the jurisdiction’s own mental impairment statute must be checked.
  2. Identify the act by which the offence was committed, and ask whether it was a willed bodily action. Do not treat the death or other result as the act.
  3. Ask what evidence displaces the presumption that an apparently conscious person acts voluntarily. An assertion, or loss of memory, is not enough; look for medical evidence naming a state, its cause and that the accused experienced it.
  4. Classify the state as one that a healthy mind may experience or as an underlying mental disease or infirmity, giving the tests of Gaudron J and of the joint reasons and noting that they are not identical.
  5. Order the questions as the four-Justice majority did: first whether the prosecution has disproved non-insane automatism beyond reasonable doubt, then whether unsoundness of mind is proved on the balance of probabilities, and say which verdict follows.
  6. Put the minority route in the alternative, and state that the consequences of a finding of unsoundness are governed by statute not covered here.

Self-check

  • Have I named the Code section for each claim, rather than treating “automatism” and “insanity” as one defence?
  • Have I said who bears the onus on each, and whose view that is?
  • Have I kept the three-Justice joint reasons apart from the four-Justice majority on onus?
  • Have I said that Porter is common law and a trial direction?
  • Have I avoided stating the Queensland procedure that follows a finding of unsoundness?

Pop quiz

5 quick questions on this article, the authorities it cites and the articles it links to.

  • About 3 minutes, and no time limit.
  • You can only go forwards: each answer locks when you submit it.
  • After each question you see the right answer, why, and where to read more.
  • Free, and no account needed. Log in or create a free account to keep your scores.