Aubrey v The Queen
Aubrey v The Queen [2017] HCA 18
A man who knew he was HIV positive had unprotected sex without telling his partner. Did he inflict grievous bodily harm, and how much did he have to foresee to act maliciously?
Clarified by legislation: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), from 15 February 2008
The definition of grievous bodily harm in s 4(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) was amended with effect from 15 February 2008 to include any grievous bodily disease, and a reference to the infliction of grievous bodily harm now includes a reference to causing a person to contract a grievous bodily disease (joint reasons at [9]). For conduct after that date the question Aubrey answered by construction is answered by the definition, and the argument starts there. Aubrey remains the High Court’s reasoning on the unamended text and on why Clarence is no longer followed.
Qualified by legislation: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), from 21 June 2012
The offence in s 35 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) no longer depends on the malice that Aubrey construed. The definition of maliciously in s 5 was repealed with effect from 15 February 2008, and from 21 June 2012 each offence in s 35 requires that the accused cause grievous bodily harm, or wound a person, and be reckless as to causing actual bodily harm to that or any other person. For conduct on or after 21 June 2012 the fault element is the one the section states. From 27 September 2007, when s 35 first spoke of recklessness in place of malice, until 21 June 2012 the section was worded differently again, so the version in force when the conduct occurred is the one to apply. Aubrey’s reasoning on foresight of possibility concerns the section as it stood in 2004.
What happened?
Michael Aubrey had unprotected sex with the complainant in NSW, knowing he was HIV positive. The complainant contracted HIV. He was charged under s 36 and, alternatively, s 35(1)(b) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). A jury acquitted him on count one, convicted him on count two. The Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed his appeal.
What did the Court decide?
The appeal was dismissed. Five Justices sat. Kiefel CJ, Keane, Nettle and Edelman JJ wrote joint reasons ([1]-[52]) and Bell J wrote separately ([53]-[74]). The joint reasons answered both questions on the appeal in the affirmative ([7]). Bell J would have allowed the appeal on the first question and entered an acquittal ([53], [74]).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
The majority (Kiefel CJ, Keane, Nettle and Edelman JJ) held that “infliction” of grievous bodily harm under s 35(1)(b) does not need direct force or immediate injury. They overruled R v Clarence on this point. Reckless transmission of a disease during consensual intercourse, without disclosing the risk, could count as infliction. Bell J dissented, saying Clarence was settled law and any change should come from the legislature.
On recklessness under s 5, the joint reasons said foresight of possible harm suffices, following R v Coleman. This differs from murder, which needs foresight of probable death or harm. Where an act has social utility, a jury may require more than bare possibility. Bell J agreed, though she thought the point didn’t arise.
The Court applied the 2004 version of the Act; the law has since been amended twice.
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Kiefel CJ, Keane, Nettle and Edelman JJ
Read judgment: [26]–[28] (PDF p 17) (opens in a new tab), [40] (PDF p 23) (opens in a new tab)
This construction of the pre-amendment s 35 was necessary to reject the first ground of appeal: transmission of HIV could constitute infliction despite the absence of force or immediately apparent symptoms. The joint reasons adopt the broader construction and decline to follow Clarence, allowing the conviction to stand on that ground.
Separate reasoning · Bell J
Read judgment: [73]–[74] (PDF p 37) (opens in a new tab)
Bell J dissented in the result. She treated Clarence as a longstanding, plausible construction of s 35 and relied on certainty in the criminal law to decline to depart from it. That route led her to allow the appeal and order an acquittal; it is not the majority’s ground of decision.
Proposition 2
Ratio · Kiefel CJ, Keane, Nettle and Edelman JJ
Read judgment: [47] (PDF p 27) (opens in a new tab), [50]–[51] (PDF p 28) (opens in a new tab)
To reject the second ground of appeal, the joint reasons upheld foresight of possibility rather than probability under the former ss 5 and 35. Their approval of Coleman and distinction of the murder standard explain that conclusion. Paragraph 51 applies it to the appellant’s admitted awareness of a real possibility of infection, so the jury had not proceeded on a bare possibility alone.
Obiter · Kiefel CJ, Keane, Nettle and Edelman JJ
Read judgment: [49]–[50] (PDF p 27) (opens in a new tab), [51] (PDF p 29) (opens in a new tab)
The discussion of socially useful activities and possible future directions goes beyond what was needed to dismiss this appeal. The joint reasons expressly contemplated a future case requiring a direction; paragraph 51 explains why this case raised no such issue. These observations qualify how students use the possibility standard, but do not establish that a social-utility direction was required here.
Separate reasoning · Bell J
Read judgment: [53] (PDF p 30) (opens in a new tab)
Bell J agreed with the joint reasons on recklessness but dissented in the result on infliction. She expressly said the recklessness issue was not reached on her approach. Her agreement therefore supplies no necessary ground for her proposed acquittal and should not be presented as a fifth judge deciding that issue as part of the disposition.
Why does this case matter?
The case answers two questions that students often run together: what the word “inflicts” covers, and how much foresight makes an act malicious. Keep them apart in an answer, because the Justices did not divide in the same way on each.
Exam and application relevance
Check the date and jurisdiction. Aubrey concerns the Act as at 2004. For later conduct, use ss 4 and 35 then in force: grievous bodily harm was redefined on 15 February 2008; s 35 was reframed on 21 June 2012.
For recklessness, identify the State. Compare the High Court decision on Victoria’s s 17.
On social utility, read [49]-[51].
Check your understanding
Which Justices rejected a direct-force requirement, and what did Bell J want done?
Why does murder need higher foresight than s 35?
What concession shaped directions on social utility?