R v Falconer

High Court of Australia · 1990

Criminal Law And ProcedureDefences

R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30

A woman who shot her husband remembered nothing between his taunt and finding him dead, and two psychiatrists thought she was sane. Could their evidence reach a jury, and who had to prove what?

Clarified by legislation: Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA), from 1 August 2008

Falconer applied s 23 of the Criminal Code (WA) as it stood in 1990, a single section that excused both an act occurring independently of the exercise of the will and an event occurring by accident. The Criminal Law Amendment (Homicide) Act 2008 (WA), s 4, replaced that section. Since 1 August 2008 the rule about an act that occurs independently of the exercise of the person’s will has been in s 23A(2), in substantially the same words, accident is in s 23B, and s 23 deals with intention and motive. The rule the Court applied is therefore now found in s 23A(2) and not in s 23, and a Western Australian answer should cite s 23A(2) for it.

Qualified by legislation: Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA), from 13 November 1997

Falconer applied s 27 of the Criminal Code (WA) as it stood in 1990, which excused a person in “such a state of mental disease or natural mental infirmity” as to deprive the person of one of three capacities. Section 27 was amended by the Mental Health (Consequential Provisions) Act 1996 (WA), s 7, in force from 13 November 1997, and the Code as it stood in January 2008 refers to “such a state of mental impairment”. It was amended again by the Criminal Code Amendment Act (No 2) 2009 (WA), s 9, and by the Criminal Law (Mental Impairment) Act 2023 (WA), s 412, in force from 1 September 2024. Section 27(1) now excuses a person “on account of mental impairment” where it formerly said “on account of unsoundness of mind”. Section 26 still presumes every person to be of sound mind until the contrary is proved. The Justices divided over the 1990 wording, so check how the current s 27 and later decisions apply their reasoning on the burden of proof before relying on it in Western Australia.

What happened?

Mary Falconer was convicted in the Supreme Court of Western Australia of the wilful murder of her husband, who was killed at close quarters when she fired a shotgun on 9 October 1988. At her trial she described her husband’s violence, her discovery that he had dealt with their daughters sexually, and the day of the shooting, after which she said she remembered nothing until she found herself on the floor with the shotgun beside her and her husband dead nearby.

The defence proposed to call two psychiatrists, Dr Schioldann-Nielsen and Dr Finlay-Jones, to show that she may have acted in a dissociative state, so that the act causing death occurred independently of the exercise of her will. Both psychiatrists regarded her as sane. The Commissioner who presided rejected the evidence. The Court of Criminal Appeal allowed her appeal and ordered a new trial, and the Crown sought special leave to appeal to the High Court against that order.

What did the Court decide?

Special leave to appeal was granted and the appeal was dismissed, so the order for a new trial stood. Seven Justices sat and gave four sets of reasons: Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ jointly; Deane and Dawson JJ jointly; Toohey J; and Gaudron J.

Proposition

What is the principle?Ratio and obiter assessed; no separate analysis added

Principle analysis

Under the Criminal Code (WA), which the joint reasons record as identical in its relevant provisions with the original Queensland Code, a person is not criminally responsible for an act that occurs independently of the exercise of the will (s 23), is presumed to be of sound mind until the contrary is proved (s 26), and is excused for an act done in such a state of mental disease or natural mental infirmity as to deprive the person of capacity to understand what they are doing, to control their actions, or to know that they ought not to do the act (s 27).

All seven Justices held that psychiatric evidence that Mrs Falconer may have been in a dissociative state when she discharged the loaded gun was relevant to whether that act was willed. The joint reasons treated the act in issue as the discharge of the gun, not the pulling of the trigger and not the fatal wounding. The Justices accepted that an apparently conscious person is taken to act by choice. The joint reasons call that an inference of fact, Gaudron J an evidentiary presumption that only credible evidence assigning a cause, ordinarily medical, will displace, and Deane and Dawson JJ say that evidence will be needed to displace ordinary human experience.

On the burden of proof the Court divided, four to three, while reaching the same orders. Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ held that where non-insane automatism is raised by evidence the prosecution must disprove it beyond reasonable doubt, and that insanity must be established by the accused on the balance of probabilities. Toohey J and Gaudron J would have the jury ask the first question before the second, and Deane and Dawson JJ described the same order, saying they were in general agreement with their reasoning. Gaudron J held that the evidence of dissociation raised no question of mental disease or natural mental infirmity, because such a state is or may be experienced by normal persons. Toohey J said that the reaction of a sound mind to external stimuli, including stress, does not fall within s 27 and may fall within s 23.

Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ took a different route to the same orders. On their reasons an accused who attributes automatism to a mental malfunction raises unsoundness of mind unless the accused proves, on the balance of probabilities, that the malfunction was transient, was caused by trauma, physical or psychological, that the mind of an ordinary person would be likely not to have withstood, and was not prone to recur. An accused who proves a malfunction that does not meet those qualifications is entitled to an acquittal on account of unsoundness of mind; one who proves that it does is entitled to an outright acquittal.

The Court decided the Western Australian provisions as they stood in 1990. It did not decide the Queensland Code as now worded, or the Code of any other jurisdiction, and Western Australia has since amended its own provisions on unwilled acts and on insanity.

Why does this case matter?

Students tend to learn Falconer as one rule and to quote it as the High Court’s view. An answer that relies on it has to say whose reasons it is applying, because the Justices did not all reason alike.

The joint reasons also record that the relationship between involuntariness and insanity had awaited consideration by the Court since Sir Owen Dixon’s 1957 paper on it, which is the background to reading the four sets of reasons as attempts to resolve it.

Exam and application relevance

Start by identifying the act that must be willed, as the joint reasons do. Then identify the starting point the Justices accepted about voluntary action and what evidence is needed to put it in issue, and decide whether the evidence points to a mind that was sound or to mental disease or natural mental infirmity. Next state the burden. The reasons of Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ were those of four of the seven Justices, and Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ reached the orders by a different analysis, so name the Justices whose reasons you are applying.

A later joint judgment of five Justices on the Tasmanian Code, Hawkins v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 500, describes Falconer as concerned with characterising the condition said to affect voluntariness, and says that where the only evidence of mental abnormality is evidence of mental disease, its admissibility depends on its relevance to insanity rather than to voluntariness. Finally, say which jurisdiction’s Code you are applying and check its present wording before relying on Falconer.

Check your understanding

1. Which Justices held that the prosecution must disprove non-insane automatism beyond reasonable doubt, and what did Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ require an accused to prove instead?

2. Both psychiatrists thought Mrs Falconer was sane. Why did the High Court nonetheless hold their evidence relevant?

3. On the joint reasons, what was the “act” that had to be willed, and what did they say it was not?