The King v McGregor

High Court of Australia · 2026

Criminal Law And ProcedureSentencing Foundations

The King v McGregor [2026] HCA 3

Can a New South Wales judge impose one aggregate sentence for several Commonwealth offences, even when one carries a mandatory minimum, and what must the judge still do?

What happened?

Andrew McGregor pleaded guilty in the District Court of New South Wales to four offences against the Criminal Code (Cth), all relating to child sexual abuse. One of them, persistent sexual abuse of a child outside Australia, attracted a mandatory minimum term of seven years’ imprisonment under s 16AAA of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ([1], [4]). The District Court imposed an aggregate sentence of 11 years and six months with a non-parole period of eight years under s 53A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), and indicated the sentence it would have imposed for each offence had separate sentences been imposed ([5]).

The Court of Criminal Appeal granted leave to appeal after the Crown conceded an error in the way the sentencing judge applied a statutory discount, and resentenced him to an aggregate term of 10 years and nine months with a non-parole period of seven years and six months ([6]-[9]). The Crown appealed to the High Court on two contentions: that courts in New South Wales cannot impose aggregate sentences for multiple Commonwealth offences at all, and, narrowly, that they cannot do so where one of the offences attracts a mandatory minimum under s 16AAA ([2]).

What did the Court decide?

The appeal was dismissed, with costs to the respondent. Seven Justices sat. Gageler CJ, Gleeson and Beech-Jones JJ gave joint reasons ([1]-[59]); Gordon and Steward JJ gave joint reasons ([60]-[105]); Edelman J ([106]-[145]) and Jagot J ([146]-[224]) each gave separate reasons. Jagot J would have allowed the appeal on the mandatory minimum ground ([224]).

Proposition

What is the principle?Includes ratio and obiter analysis

Principle analysis

Six Justices held that a New South Wales court sentencing for multiple offences against a law of the Commonwealth may impose an aggregate sentence under s 53A of the Sentencing Procedure Act, which s 68(1) of the Judiciary Act is capable of picking up and applying, including where one of the offences attracts a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment under s 16AAA of the Crimes Act.

Gageler CJ, Gleeson and Beech-Jones JJ held that the parenthetical words in s 53A(2)(b) have limited effect, that there is no inconsistency between s 53A and Pt IB of the Crimes Act, and that no translation of s 53A was required ([46]-[48]). On the narrower contention they held that s 16AAA implicitly requires a sentence for the listed offence, that an indicative sentence is not an operative sentence, and that provided the aggregate sentence is imposed for the listed offence and meets s 16AAA’s requirements it is not inconsistent with s 16AAA that it is also imposed for other offences ([51]). The potential application of State and Territory aggregate sentencing regimes to Commonwealth offences has been established at least since Putland in 2004 ([54]). They left open whether other provisions of the Sentencing Procedure Act, including those about non-parole periods for an aggregate sentence, can be picked up ([47]).

Gordon and Steward JJ found no inconsistency and said that s 53A is capable of being picked up and applied, with a permissible degree of translation, to federal offences ([63]). Edelman J agreed that the Court of Criminal Appeal was right to reject both of the Crown’s submissions ([109]). Jagot J held that the wider contention failed because Putland could not be distinguished ([150]), but that s 53A is applicable to a person convicted of a s 16AAA offence only to the extent that the aggregate sentence includes at least the minimum period s 16AAA requires and can be seen to do so ([151]).

On what an aggregate sentence still requires: Gageler CJ, Gleeson and Beech-Jones JJ said that without s 53A New South Wales judges would sentence for multiple offences in accordance with the approach in Pearce v The Queen, fixing an appropriate sentence for each offence and then considering cumulation or concurrence and totality. They said that s 53A was introduced to ameliorate the perceived difficulties of applying Pearce, and that aggregate sentences do not alleviate sentencing judges from considering the individual offences, the individual offender and his or her circumstances, and the totality of criminality involved as part of the process of instinctive synthesis ([43]).

Ratio and obiter

Ratio is reasoning necessary to the decision; obiter is an observation not necessary to it. Read each passage in context. The links open the judgment in a new tab; use the cited paragraph or report page.

Proposition 1

Ratio · Gageler CJ, Gleeson and Beech-Jones JJ

Read judgment: [46] (PDF p 19) (opens in a new tab), [51] (PDF p 21) (opens in a new tab)

These conclusions answer the two grounds of appeal in these joint reasons: the parenthetical words in s 53A(2)(b) do not create the alleged inconsistency with Pt IB, and s 16AAA does not require a separate sentence solely for the listed offence. An aggregate sentence imposed for that offence and satisfying the mandatory minimum requirements can also punish other offences. Both conclusions were necessary to these Justices’ rejection of the Crown’s grounds. Their view that no translation was required should not be attributed to Gordon and Steward JJ, who took a different route to dismissal.

Separate reasoning · Jagot J

Read judgment: [151] (PDF p 54) (opens in a new tab), [223]–[224] (PDF p 78) (opens in a new tab)

Jagot J dissented on the mandatory minimum ground. She required the aggregate sentence to include, and be seen to include, the minimum imprisonment for the specified offence. Because the indicative sentences for the other offences could account for the whole aggregate term here, she considered compliance unshown and would have allowed that ground and remitted for re-sentencing. This is her contrary route, rather than the reasoning supporting dismissal of the appeal.

Proposition 2

Ratio · Gageler CJ, Gleeson and Beech-Jones JJ

Read judgment: [36] (PDF p 16) (opens in a new tab), [43] (PDF p 18) (opens in a new tab), [46] (PDF p 19) (opens in a new tab), [51] (PDF p 21) (opens in a new tab)

The continuing assessment of each offence, the offender and total criminality explains why aggregate sentencing changes the form of the sentence without displacing the substantive sentencing exercise. That explanation underpins these Justices’ rejection of the alleged inconsistency with Pt IB. Their distinction between indicative and operative sentences also underpins the answer to the mandatory minimum ground. The Pearce formulation is expressly drawn from Pearce and the account of s 53A’s introduction from Pearson; the reasoning identified here is their use of those authorities to construe and apply s 53A in this appeal, rather than a new holding on Pearce itself.

Why does this case matter?

Use McGregor when a sentencing problem combines State sentencing procedure with Commonwealth offences. The earlier authority on State aggregate sentencing in federal cases, Putland, had concerned the Northern Territory’s provision ([29]).

Exam and application relevance

State the jurisdiction. The decision concerns a New South Wales court exercising federal jurisdiction and s 53A of the New South Wales Act. The joint reasons recorded that aggregate sentencing is not available in the Australian Capital Territory, Queensland or Western Australia, and that the regimes of the other States and the Northern Territory vary ([53], footnote 88), so for another place identify its own provision before relying on McGregor.

Name the Justices whose reasons you rely on.

When a problem involves a mandatory minimum, ask what the aggregate sentence shows about the sentence for the listed offence, using the joint reasons at [51] and Jagot J’s contrary view at [151].

Check your understanding

1. What were the Crown’s wider and narrower contentions, and how did the joint reasons of Gageler CJ, Gleeson and Beech-Jones JJ answer each?

2. According to the joint reasons, what must a sentencing judge still consider when imposing an aggregate sentence?

3. How did Jagot J’s conclusion on the mandatory minimum differ from that of the other Justices, and what order would she have made?