Neill-Fraser v Tasmania
Neill-Fraser v Tasmania [2021] TASCCA 12
A murder conviction survived its first appeal in 2012. A 2015 Tasmanian law then opened a second appeal on new evidence. What must that evidence show, and what else must the appellant prove?
What happened?
On 27 October 2010 a jury convicted Susan Neill-Fraser of murdering her partner, Robert Chappell, on or about 26 January 2009 ([1]). The Crown case was entirely circumstantial ([2]). The defence case was that a reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence was open, namely that another person or persons were responsible ([37]). The defence relied heavily on two things: the finding of a third person’s DNA on the deck of the yacht, and the sighting of a grey dinghy tied to the yacht that was said to be inconsistent with the yacht’s own dinghy ([38]).
At the trial the Crown’s forensic scientist was asked how a person’s DNA could be on a surface where the person had not been. The defence objected that the question was not the subject of any proof; the trial judge allowed it and said that time could be asked for to prepare cross-examination ([114]). The scientist said that transfer, for example on the bottom of someone’s shoe, was a possibility, but that he could not say how likely it was ([116]-[120]).
The first appeal against the conviction was dismissed in 2012 and special leave to appeal to the High Court was refused ([467]). Tasmania introduced a statutory route to a second or subsequent appeal on fresh and compelling evidence in 2015 ([468]). On 21 March 2019 Brett J granted leave under s 402A(5), resolving the application on out-of-court statements by the person whose DNA had been found ([43], [48]). At the hearing of the appeal those statements were abandoned: the witness recanted in cross-examination and the appellant withdrew reliance on her evidence ([49], [53]). The appeal went ahead on the evidence of a forensic scientist, Mr Maxwell Jones, about how rarely DNA is transferred by someone stepping in a biological substance and carrying it on the sole of a shoe, and the circumstances that would be required ([39], [56]).
What did the Court decide?
The Court of Criminal Appeal (Wood, Estcourt and Pearce JJ) dismissed the appeal on 30 November 2021 by majority ([319], [544]). Wood J and Pearce J formed the majority. Estcourt J dissented: he would have upheld the appeal, quashed the conviction and ordered a retrial ([465]-[466]).
The reasons are in three parts: Wood J ([1]-[319]), Estcourt J ([320]-[466]) and Pearce J ([467]-[544]).
Afterwards the High Court refused special leave to appeal. Gageler J said for the Court that the principles are those established in its decisions, the most recent being Van Beelen, and that the Court was not persuaded there was sufficient prospect that the majority had erred in applying them ([2022] HCATrans 128).
Proposition
What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis
Principle analysis
Section 402A(6) of the Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) allows the Court to uphold a second or subsequent appeal only if satisfied that there is “fresh and compelling evidence” and that, after taking it into account, there has been a “substantial miscarriage of justice” ([57]); Wood J described freshness as one of three essential requirements for upholding an appeal ([76]). Evidence is fresh if it was not adduced at trial and could not, “even with the exercise of reasonable diligence”, have been adduced then ([59]). It is compelling if it is reliable, substantial and, “in the context of the issues in dispute at the trial of the convicted person, it is highly probative of the case for the convicted person” ([60]).
Wood J held that the Tasmanian test substantially replicates South Australian legislation, so that the South Australian decisions in Keogh (No 2) and Drummond (No 2), and the High Court’s decision in Van Beelen, guide its meaning ([61]-[69]). Pearce J accepted that approach ([516]), and Estcourt J applied the same sections and the same test for miscarriage ([427], [435], [442], [446]).
Wood J set out the meanings: reliable means “credible and provide a trustworthy basis for fact finding”; substantial means “of real significance or importance with respect to the matter it is tendered to prove”; evidence is highly probative if it has “a real or material bearing on the determination of a fact in issue which, in turn, may rationally affect the ultimate result in a case” ([88]-[90]). The appellant carries the onus, “on the balance of probability” ([99]).
On freshness, Wood J, adopting Keogh (No 2), described the reasonable diligence requirement as an objective assessment of what the appellant could reasonably be expected to have done in all the circumstances leading up to and including the trial ([71]). Latitude may be given to an accused in judging what was reasonably available, but there can be no latitude for evidence that is not strictly fresh ([75]-[76]).
Wood J accepted that the primary reports of the scientists, including the electropherogram, were not disclosed before the trial and that the Crown gave no advance notice of its scientist’s opinion on secondary transfer ([198], [231]). But the primary sources were readily available on request, the third person’s DNA was crucial to the defence case, the trial judge offered time to prepare cross-examination, and Mr Jones’s evidence could have been obtained during the trial; “even allowing great latitude”, it could have been adduced at trial if reasonable diligence had been exercised ([229]-[232]).
Pearce J reached the same conclusion: the defence had notice of the scientific results well before the trial, the trial judge offered time, and no adjournment application was made ([523], [527]-[528]).
Estcourt J held the evidence fresh: the Crown scientist’s opinion had not been disclosed before it was given, and, extending great latitude, on an objective assessment the evidence could not with reasonable diligence have been adduced by the defence ([432]-[435]).
On the second limb, Wood J accepted that Mr Jones was a reliable witness ([234]) but held his evidence neither substantial nor highly probative. Part of it, that the DNA was likely deposited one to two days before the swab was collected, undermined the defence hypothesis ([267], [272]). The evidence left open that the DNA was deposited directly, or transferred, when the yacht was at other places after the event ([268]-[269]), and it could not show that presence on the yacht was a more likely explanation than secondary transfer, which was beyond his expertise, and even if the jury had regarded presence as more likely, that would not necessarily point to a time close to the murder ([271]). The evidence is to be taken as a whole, because “The defence cannot cherry pick only the favourable parts of his evidence” ([267]).
For substantial miscarriage, Wood J applied the test from Mickelberg as endorsed in Van Beelen: whether there is a “significant possibility” that the jury, acting reasonably, would have acquitted had the fresh evidence been before it ([93]), looking backwards to the trial and considering the evidence in the context of the evidence at trial ([94], [98]).
Wood J noted that a different test applies where a substantial miscarriage is said to arise from a material error or serious irregularity in the trial process, but the appellant did not suggest that here ([95]-[97]).
Taking Mr Jones’s evidence into account despite her conclusion that it was not fresh and compelling, she held that no significant possibility was shown ([273], [313]-[319]). She also held that the jury did not need to decide whether the DNA was directly deposited or transferred in order to convict, because neither mechanism was inconsistent with guilt ([318]).
Pearce J held that the evidence had not been shown to be highly probative of the appellant’s case ([541]) and agreed that there was no significant possibility the jury would have acquitted ([543]).
Estcourt J held the evidence reliable and substantial because it was contrary to the way the Crown put the DNA to the jury, held it highly probative of the defence case ([443]-[444]), found a significant possibility of an acquittal ([463]) and, adopting the approach in Keogh (No 2), would have ordered a retrial ([465]-[466]).
Ratio and obiter
Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.
Proposition 1
Ratio · Wood J, with Pearce J accepting the same approach at [516]
Read judgment: [57]–[60] (PDF p 11) (opens in a new tab), [61]–[69] (PDF p 12) (opens in a new tab), [76] (PDF p 15) (opens in a new tab), [86]–[90] (PDF p 16) (opens in a new tab), [93]–[99] (PDF p 18) (opens in a new tab)
These paragraphs set out the statutory test, the South Australian model and the meaning given to fresh, compelling and substantial miscarriage, and the Court applied them to reach its result. Pearce J accepted the same approach ([514]-[516]) and reached the same conclusions on each limb in his own reasons ([528], [541], [543]-[544]).
Proposition 2
Ratio · Wood J, with Pearce J agreeing in his own reasons
Read judgment: [71]–[76] (PDF p 14) (opens in a new tab), [196]–[198] (PDF p 39) (opens in a new tab), [228]–[233] (PDF p 45) (opens in a new tab), [518]–[528] (PDF p 109) (opens in a new tab)
The majority held that the evidence was not fresh, and Wood J and Pearce J each gave their reasons ([233], [528]).
Separate reasoning · Estcourt J (dissenting)
Read judgment: [427]–[435] (PDF p 80) (opens in a new tab)
Estcourt J would have held the evidence fresh; his reasons are a dissent and not the Court’s holding.
Proposition 3
Ratio · Wood J, with Pearce J reaching the same conclusions in his own reasons
Read judgment: [93]–[98] (PDF p 18) (opens in a new tab), [234]–[272] (PDF p 46) (opens in a new tab), [273]–[275] (PDF p 53) (opens in a new tab), [313]–[319] (PDF p 59) (opens in a new tab), [539]–[544] (PDF p 114) (opens in a new tab)
The majority held that the evidence was not compelling and that no substantial miscarriage was shown ([319], [541], [543]-[544]).
Separate reasoning · Estcourt J (dissenting)
Read judgment: [442]–[444] (PDF p 83) (opens in a new tab), [463]–[466] (PDF p 96) (opens in a new tab)
Estcourt J would have held the evidence compelling and a significant possibility of an acquittal shown, and would have ordered a retrial; his reasons are a dissent and not the Court’s holding.
Why does this case matter?
A common mistake is to treat a second appeal on new evidence as a first appeal with a better expert: if a different opinion would have helped the defence, the conviction must be unsafe. This case is useful because the appeal failed although the expert’s qualifications and credibility were not in question ([234]).
Exam and application relevance
In a problem under s 402A, the judges here dealt with freshness, compelling quality and substantial miscarriage as separate questions ([233], [234]-[272], [273]-[318]; [435], [444], [463]), so an answer can do the same and cite the judge whose reasons it follows.
Cite Wood J and Pearce J for the majority’s treatment of the expert evidence on these facts, and Estcourt J for the contrary view; the three judges divided on each of the three questions ([319], [528], [541], [543]; [435], [444], [463]).
Wood J observed that leave to appeal is a separate step with its own test and that leave may be granted on evidence that is not pursued at the hearing of the appeal ([42], [63], [50]).
Check your understanding
1. What must the Court be satisfied of before it may uphold a second appeal under s 402A(6), and what does s 402A(10) require for evidence to be fresh and for it to be compelling? ([57]-[60])
2. On what basis did Wood J and Pearce J hold that Mr Jones’s evidence was not fresh, and why did Estcourt J reach the opposite conclusion? ([229]-[233], [526]-[528], [432]-[435])
3. What test did the judges apply to decide whether there had been a substantial miscarriage of justice, and how does it direct the Court to look at the trial? ([93]-[94], [98], [427], [446], [516])
4. Why did Wood J regard part of Mr Jones’s own evidence as unhelpful to the defence? ([267], [272])
5. What did Estcourt J say should follow had his view prevailed? ([465]-[466])