Armstrong v R
Armstrong v R [2026] NSWCCA 112
An offender taken from his family as a small child and abused in State care is sentenced for offences against a child. The judge is not persuaded that the childhood caused the offending. What does that leave to be decided?
What happened?
Michael Armstrong, a Kamilaroi man, was tried before a jury in November 2022 on eight counts of sexual offences against the same complainant. He was found guilty of three counts of sexual touching of a child aged between 10 and 16 years and two counts of aggravated sexual act towards a child of that age; he was found not guilty on one count, and no verdicts were required on two counts charged in the alternative ([5]-[6]). On the agreed facts the complainant was 14 and the offending happened in the applicant’s house on 3 January 2020 ([11]). The maximum penalties were 10 years for sexual touching and 5 years for the aggravated sexual act ([8]).
Judge English sentenced him on 29 March 2023 to an aggregate sentence of 6 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 3 years and 10 months ([7]). She found the offending in counts 1 and 4 at the mid-range of objective seriousness and the offending in counts 2, 5 and 7 below it ([13]).
The applicant’s background was described in a psychologist’s report. When he was six or seven he was taken from his parents and separated from his siblings as part of the Stolen Generation, and he was physically, sexually and emotionally abused by State employees in the homes in which he was placed ([16]). The sentencing judge said she took his childhood deprivation into account but was “not persuaded” that the psychologist’s opinion allowed a finding that his upbringing was causatively linked to his offending ([21]). The psychologist had written that a causal relationship had not been clearly established, in a report that also recorded her opinion that those experiences had left him emotionally vulnerable and contributed to his offending behaviour ([28]).
He sought leave to appeal against the sentence on one ground: that the failure to properly determine whether his moral culpability was reduced because of his disadvantaged background resulted in a miscarriage of justice ([4], [10]). At first instance the respondent had submitted that the material did not provide a basis for a finding of a causative link and that the background did not reduce his moral culpability, and Dhanji J described the applicant’s own written submission at first instance as in effect a concession that it did not ([24]-[25]).
What did the Court decide?
On 1 May 2026 the Court (N Adams CJ at CL, Dhanji J and Roberts J) extended time, granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal, quashed the sentence imposed on 29 March 2023 and imposed an aggregate sentence of 6 years commencing on 10 November 2022 and expiring on 9 November 2028, with a non-parole period of 3 years 6 months expiring on 9 May 2026 ([2]). Dhanji J gave the reasons on 27 July 2026.
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Dhanji J (with whom N Adams CJ at CL ([1]) and Roberts J ([47]) agreed in the orders, each saying that his reasons reflect their own) held that proof of a causal connection between a disadvantaged background and the offending “does not need to be shown in order that that background may be taken into account in an assessment of the offender’s moral culpability” ([30]). He described that as “now abundantly clear” and cited YZ v R [2025] NSWCCA 165, R v MJ [2023] NSWCCA 306, Nasrallah v R [2021] NSWCCA 207, DS v R [2025] NSWCCA 53 and DG v R [2025] NSWCCA 137 for it ([30]).
He added that any connection between the background and the offending will be relevant to the assessment of moral culpability and that, where there is a causal connection, “a reduction in moral culpability will be inevitable” ([30]). Insisting on proof of a causal connection “will often be problematic”, particularly where the nature and extent of the abuse left the applicant unable to talk about his experiences ([30]). The parties at first instance had proceeded on the basis that, without a causal link, there would be no reduction in moral culpability, reading Bellew J’s statement of two principles in DR v R [2022] NSWCCA 151 as having that result ([26]-[27]); Dhanji J said that, if that is what Bellew J intended, “it is not correct” and it is “inconsistent with both earlier and with later authority” ([27]).
The applicant submitted that, because the sentencing judge concluded that no causal link was established, she made no finding on whether his history of disadvantage reduced his moral culpability ([23]). Dhanji J held that the applicant had made good his ground of appeal ([35]) and that he had established an error of principle ([36]).
Dhanji J observed that the assessment of moral culpability “is not an end unto itself” but “a tool” that may be employed to assist in explaining the relationship between particular considerations and a sentencing purpose, citing DS v R; DM v R (2022) 109 NSWLR 82 at [92] ([34]). On resentence he treated the applicant’s background of deprivation as “an important consideration” that could not “be allowed to overwhelm the exercise” ([37]), and began from the offending being extremely serious ([38]). He found moral culpability “reduced, and in my view substantially reduced” by the extreme background and said that finding should ameliorate the weight given to general deterrence and the degree of punishment required to make the offender accountable, with some emphasis on rehabilitation at the expense of punishment ([43]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Dhanji J (N Adams CJ at CL and Roberts J stating that his reasons reflect their own)
Read judgment: [27] (opens in a new tab), [30] (opens in a new tab), [35]–[36] (opens in a new tab)
Dhanji J’s statement that a causal connection need not be shown for a disadvantaged background to be taken into account in assessing moral culpability ([30]), his conclusion that the contrary reading adopted by the parties was not correct ([27]) and his conclusion that the ground was made good and an error of principle established ([35]-[36]) were the grounds on which the appeal was allowed, so they were necessary to the result.
Obiter · Dhanji J (N Adams CJ at CL and Roberts J stating that his reasons reflect their own)
Read judgment: [33] (opens in a new tab)
Dhanji J introduced his remarks that a prescriptive bright-line causal-link test would be inconsistent with the evaluative nature of sentencing as something he would add, at the risk of using more words, to what he considered should now be clear ([33]). They support the conclusion at [30] but were not needed for it, and he did not make them the ground of the error of principle.
Proposition 2
Obiter · Dhanji J (N Adams CJ at CL and Roberts J stating that his reasons reflect their own)
Read judgment: [34] (opens in a new tab)
Dhanji J’s remark that the assessment of moral culpability is a tool and not an end unto itself was introduced as something to be remembered in this context ([34]) and was not the ground on which the appeal was allowed, so it is not necessary to the result.
Ratio · Dhanji J (N Adams CJ at CL and Roberts J stating that his reasons reflect their own)
Read judgment: [37]–[43] (opens in a new tab)
These are the reasons for the sentence imposed when the Court re-exercised the sentencing discretion ([36]), so they were necessary to the orders made on resentence. They are an exercise of discretion on these facts, in Dhanji J’s first-person terms, and are not put forward as a rule about how far a reduction in moral culpability reduces a sentence.
Why does this case matter?
A sentencing problem that mentions a deprived or traumatic upbringing invites a student to ask what the offender’s history is worth. Armstrong shows how much can turn on the question a sentencing judge and the parties think they are answering, and what follows on appeal when that question is put one way at first instance and another way in the Court of Criminal Appeal. It is also a worked example of an appellate court re-exercising the sentencing discretion itself after finding error.
Exam and application relevance
In a sentencing problem involving a disadvantaged background, ask which question the sentencing judge answered about the link between the background and the offending, and whether a further question about moral culpability was addressed ([21], [23]). Ask what the evidence of the background was, and what it was said to show about the offending ([16], [28]-[29]).
Attribute quoted passages precisely: the passages at [26] and [31]-[32] are Bellew J’s and Simpson AJA’s words, quoted by Dhanji J, and the cases listed at [30] are cited by him rather than discussed.
This is a decision of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal. It operates within the New South Wales hierarchy and is persuasive elsewhere. The decision is dated July 2026, so confirm the current position before relying on it.
Check your understanding
1. What did the applicant say, in his ground of appeal, that the sentencing judge had not determined ([10], [23])?
2. Whose words are quoted at [26] and at [31]-[32], and in which decisions?
3. How did Dhanji J describe the reading of DR v R that the parties had adopted at first instance ([27])?
4. Which sentencing considerations did Dhanji J say were affected by his finding on moral culpability ([43])?