Sentencing limits: proportionality, consistency and double punishment
Three limits on the sentencing discretion drawn from High Court decisions: proportionality (Veen No 2), consistency in the application of principle (Hili) and the rule against punishing common elements twice (Pearce, as qualified by s 53A of the NSW Act).
Learning outcomes
- Distinguish extending a sentence for preventive detention from weighing protection of society within a proportionate sentence, using Veen (No 2).
- Explain why a range, norm or percentage cannot fix a sentence, and confine Hili to federal offenders.
- Apply the rule against punishing common elements twice, and say how s 53A of the New South Wales Act changes the form of the orders.
The purposes of sentencing and the method of instinctive synthesis are set out in Sentencing foundations. This article asks a narrower question that a problem question often turns on: what limits stop a sentencing judge from reaching a number by a route the High Court has rejected? Three limits are taken from three decisions: proportionality in Veen v The Queen (No 2), consistency in Hili v The Queen, and the rule against punishing twice for common elements in Pearce v The Queen. Each was decided on a particular body of law, and the article says which. It states Commonwealth sentencing law as applied in New South Wales and New South Wales common law and statute; it does not state the sentencing legislation of other jurisdictions.
Proportionality: a ceiling, not a softener
In Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465, the offender had been convicted of manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility after a savage killing, and had a history of violence that the sentencing judge found made him a continuing danger. He was sentenced to life imprisonment in New South Wales. By four Justices to three, the High Court dismissed his appeal1.
The joint reasons of Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ said that the principle of proportionality is firmly established: a sentence should not be increased beyond what is proportionate to the crime merely to extend the period of protection of society from the risk of recidivism. They then drew the distinction on which the case turns. Extending a sentence merely by way of preventive detention is impermissible; having regard to the protection of society among other factors in fixing a proportionate sentence is permissible. They acknowledged that observing the line takes experience and discernment. The purposes of punishment, they added, overlap, none can be considered in isolation, and they are guideposts that sometimes point in different directions.
Two subsidiary principles in the same reasons are often needed. An offender’s criminal history may be taken into account, but not so as to produce a penalty disproportionate to the gravity of the present offence, which would be a fresh penalty for past offences; it is relevant to whether the offence was an aberration and to moral culpability, dangerous propensity and the need for deterrence. And the maximum penalty is intended for cases so grave as to warrant it, which does not mean a lesser penalty is required whenever a worse case can be imagined. The High Court has since said that sentencing judges should avoid the expression “worst category” and state in full whether the offence is so grave as to warrant the maximum penalty, because the shorthand is confusing and can mislead lay people5. Wilson, Deane and Gaudron JJ would have allowed the appeal, so the application of the principle to Mr Veen was contested, even though the principle was not.
Consistency: principles, not numbers
Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 45 concerned federal tax offenders sentenced in New South Wales. The New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal had said that the “norm” for the period to be served before release on a recognizance release order was 60 to 66 per cent of the head sentence. The High Court, in joint reasons of French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ with Heydon J agreeing in the orders, held that there neither is nor should be a judicially determined norm or starting point of that kind, and dismissed the applicants’ appeals2.
The reasons are about what consistency means. The consistency sought is consistency in the application of the relevant legal principles, not numerical equivalence; the first and paramount means of achieving it in federal sentencing is to apply the statutory provisions, which for federal offenders are in Pt IB of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), where s 16A(1) requires a sentence of a severity appropriate in all the circumstances of the offence. Past sentences must be used with care. A history of sentences shows a range actually imposed but does not establish that it is the correct range or fix the boundaries within which future judges must sentence; statistics help only if accompanied by the unifying principles that explain them. Manifest inadequacy, the Court added, is a conclusion reached by considering all the matters relevant to the sentence, not an intuition.
Part IB is not an exhaustive statement of the law of federal sentencing: s 68(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) picks up some State sentencing provisions for federal offenders, although not those that fix non-parole periods. Hili is a decision about federal offenders. Whether and how its reasoning applies to a sentence under a State statute is not something it decides.
Double punishment and totality
In Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610 the offender was convicted of two New South Wales offences arising from one episode of violence, each of which had the infliction of grievous bodily harm as an element. In the joint reasons of McHugh, Hayne and Callinan JJ, to the extent that two offences contain common elements it would be wrong to punish the offender twice for those elements, subject to contrary legislative intention; and a sentencing judge must fix an appropriate sentence for each offence and then consider cumulation or concurrence and totality, rather than look only at the total effective sentence3. Gummow J and Kirby J gave separate reasons. The full treatment of the double-punishment rule is in Double jeopardy.
The method in Pearce has since been qualified by statute. In The King v McGregor [2026] HCA 3, which concerned Commonwealth offences sentenced in New South Wales, Gageler CJ, Gleeson and Beech-Jones JJ said that absent s 53A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), judges in New South Wales would have to sentence for multiple offences in accordance with Pearce; that s 53A was introduced to ameliorate the difficulties of doing so; and that aggregate sentences do not relieve a judge from considering the individual offences, the offender and the totality of the criminality4. The rule against punishing twice remains; what the statute alters is the form of the orders.
Applying this in a problem question
- Identify whether the offender is sentenced for a State or a Commonwealth offence, and state the statute that governs. For a Commonwealth offender sentenced in a State court, say whether a State provision applies through s 68(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), as was in issue in McGregor, rather than assuming either body of law applies of its own force.
- Test any argument for a longer sentence against proportionality: is the reason the gravity of this offence and the offender’s culpability, or the protection of the community alone? The second may be weighed but may not extend the sentence beyond what is proportionate.
- Where a party relies on a table, range or percentage, ask what principles it expresses and whether it is being used as a norm. Hili says it cannot be.
- Where several offences share elements, ask whether the same criminality is being punished twice, then whether the jurisdiction’s statute lets the court impose an aggregate sentence.
- Return to the single synthesis. These limits shape the exercise of the discretion; they do not replace it.
Self-check
- Have I said that Veen (No 2) was four Justices to three, and that the principle was common ground?
- Have I confined Hili to federal offenders and to Pt IB?
- Have I said that the Pearce reasons are those of three Justices, and that s 53A alters the form of the orders without removing the rule against double punishment?
- Have I separated what the High Court held from my own grouping of three limits?