Non-fatal offences against the person

The graded ladder of non-fatal offences against the person, from common assault to acts done with intent, and how the common-law and Code jurisdictions set the harm threshold and the fault element at each rung.

Learning level
Core Doctrine
Jurisdictions
nsw, vic, qld
Subjects
criminal-law-and-procedure
Topics
non-fatal-offences-against-the-person

Learning outcomes

  • Place a set of facts on the ladder of non-fatal offences in a named jurisdiction, and say which rung the harm and the accused’s state of mind support.
  • Distinguish the harm thresholds of New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland, and explain why an inclusive definition and an exhaustive one are not interchangeable.
  • Explain how each jurisdiction supplies the fault element for grievous bodily harm or serious injury, including where the statute states none.

Violence that stops short of killing is punished through a graded ladder of offences, rising from an unwanted touch to a wounding inflicted with a settled purpose to cause lasting damage. The rungs are recognisably the same from one jurisdiction to the next, and a student who learns the ladder can read any of the Acts. What differs, and what decides real cases, is how each jurisdiction defines the harm at each rung and how much of that harm the prosecution must prove the accused foresaw. This article states the position in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland; it does not state the provisions of the other jurisdictions.

What this covers

Four rungs, and the two questions — what harm, and what state of mind — that separate them.

The elements

The first rung is the assault itself, with no harm required. In New South Wales, s 61 of the Crimes Act 1900 punishes whoever “assaults any person, although not occasioning actual bodily harm” with two years’ imprisonment1. The Act never says what an assault is: s 4 defines grievous bodily harm but not assault, wounding or actual bodily harm, so the content of those terms comes from the common law. Queensland does the opposite. Under s 245(1) of the Criminal Code 1899 a person assaults another by striking, touching, moving or otherwise applying force of any kind, directly or indirectly, without consent or with consent obtained by fraud; or by any bodily act or gesture attempting or threatening to apply force without consent, where they have “actually or apparently a present ability to effect the person’s purpose”6. Section 245(2) extends “applies force” to heat, light, electrical force, gas, odour or any other substance applied so as to cause injury or personal discomfort. Section 246(1) then makes an assault unlawful and an offence “unless it is authorised or justified or excused by law”, and s 246(2) adds that force may be unlawful although applied with consent6. Section 335 carries the offence: a misdemeanour at three years, “if no greater punishment is provided”7. In Victoria simple common assault is reached two ways: summarily under s 23 of the Summary Offences Act 196615, at a maximum of 15 penalty units or three months, or on indictment at common law, whose maximum the Crimes Act 1958 s 320 fixes by Table at five years (s 320A raising it to ten in specified circumstances)16; s 31 of the Crimes Act reserves five years for assaults with an ulterior purpose or on protected workers, and defines assault for that section alone14.

The second rung adds harm caused by the assault. New South Wales s 59(1) sets assault occasioning actual bodily harm at five years, rising to seven under s 59(2) where it is committed in company2. Queensland s 339(1) makes it a crime at seven years to unlawfully assault another “and thereby” do bodily harm7 — bodily harm being defined in s 1 as “any bodily injury which interferes with health or comfort” — a low threshold10, but it still requires a bodily injury, and interference with health is an alternative to interference with comfort rather than a separate requirement. Victoria breaks the pattern here, and the break is the most consequential difference in the area: ss 16 to 18 of the Crimes Act 1958 are not assault offences at all. Section 18 punishes a person who, “without lawful excuse, intentionally or recklessly causes injury”, at a maximum of ten years if intentional and five if reckless13. No assault need be proved; causing the injury is the conduct element.

The third rung is grave harm, reached without having to prove a purpose to cause it — these offences do not exclude intentional harm, they simply do not require it. Here the three jurisdictions diverge sharply. New South Wales s 35 creates reckless grievous bodily harm at ten years and reckless wounding at seven, with in-company forms at fourteen and ten3. Read its fault element closely: each subsection requires only that the accused was “reckless as to causing actual bodily harm”, a full rung below the harm the prosecution must prove resulted. Queensland states no fault element at all — s 320(1) makes it a crime at fourteen years to unlawfully do grievous bodily harm, and s 323(1) a misdemeanour at seven years to unlawfully wound8. Victoria’s third rung is s 17, recklessly causing serious injury without lawful excuse, at a maximum of fifteen years13.

The fourth rung requires the intent. New South Wales s 33 carries twenty-five years for wounding or causing grievous bodily harm with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, or with intent to resist or prevent a lawful arrest or detention4. Queensland s 317 is wider on both sides and carries life: it pairs four intents — to maim, disfigure or disable; to do grievous bodily harm or transmit a serious disease; to resist or prevent the LAWFUL arrest or detention of any person; to resist or prevent a public officer acting in accordance with lawful authority — with a long list of acts in paragraphs (e) to (k): unlawfully wounding, doing grievous bodily harm or transmitting a serious disease; unlawfully striking or attempting to strike a person with any kind of projectile; unlawfully causing an explosive substance to explode; sending or delivering an explosive substance or other dangerous or noxious thing, or causing it to be taken or received; putting corrosive fluid or a destructive or explosive substance in any place; and unlawfully casting or throwing such fluid or substance at or upon a person9. “Unlawfully” is not in every paragraph — it appears in (e), (f), (g) and (k) and not in (h), (i) or (j) — so do not add an unlawfulness element to the paragraph you are relying on; what every paragraph does require is that one of the four intents accompany the act relied on. Victoria’s intention rung is s 16, intentionally causing serious injury without lawful excuse, at a maximum of twenty years13.

How it works in practice

The fault element is where students lose marks, because at the grievous-harm rung two of these three jurisdictions do not ask what the accused foresaw about the harm actually caused. That is a statement about those offences only — the top rung asks about intent everywhere, and Queensland’s s 23(1)(b) itself turns in part on what the accused foresaw.

In New South Wales the gap is deliberate and on the face of s 353: recklessness as to actual bodily harm supports a conviction for causing grievous bodily harm. A student who writes that the Crown must prove the accused foresaw grievous bodily harm has made the section harder to satisfy than Parliament wrote it.

In Queensland the gap is structural. Sections 320 and 323 state no fault element, so it is supplied negatively by s 23(1): a person is not criminally responsible for an act occurring independently of the exercise of their will, or for an event they did not intend or foresee as a possible consequence and which an ordinary person would not reasonably foresee as a possible consequence.11 Because both limbs must hold before the excuse operates, the excuse is DEFEATED where an ordinary person would reasonably have foreseen the event as a possible consequence, whether or not the accused did. Defeating an excuse is not the same as proving guilt: the offence’s remaining elements still have to be established. Section 23(1A) narrows that excuse alone — not the involuntariness excuse in s 23(1)(a) — by providing that a victim’s “defect, weakness, or abnormality” does not excuse resulting death or grievous bodily harm11. The section is also expressly subject to the Code’s provisions about negligent acts and omissions.

Victoria is the outlier in the student’s favour: ss 16 to 18 direct intention or recklessness at the very injury the section names.

Where the boundaries are

The harm thresholds are not interchangeable, and a borrowed definition is the commonest error. New South Wales s 4 says grievous bodily harm “includes”5 the destruction of the foetus of a pregnant woman — other than in the course of a medical procedure or a termination in accordance with the Abortion Law Reform Act 2019 — “any permanent or serious disfiguring of the person” and any grievous bodily disease — an inclusive definition, so the common law meaning survives alongside the three listed matters. Queensland s 1 says grievous bodily harm “means”10 the loss of a distinct part or an organ, serious disfigurement, or bodily injury of such a nature that if left untreated “would endanger or be likely to endanger life, or cause or be likely to cause permanent injury to health”, whether or not treatment was available — exhaustive. Victoria uses neither term: s 15 defines injury12 as physical injury or harm to mental health, whether temporary or permanent, and serious injury as either an injury “including the cumulative effect of more than one injury” that endangers life or is substantial and protracted, or, on a separate limb, the destruction of the foetus of a pregnant woman other than in the course of a medical procedure as that term is narrowly defined. Only Victoria expressly aggregates separate injuries to reach the threshold.

Applying this in a problem question

  1. Name the jurisdiction and the Act before naming an offence. The rungs look alike; the section numbers, the harm definitions and the fault elements do not.
  2. Fix the harm against that jurisdiction’s own definition, and say whether the definition is inclusive or exhaustive before arguing the margins.
  3. Identify the rung the harm supports, then ask separately what the statute requires the accused to have foreseen — not what the facts suggest they did foresee.
  4. Where the section states no fault element, say so and work through the jurisdiction’s general provision rather than importing one from elsewhere.
  5. Check for an alternative verdict and for aggravated forms, such as commission in company, before settling on a single charge.

Self-check

  • Have I named the Act and the jurisdiction, rather than a bare section number?
  • Have I measured the harm against the definition in that jurisdiction’s own Act?
  • Have I stated what the statute requires the accused to have foreseen, and noticed where that is pitched below the harm charged or absent altogether?
  • Have I avoided treating actual bodily harm, bodily harm and injury as the same threshold?

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