Inflicting harm: recklessness, intent and the serious disease cases
What “inflicts” covers
In Aubrey v The Queen [2017] HCA 18, the accused knew he had HIV. He had unprotected anal intercourse with the complainant, who caught the virus. He was convicted under s 35(1)(b) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), as it stood in 2004, for maliciously “inflicting” grievous bodily harm.
The issue was what “inflicts” means. The English case R v Clarence (1888) had suggested it needs a direct application of force causing immediate injury.
The majority (Kiefel CJ, Keane, Nettle and Edelman JJ) rejected that view. They reasoned that “inflicts”, “causes” and “occasions” meant much the same thing historically, and that inflicting a disease is like inflicting psychiatric injury. On this reasoning, recklessly transmitting HIV through consensual sex, without telling the other person of the risk, can count as inflicting grievous bodily harm.
Bell J dissented. She thought Clarence had long settled the meaning of “inflicts”, and that changing it was a job for Parliament, not the courts. Students should note this was a four-to-one split, not a unanimous decision.
Parliament has since changed the law. Section 4(1) now says grievous bodily harm includes “any grievous bodily disease”, and that inflicting grievous bodily harm includes causing someone to contract such a disease. The majority in Aubrey noted this amendment, made in 2008.
Reckless: possibility, not probability
The second question was about “maliciously” under the old s 5, which covered acts done “recklessly”. Did this require foresight that harm was probable, or just that it was possible? The Court agreed: possibility is enough.
The joint reasons followed the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in Coleman. They reasoned that R v Crabbe’s probability requirement was about common law murder. There, foreseeing death as probable is treated as morally equal to intending it. That reasoning does not necessarily apply to other statutory offences.
The Court noted the Victorian Court of Appeal had required probability for reckless infliction under s 17 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). It also said other States’ requirements may differ, depending on their own legislation.
The Court refused to replace “possibility” with “probability”, despite English decisions suggesting the risk must be unreasonable. It reasoned that reasonableness and the needed degree of foresight are connected. For acts with social utility, like driving or contact sport, a jury may properly require more than bare possibility. For acts with no such utility, foresight of mere possibility more readily counts as recklessness.
Juries usually weigh this using common sense, without needing a direction. But the Court left open that in some future case, a judge might need to direct the jury on an act’s social utility. That issue didn’t arise here, since the accused admitted knowing of a real possibility of infection.
The current s 35 uses different wording. Each offence in s 35(1)-(4) requires grievous bodily harm or wounding, plus recklessness “as to causing actual bodily harm” to that person or anyone else. Aubrey was decided under the old wording and old s 5. This article does not say how its “possibility” reasoning applies to the current section.
Applying this in a problem question
Work out the jurisdiction and the exact offence charged. New South Wales and Queensland use different sections for the same conduct, with different fault words.
Check the conduct word. If the offence uses “inflicts”, ask whether the harm must come from a direct application of force. Aubrey says it need not, under the New South Wales provision it dealt with.
Identify the fault word using the statute’s own language. Under New South Wales s 35, the fault element is recklessness as to actual bodily harm. Under the older word “maliciously”, Aubrey set the test as foresight of possibility.
If the offence needs intent to cause a result, keep foresight and purpose separate. Ask whether the accused meant to cause that result. Awareness of risk is only evidence toward that question, not the element itself.
Finally, consider what lesser offence applies if intent cannot be proved, and identify who carries the onus on each element.
Self-check
Before moving on, check a few things.
In Aubrey, remember the split: four Justices to one on the meaning of “inflicts”. On recklessness, though, the Court was unanimous.
Aubrey dealt with the 2004 version of s 35 and s 5. It did not decide what the current s 35 means.
Keep Queensland’s s 317(b) intent separate from recklessness, and separate from the Commonwealth Criminal Code. These are three distinct concepts.
Finally, do not apply a case to a jurisdiction it never considered.
A Quick Read uses simpler language and may leave out detail, including whole topics, to stay short. The full article is the complete statement.