R v Porter
R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182
A father poisoned his infant son, and the jury had to decide whether his mind was disordered enough to excuse him. What did Dixon J tell them counts as disorder, and what does not?
What happened?
Bertram Edward Porter was tried before Dixon J, with a jury, for the murder of his child, Charles Robert Porter, committed on 28 November 1932. The Crown’s case was that he gave the infant strychnine and that the child died of it. Dixon J told the jury that they would probably have no difficulty in finding that the prisoner had given the poison with the intention of killing the child and that death resulted, and the main question left to them was whether his mind was in a condition that excused him.
What did the Court decide?
This is a judge’s summing-up to a jury, not a judgment of a Full Court. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty on the ground of insanity at the time of commission of the act charged.
Proposition
What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added
Principle analysis
Dixon J directed the jury as follows.
Every person is presumed to be of sufficient soundness of mind to be criminally responsible, and it is for the defence, not the Crown, to establish that he was not. The Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused did the acts constituting the crime with the necessary intention. The accused need only make out, on a balance of probability, that he was not criminally responsible by reason of unsoundness of mind.
The state of mind relied on must be one of disease, disorder or disturbance. That is different from the mere excitability of a normal man, passion, even stupidity, obtuseness, lack of self-control and impulsiveness. It must also have been of such a character as to prevent him from knowing the physical nature of the act he was doing, or from knowing that what he was doing was wrong. Dixon J told the jury that “disease” did not require physical deterioration of the brain, and that it meant that the functions of the understanding were, through some cause, thrown into derangement or disorder.
“Wrong” means wrong having regard to the everyday standards of reasonable people, and the question is about the particular act at the particular time, not right and wrong in the abstract. The accused is not excused because he reasoned wrongly, but if he was incapable of reasoning about the rightness or wrongness of the act according to ordinary standards, with a moderate degree of sense and composure, he was insane at the time.
These are Dixon J’s directions under the common law, and they do not interpret the Queensland Code.
Why does this case matter?
Porter’s words reach students mainly as quotations inside later cases, including R v Falconer, one step removed from the source. Falconer’s joint reasons record Sholl J’s view that some of them were wide enough to cover any temporary disorder of the mind, which he declined to adopt as the meaning of disease of the mind.
Exam and application relevance
Attribute the directions to Dixon J at trial, not to a Full Court. In a Queensland problem, begin with s 27 of the Code and identify where its wording goes beyond what Dixon J put to the jury, as the joint reasons in Falconer note. Say that Porter is persuasive only. For the allocation of the burden between non-insane automatism and insanity, turn to Falconer.
Check your understanding
1. Whose words are the directions in Porter, and why is it wrong to describe them as a holding of the Full Court?
2. Dixon J listed things that are different from a state of disease, disorder or disturbance. Name three of them.
3. What did Dixon J say “wrong” means, and what is the act it is asked of?